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International workshop on 
Modelling of Physical, Economic 
and Social Systems for Resilience 
Assessment 
The Joint Research Centre of the European Commission in close collaboration 
with NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology, US Department of 
Commerce) and Colorado State University organised the 2nd International 
Workshop on Modelling of Physical, Economic and Social Systems 
for Resilience Assessment on 14-16 of December 2017. 
It followed the 1st International Workshop on Modelling of Physical, 
Economic and Social Systems for Resilience Assessment which took place in 
Washington, DC on 19-21 of October 2016, and was organised by NIST and 
Colorado State University.
Interest in resilience has been rising rapidly during the last twenty years, both 
among the policy makers and academia, as a response to increasing concern 
about the potential effect of shocks to individuals, civil infrastructure, regions, 
countries and social, economic and political institutions. The objective of the 
workshop was to bring together the scientific community and policy makers 
towards developing better policies and practices incorporating the element of 
resilience in various fields. 
The JRC therefore is building on previous experience acquired during the JRC 
and the European Political Strategy Centre (EPSC) annual conference "Building 
a Resilient Europe in a Globalised World" which took place in September 2015. 
This workshop was aimed at identifying strategic needs and providing an 
outlook of future policy making actions.  
This 2nd International Workshop in 2017 aimed at building on the experience 
gained from these previous events focusing both on the high-level strategic 
needs and on the current scientific advances on modelling of physical, economic 
and social systems. The primary goal was to explore how these are linked in 
order to support resilience assessment in various dimensions aiming to: 
• Bring together the most up-to-date knowledge in the field of resilience 
across different disciplines.
• Establish the dialogue between policy and research with a two-fold scope: 
to provide scientific advice and support for policies that incorporate the 
element of resilience, and to provide guidance to the scientific community 
on the knowledge and tools needed to support current and future policies.  
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• Contribute towards establishing a coherent resilience assessment 
framework for communities and societies.
• Identify the constituents for measuring the resilience at various scales 
(local, regional, national, international) towards establishing the necessary 
indicators.
• Establish a long-standing partnership among the key actors in the area 
of resilience at global level that will support the continuous development 
of models that fit into the assessment framework and consequently the 
respective training curricula. 
The following dimensions were covered:
• Resilience of technological systems (e.g. electricity, gas, water, transport) 
that provide essential services to citizens during normal conditions as well 
as during crises.
• Resilience of the built environment, thus civil engineering structures that 
need to guarantee a certain level of functionality both in terms of safety as 
well as in terms of business continuity and socioeconomic services that are 
supported by these buildings.
• Resilience of communities and societies to cascading effects that propagate 
across infrastructures and networks of infrastructures.
• Economic and societal resilience of modern societies and communities 
during shocks but also to longer term adaptations. 
• Resilience of individuals, depending on social and economic contexts, as 
well as inter-dependency relationships between individuals and the rest of 
the society (being communities or national institutions) with respect to risk 
assessment, risk mitigation and post-crisis recovery.
• Resilience to changes brought about by population growth, utilization 
requirements, and environmental conditions.
The Organizing Committee thanks all contributors for submitted research 
papers, which feed into future work on resilience modelling. 
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JRC 2nd International workshop 
on Modelling of Physical, 
Economic and Social Systems  
for Resilience Assessment
Introduction
JRC Directorate E – Space, Security and Migration has organized the 2nd international 
workshop on Modelling of Physical, Economic and Social Systems for Resilience Assessment 
in Ispra that will consist in more than ten sessions for three days of full immersion into this 
topic. Interest in resilience has been rising rapidly during the last twenty years, both among 
policy makers and academia, as a response to increasing concern about the potential 
effect of shocks to individuals, civil infrastructure, regions, countries and social, economic 
and political institutions. The objective of the workshop is to bring together the scientific 
community and policy makers towards developing better policies and practices incorporating 
the element of resilience in various fields. 
This workshop has been organized in close collaboration with NIST and Colorado State 
University who organized in Washington on 19-21 October 2016 the 1st International 
workshop on the same subject. This is a follow-up of several similar events in this field. 
The JRC already organized a higher level event, the JRC-EPSC annual conference “Building 
a Resilient Europe in a Globalised World” in September 2015. These workshops aimed at 
identifying more strategic needs and provide an outlook of future actions. In addition, the 
JRC organized the first plenary session during the IDRC Davos 2016 conference entitled 
“Implementing resilience in a world of interconnectedness and emerging challenges” in which 
the JRC, NIST, Rotterdam city, the Dutch authorities and researchers from Japan presented 
their views and best practices on resilience implementation. Such an event constitutes an 
excellent opportunity for positioning JRC among the top institutions in resilience modelling 
with the capability to influence and steer the work of this community in close collaboration 
with recognized institutions around the globe. 
Summary
Resilience – understood as the capacity to withstand, adapt and recover from crises and 
shocks – emerged as a concept bridging different policy areas: economy, environment, 
crisis management, geopolitics, financial services, digital, food, health and many others. An 
important role of science in the process of building a stable, competitive and prosperous 
World has been confirmed.
The workshop will aim at covering the following topics:
• Resilience of technological systems (e.g. electricity, gas, water, transport) that provide 
essential services to citizens during normal conditions as well as during crises.
• Resilience of built environment, thus civil engineering structures that need to guarantee 
a certain level of functionality both in terms of safety as well as in terms of business 
continuity and socioeconomic services that are supported by these buildings. 
• Resilience of communities and societies to cascading effects that propagate across 
infrastructures and networks of infrastructures.
| 8
• Resilience of economic systems and more generally economic resilience of modern 
societies and communities during shocks but also to longer term adaptations.
• Resilience of individuals, depending on social and economic contexts, as well as inter-
dependency relationships between individuals and the rest of the society (being 
communities or national institutions) with respect to risk assessment, risk mitigation and 
post-crisis recovery.
• Resilience to changes brought about by population growth, utilisation requirements, 
environmental conditions and climate change
Objectives 
a.  Bring together the most up-to-date knowledge in the field of resilience across different 
disciplines.
b.  Establish the dialogue between policy and research with a two-fold scope: to provide 
scientific advice and support for policies that incorporate the element of resilience, and 
to provide guidance to the scientific community on the knowledge and tools needed to 
support current and future policies.  
c.  Contribute towards establishing a coherent resilience assessment framework for 
communities and societies.
d.  Identify the constituents for measuring the resilience at various scales (local, regional, 
national, international) towards establishing the necessary indicators.
e.  Establish a long-standing partnership among the key actors in the area of resilience at 
global level that will support the continuous development of models that fit into the 
assessment framework and consequently the respective training curricula.
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The building blocks of resilience 
Some contributions to support the development  
of training curricula.
Tabajara Dias de Andrade, MD, PhD1
1 CLADE- Latin American Development Center
Abstract
We believe in a better world and in the responsibility of every person in making it possible.
In this paper we present the fundamentals of our practice in programs of emotional 
competence development, focusing on “the human side of resilience” and on the three skill 
groups that form resilience: personal, relational, and executive skills.
We based our work on the triple convergence promoted by advances in 
technological sciences, neurosciences, and training and learning development 
sciences.
These resources allow us to train the “behavioral algorithms” that will improve 
participants’ resilience.
Some practices used are artistic activities, games, mentalization, storytelling, 
and theatrical activities. 
1. Introduction
“Humanity is complex, unpredictable, and brings together people capable of the most 
destructive actions. It is also capable of projecting its future and building a desirable reality.”
Resilience is a comprehensive and dynamic concept, briefly defined as the ability of people or 
systems to succeed in the face of change and uncertainty and to continue to develop even 
at critical times. It means living in a crisis and even taking advantage of it. It is the ability to 
transit in adversity and overcome situations of intense change or high need for adaptation.
Psychological resilience is an important factor in different contexts; its development benefits 
not only the individual himself but also all other instances where some level of human 
interaction occurs.
It is not an unusual ability. Most people have it on some level. And it is the result of multiple 
personal, group and community factors.
Genetic structure, biological and psychological factors, social aspects, values, personal and 
group histories, experiences, prior learning, and environmental resources are some of the 
elements that influence it.1 
Here we will address the “human side of resilience”. Or more specifically, “how to empower 
people and groups with the skills they need to have a high level of resilience.”
1 Sapolsky, 2007
Keywords:
Resilience, 
Resilience 
Development, 
Positive Stress 
management, 
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2. The Triple Convergence.  
Resources and Strategies
The triple convergence; resulting from advances in the technological sciences, neurosciences, 
and in the sciences of training and learning gives us a spectacular advance in the possibilities 
of developing people and groups in the most different capacities, like the resilience itself.
We should be concerned about the building of resilience for all mankind. Here it is not a 
problem of ours or of them, but of all.
We must engage in this development in all contexts and in all the stages of life; since 
childhood - this is one of the best times for this; but also in adulthood – when many skills, 
acquired naturally during life, are useful in this learning.2
Many scholars claim that this is a spontaneous and natural improving, promoted by people’s 
own experiences. There are even those who say that the difficulties of life are good teachers. 
We, at the Latin American Center for Development, believe that it can be accelerated and 
optimized in a calm, serene and controlled environment. For 23 years, we have developed 
emotional and behavioral training projects, empowering leaders, groups, and individuals in the 
main aspects involved in the evolution of personal, group and social resilience through the 
training of “behavioral algorithms”.
Informally speaking, an algorithm is a collection of simple instructions to accomplish some 
tasks. Commonplace in everyday life, algorithms are sometimes called procedures or recipes.3
Behavioral algorithms are mental schemes that direct our strategies of thoughts and actions. 
They are structured through our previous learning and experiences.
They can be more automated or more conscious, but we all have them, even if we  
do not know it. 
Whenever we face a new situation we tend to use strategies that have proven appropriate 
in the past. But often these processes are no longer adequate, or our “old strategies” are 
insufficient in the face of new or critical situations.
2 Sandberg, 2017
3 Sipser, 2006; Gawande, 2011
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When people can improve these strategies in quality and quantity, they have a positive 
behavioral differential in new situations, especially in contexts that require a great deal  
of adaptation.
The training also aims to teach people how to identify possible future critical or risk  
situations and to build their own training program in order to qualify themselves for skills  
that may be needed.
3. Practices
Several are the practices used for these goals. Let’s look at some:
3.1. Artistic Expressions
Artistic expressions are excellent means to form the essential basis for the construction and 
structuring of resilience.
In front of a white screen to be painted, a piece of clay to be shaped or a stone to be 
sculpted, the person develops autonomy, creativity and, among others, a procedural view. 
Once the work is finished, the self-esteem and empowerment are improved, revealing to the 
individual his capacity for achievement. When it is done in a group, the activities will also 
contribute to the development of specific collaborative skills. All of them are fundamentals of 
resilient behavior.
3.2. Games
Many of the situations that we live on a daily basis can be compared to games. In this 
context, the games help us to understand any processes of human relationships where roles, 
objectives, and rules are defined. We are talking about love, professional, learning games and 
so many others. Games can be healthy and constructive, but they can also be destructive and 
perverse. Rules, roles, and objectives may be well defined or not.
This perspective opens up a great field of action, allowing us to use game design elements 
in various contexts of development and learning. These experiences are very motivating and 
produce an unparalleled engagement in both intensity and duration, allowing the individual to 
experience a fragment of space and time, that is characteristic of real life, in a fictional and 
controlled context, even when addressing critical issues. When collaborative, it also promotes 
the optimization of group resources to overcome critical situations.4 
3.3. Theater practice activities
Theatrical practices enable people to deal with complex and highly critical situations within a 
safe and controlled educational environment. They provide a good insight into the identified 
behaviors that can be developed or avoided according to their suitability in specific contexts. 
It’s a great way to test and practice behaviors “before” every possible situation.
They can be performed in private groups in which all the participants take part in the scene, 
or with an audience, when who is watching the practice is also allowed to interact.5
4 Huizinga, 1955; Deterding-2011; Dominguez, 2013; Andrade, 2016
5 Spolin, 2013
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3.4. Mentalization
Mentalization - if well trained - is an excellent resource for self-control, internal assessment, 
definition and maintenance of focus, strategic planning, personal resource recovery and 
construction of possible solutions and new realities. Also, it allows the visualization of the 
most appropriate solutions in each context.
It can also promote a feeling of  freedom and peace, even in the most complex contexts. 
Imagining the end of the situation can increase adaptability and facilitate overcoming the 
situation.6
The practice of this “voluntary emotional adequacy” improves our ability to coping stress and 
finding balance, motivation and new solutions, even in critical situations.
3.5. Storytelling
Storytelling is the act of sharing stories.
Undoubtedly it is one of the teaching techniques most used by all peoples and at different 
times. In its various formats, it has divulged customs, thinking and life styles, strategies of 
conduct and values for many centuries.
This practice, of telling real or fiction stories, offers us excellent strategies for the building of 
learning and development programs.
Committed to ethical values and to develop skills in the population, the storytelling becomes 
an instrument of great value in building up resilience in individuals and groups.
These are very effective resources, with an excellent cost-benefit ratio and that do not require 
large structures and investments for their realization. Isolated or combined, they provide us 
with many possibilities for action.
4. Skills
The personal and the group resilience are better developed and trained if we break it down 
into its basic elements, which can be grouped into Personal, Relational and Executive skills.
4.1. Personal skills
We understand personal skills as those directly related to the person.
Among them, we mention sovereignty, self-knowledge, self-management, positive stress 
management7, personal shielding, creativity, the ability to read the environment and to 
perceive risk situations, capacity to identify and create opportunities, problem solving skills 
in critical situations, the capacity to perform and, fundamentally, the capacity for adaptation 
and overcoming.
4.2. Relational skills
Relational skills, like healthy leadership, the ability to establish reliable links, effective 
networks, and creative interdependence, determine the dynamics and effectiveness of 
interpersonal relationships, helping the functioning of groups and communities. 
They also provide consistency, alignment, synergism, shared empowerment and 
reorganization to those groups, in the face of critical situations or intense need for adaptation.
6 Frankl, 1984
7 Andrade, 2010
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4.3. Executive skills
Executive skills are formal or informal processes, which give us, under different circumstances, 
the best functioning when we deal with different types of processes that occur in our lives.
They are the competencies necessary for the conduct of processes and the execution of 
projects. We need them to manage our own health, our career, our financial lives and, above 
all, to conduct ourselves effectively, individually or collectively, during crises or intense periods 
of adaptation.
5. Items
The good news is that resilience is a systemic ability composed by an interacting group of 
items that can easily be trained one by one.
We quote here some of the items most frequently addressed.
5.1. The building blocks of resilience
They include competencies in the three groups mentioned, but also the various community 
resources that must be developed before being needed.
5.2. Personal and group sources of resilience
Each individual or group should develop their own strategies, driven by behavioral algorithms, 
in different situations. Training coordinators should facilitate the process and point out 
positive or negative points, stimulating the engagement and cooperation of all.
5.3. Institutions as sources of resilience
Strong, warm and humane institutions are important drivers of resilience. The commitment, 
especially from the authorities, in improving these institutions should be stimulated.
5.4. True values and beliefs
Values and beliefs are important pillars for structuring resilient behavior. They guide us. We 
live in search of meaning, and when we find it, we are more effective in dealing with critical 
situations. During periods of crisis, identifying a purpose in life, and feeling positive about it, 
can promote resilience.8
5.5. Bringing out the best in people
The human being is not a homogenous being. 
The contradictions of society are only reflections of internal personal contradictions. We 
possess terrible and also very positive aspects. Redeeming the best of people is a top priority 
in any project that seeks the development of a resilient behavior.
5.6. Mental and emotional balance
Mental and emotional balance is one of the most important aspects of life. When we lose 
them in a crisis situation, we stop being part of the solution and become part of the problem.
8 Frankl, 1946
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5.7. Self-control
Self-control is a cognitive process necessary to regulate one’s behavior in order to achieve 
specific goals.
It is the ability to exercise control over our state in different circumstances, even the most 
critical ones. In other words is to have control over our feelings, emotions, thoughts, actions, 
and behaviors to recover from adversity or to overcome situations of intense change or high 
need for adaptation.9
5.8. Creativity and improvisation
Creativity is a partner of resilience. 
Creating is the art of being, the art of building the world in which we live. 
Creativity can be spontaneous or a conscious choice, but it will always be a tool for problem-
solving and an indispensable strategic factor.
Improvisation is here seen as the ability to build quick solutions in unforeseen situations with 
limited resources.
The development of these skills can define the success or failure in critical situations.
5.9. Initiative
The ability to start something. An act or strategy designed to solve a problem or improve a 
situation. The readiness to engage in difficult activities.
5.10. Proactive Critical Adaptation
It is the ability to withstand undesirable situations of reality and not submit to them, but to 
seek a critical adaptation and develop effective strategies to overcome them.
5.11. Personal and community perspectives
Alignment of personal and group perspectives. 
People feel valued by the group and value it, and defend it as themselves. 
5.12. Responsibility
The duty to deal with something and the ability to act independently to make decisions 
without authorization, but with an obligation to respond to their actions.
5.13. The sense of community
It is not only a matter of recognizing that “my right ends when the right of the other begins” 
but of accepting that when the rights of anyone in the world are being disrespected, mine will 
also be disrespected.
5.14. Building winning teams
It is the construction of a group identity committed to the intended result.
9 Timpano, 2013
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5.15. Shared social responsibility
Responsibility is divided and everyone feels responsible for the common good.
5.16. Synergistic and objective collaboration
It is the ability of people to act together with a common goal. 
5.17. The strength of character
They are the values practiced by individuals and communities.
Ethics and other values are not characteristics of good people, but of smart people. It is much 
easier to live in an ethical context!
6. Final considerations
We are all responsible for enhancing everyone’s resilience. 
Governments, institutions, associations and individuals, all of us have this important mission.
We all dream of a better world and this means greater capacity for innovation, adaptation, 
coping and overcoming crises.
Training is the differential that provides the consolidation of development and essential skills 
for us to better conduct ourselves in different contexts.
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The Evolution of Risk Assessment  
for the Evolution of  
the Future Complex and 
Interconnected Physical,  
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Enrico Zio1
1 Chair on System Science and the Energetic Challenge, EDF Foundation, Laboratoire  
Genie Industriel, CentraleSupélec/Université Paris-Saclay, Grande voie des Vignes,  
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Abstract
I consider the changing industrial, environmental and social context and address some 
challenges and opportunities therein, focusing on aspects of risk. Digitalization 
brings improvements but with them comes also the complexity of cyber-phyiscal 
systems. Climate change and extreme natural events are increasingly threatening 
our infrastructures. Terrorist and malevolent threats are posing severe concerns. 
Risk assessment must evolve for addressing these challenges. Development 
directions are presented, including the use of simulation for accident scenario 
identification and exploration, the extension of risk assessment into the 
framework of resilience and business continuity, the reliance on data for 
dynamic and condition monitoring-based risk assessment.
1. Introduction
As the digital, physical and human worlds continue to integrate, we experience a deep 
transformation in industry, which far-reaches into our lives. The 4th industrial revolution, 
the internet of things and big data, the industrial internet, are changing the way we design, 
manufacture, provide products and services. This is creating a complex network of things 
and people that are seamlessly connected and communicating. It is providing opportunities 
to make productions systems more efficient and faster, and more flexible and resilient the 
complex supply chains and distribution networks that tie the global economy.
In this fast-pace changing environment, the attributes related to the reliability of 
components and systems continue to play a fundamental role for industry and those 
related to safety and security continue to be increasingly of concern, as a right to freedom. 
The innovations that are being developed have high potential of increased wellbeing and 
benefits, but also generate new and unknown failure mechanisms, hazards and risks, partly 
due also to new and unknown functional and structural dependencies. On the other hand, 
the advancements in knowledge, methods and techniques, the increase in information 
sharing, data availability and computational capabilities, and the advancements in 
knowledge that these can bring, offer new opportunities of development for the analysis 
Keywords
Risk assessment, 
Simulation, 
Resilience, 
Condition 
monitoring-based 
risk assessment, 
Dynamic risk 
assessment.
17 |
and assessment of risks. An evolution of risk assessment is in the making, or perhaps even 
a “revolution” that takes the form of new approaches to and methods for risk assessment.
In this paper, I consider the above context and point at some directions that are shaping the 
road of advancement of risk assessment. Some directions and challenges for risk assessment 
are discussed, in relation to simulation for accident scenario identification and exploration, 
resilience and business continuity, dynamic and condition monitoring-based risk assessment.
2. Risk Assessment
Risk assessment is a science that has been developed in the past 40 years for understanding 
and controlling the risk of accident events. This allows the rational management of hazardous 
industrial activities, through their systemic understanding. The basic idea of risk assessment 
is to structure, by systematic modelling, the information and knowledge available at 
the detailed component/basic event level to assess the accident risk at system level. As 
knowledge on these events and on the system responses to them is limited, the outcomes of 
the assessment are uncertain. The common framework used to describe the uncertainties in 
the assessment stands on probability theory, and particularly on the subjectivistic (Bayesian) 
theory of probability (Kelly and Smith; 2009, 2011). Indeed, the common term used is 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), although Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) and 
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) are also widely used. 
Knowledge is central to the risk assessment and should be made explicit in the definition of 
risk (Aven 2010):
where A indicates the set of accident scenarios that may occur, C represents the set 
of consequences, Q is the metric used to quantify the associated uncertainties and K 
is the body of knowledge which the risk assessment (i.e., the identification of A and the 
quantification of C and Q) is based on.
The risk assessment outcomes are functions of the current state of knowledge, and of 
the related assumptions made and parameter values assigned. The methodologies and 
approaches for risk assessment support the structuring of knowledge in a systematic, rigorous 
and transparent framework.
©
 iStock.com
/Filograph
| 18
But, it is just as important to be aware of the (incomplete) knowledge conditioning the risk 
assessment outcomes. Correspondingly, accident events and scenarios in a risk assessment 
model can be classified according to the knowledge available at the time of the assessment 
(Flage & Aven 2015).
Eventually, for decision making, risk assessment must provide traceable information for 
arguing the decisions; the risk assessment outcomes must be communicated in a way that 
allow the decision makers to interpret them properly for their purposes and to understand 
the associated uncertainty related to the available knowledge used for the assessment. It 
remains an open research challenge how to explicitly treat knowledge in risk assessment 
and management. When a risk assessment is performed to provide information that is used 
for making decisions, there must be a way to tell that it has been performed with adequate 
techniques and sufficient knowledge for making the decisions (Rae et al. 2012). 
3. Simulation for Risk Assessment
The identification and characterization of hazards and accidents is a fundamental task of 
knowledge mining for risk assessment. This task is far from trivial in practice, given the 
complexity of the systems and processes: a large, combinatorial set of possible scenarios, 
events and conditions needs to be considered, of which only few, rare ones lead to critical, 
unsafe situations. This makes experimentation economically unsustainable and physically 
infeasible.
Simulation has long been advocated as a way to explore and understand system behavior for 
knowledge retrieval (Santner, Williams, & Notz 2003; Simpson, Poplinski, Koch, & Allen 2001). 
Thanks to the advancements in modelling techniques and the increase in computational 
power, the beneficial use of simulation for advancing knowledge for risk assessment has 
steadily increased. 
Within a simulation-based accident scenario analysis, a set of simulations is run with different 
initial configurations of the system parameters (input), and the corresponding system states 
are computed (output) and evaluated with respect to specified safety conditions (critical 
thresholds). These states form the so called “Critical Regions” (CRs) or “Damage Domains” 
(DDs) (Montero-Mayorga, Queral, & Gonzalez-Cadelo 2014).
Concurrently, simulation can also be exploited to estimate the accident scenarios 
probabilities, or any other measure of uncertainty adopted to describe risk.
As simple and intuitive the use of simulation may seem for addressing the above two 
questions, in the practice of risk assessment it is actually quite demanding because the 
models of system behavior are:
• High-dimensional, i.e., with a large number of inputs and/or outputs;
• Black box, i.e., without an explicit Input/Output (I/O) relation;
• Dynamic, because the system evolves in time;
• Computationally demanding even for a sinlge trial simulation, as a consequence of the 
above characteristics of the models and of the numerical methods employed for their 
solution.
Two main strategies are currently followed to address the two research questions and related 
challenges above presented:
• Simulation of large sets of system life histories using the increased computational power 
made available through parallel computing, cloud computing etc.;
• Simulation by adaptive sampling, which amounts to intelligently guiding the simulation 
towards the system states of interest (i.e., those belonging to the CRs). This entails that 
the simulation methods be capable of automatically understanding, during the simulation, 
which configurations are most promising to visit.
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Simulation is particularly strongly advocated for the hazard analysis, and safety and resilience 
assessment of critical infrastructures and systems of systems (Alexander & Kelly 2013; Zio 
2016). The increasing concern on the vulnerability of critical infrastructures (see Section 
5 below) and the increasing role of systems of systems in safety-critical applications has 
raised the need for methods to analyse their hazards, and verify their safety and resilience 
properties. One viable way for this is simulation of the variety of scenarios that can emerge 
from the response of the individual system components to different perturbations and 
failures, sampled over space and time. The effects of the interaction between system 
components can, then, be observed together with the corresponding system behaviour that 
emerges. The challenges for the analysis of such systems come from the fact that the 
system boundary is not well defined and the set of components in the system can vary over 
time, either as part of normal operation (e.g. a new car enters the traffic scene or a new 
aircraft enters a controlled airspace region) or as part of evolutionary development (a traffic 
lane is interrupted because of construction work or a military unit receives a new air-defence 
system). In such an undefined and dynamic setting, conventional techniques of analysis 
may be inadequate for determining whether or not the failure of a given component may 
be hazardous for the system as a whole. Simulation, on the other hand, can provide a way 
of analysis of such systems made of multiple components that interact in complex and 
continually changing ways.
4. Business Continuity Assessment
Business continuity (BC) measures the capability of an organization to remain at or quickly 
recover to operational states after being affected by disruptive events. Business Continuity 
management (BCM) is a managerial framework that aims at ensuring that no disruptive 
events can lead to unexpected, unwanted interruptions of production or service activity. In 
this view, it lays down the vision of integrating the post-accident recovery process to the 
preventive view of risk assessment (Cerullo and Cerullo, 2004). 
As a holistic, integrated risk management strategy, BCM offers great potential benefits but 
the complexity of the systems and risk problems involved is such that most currently existing 
BCM strategies are based on qualitative methods only, and this limits practical and effective 
application. No clearly defined business metrics, which impedes the quantitative analysis of 
BC and, therefore, limits application in practice.
To contribute to the advancement of BCM for its application in practice, Zeng and Zio (2017) 
have developed an integrated, quantitative framework for modeling BC, founded on the 
definition of four metrics that measure the potential losses caused by the disruptive events. 
A simulation-based method has been presented in the paper to calculate the BC metrics 
based on the integrated model. To demonstrate the use of the framework, the BC of an 
oil storage tank farm is assessed. The conceptual model that describes BC and identifies 
its major contributing factors refers to a performance indicator, denoted by PPIB (Process 
Performance Indicator-Business), whose value reflects the degree to which the objective of 
the system is satisfied. For example, for an oil refinery, the PPIB is its daily production yield; 
for a manufacturing factory, the PPIB is the products produced per day. The value of PPIB 
is determined by the operation state of the system: the PPIB remains at its nominal value 
when the system is under normal operation and drops to a degraded value when the normal 
operation of the system is disrupted. To reduce losses, various BC measures can be taken to 
guarantee the continuity of the business process in the face of disruptive events. 
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5. Resilience Assessment
In comparison to risk, resilience is focused also on the ability to prepare and recover quickly 
from threats which may be known or unknown. Managing for resilience, then, requires 
ensuring the system’s ability to plan and prepare for a threat, and then absorb, recover,  
and adapt. 
It is the lessons learned in recent years from some catastrophic accidents that have led to 
the concept of resilience to ensure the ability of systems to withstand, adapt to and rapidly 
recover from the effects of a disruptive event. Today’s systems are not only required to be 
reliable but must also be able to recover from disruptions (Zio 2009, Zio 2016b). 
Resilience is characterized by four properties, i.e. robustness, redundancy,  resourcefulness, 
rapidity and four interrelated dimensions, i.e., technical, organizational, social, economic. It 
is considered a new paradigm for risk engineering, which proactively integrates the accident 
preventive tasks of anticipation (imagining what to expect) and monitoring (knowing what to 
look for), the in-accident tasks of responding (knowing what to do and being capable of doing 
it) and learning (knowing what has happened), the mitigative tasks of absorbing (damping 
the negative impact of the adverse effect) and the recovery tasks of adaptation (making 
intentional adjustment to come through a disruption), restoration (returning to the normal 
state) (Hollnagel et al. 2006). 
Various models, methods and frameworks for analyzing and measuring resilience have been 
proposed in the literature (Carpenter et al. 2001; Fiksel 2003; Wreathall 2006; Jackson 2007; 
Madni and Jackson 2009), with focus on diverse fields of application.
For ensuring adequate protection and resilience, vulnerability and risk must be analysed 
and assessed in order to prepare to address them by design, operation and management. 
Modeling and analysis by reductionist methods are likely to fail to capture the behavior of the 
complex systems of interest, and new approaches are needed that consider these systems 
from a holistic viewpoint to provide reliable predictions of their behavior for their safe 
control (Kröger and Zio 2011). Furthermore, large uncertainties exist in the characterization 
of the failure behavior of the elements of a complex system, of their interconnections and 
interactions (Zio and Aven 2011).
The analysis of complex systems and CIs cannot be carried out only with classical methods 
of system decomposition and logic analysis; a framework is needed to integrate a number of 
methods capable of viewing the complexity problem from different perspectives (topological 
and functional, static and dynamic), under the existing uncertainties (Ouyang et al. 2009; 
Reed et al. 2009; Ouyang 2014).
6. Dynamic Risk Assessment
Risk assessment must account for the time-dependent variations of components and 
systems, as they operate, age, fail, are repaired and replaced (Villa et al. 2016). Dynamic 
Risk Assessment (DRA) is defined as a risk assessment that updates the estimation of the 
risk of a deteriorating system according to the states of its components, as knowledge on 
them is acquired in time (Khan et al. 2016). DRA is capable of capturing the time-dependent 
behaviour of the risk and provides a more realistic description of the system risk profile (Khan 
et al. 2015, 2016; Villa et al. 2016).
An early attempt of DRA was conducted in (Meel and Seider 2006, 2008) where Bayes 
theorem was used to dynamically update the estimates of accident probabilities, using near 
misses and incident data collected from similar systems. In Khakzad et al. (2012), Bayes 
theorem was combined with a Bow-Tie (BT) model for DRA: failure probabilities of the primary 
events and safety barriers in the BT were constantly revised over time and the updated BT 
model was used to estimate the updated risk profile. Paltrinieri et al. (2014) used BT to 
support the DRA from metal dust accidents. Abimbola et al. (2014) applied a similar method 
to update in real time the risk estimation of offshore drilling operations. 
21 |
Most existing DRA methods only use statistical data, i.e., count data of accidents or near 
misses from similar systems, to update the estimated risk indexes. Additional information 
potentially useful for the estimation of the risk indexes may come from condition-monitoring 
data. The condition-monitoring data give information on the individual degradation process 
of the target system and of the safety barriers, and provide the opportunity to update the 
reliability values before actual failures occur. Therefore, introducing condition-monitoring 
data in DRA could be a beneficial complement to the statistical data, towards a condition 
monitoring-based risk assessment (CMBRA).
A method for DRA that allows the joint utilization of statistical and condition-monitoring data 
has been proposed in (Zeng and Zio 2017b). Consequence analysis is also considered by 
means of an ET. 
7. Discussion
Risk assessment is a mature discipline for a structured analysis of a system, to qualitatively 
and quantitatively describe its risk, based on the available knowledge. The quantitative 
analysis is often criticized in view of the difficulty of assigning probabilities (e.g., to human 
errors or software failures), the difficulty of verifying the assumptions behind the models 
at the basis of the assessment, the inherent uncertainty involved in the phenomena of 
interest. However, the use of quantitative measures remains essential for rational, effective 
decision making combining evidential knowledge and subjective beliefs. The risk assessment 
must, thus, provide an argument that it must be possible to scrutinize and not a formalized 
demonstration of an objective truth. The argument stands on the knowledge available and 
the related modeling assumptions made to formalize the assessment.
Furthermore, the changes and innovations that the World is experiencing, with digitalization 
and the complexity of cyber-phyiscal systems (CPSs), climate change and extreme natural 
events, terrorist and malevolent threats, challenge the existing methods to describe and 
model quantitatively risk. 
In this view, the increasing modeling and computational capabilities and data availability 
open great opportunities for mining knowledge and improving models for use in risk 
assessment. In this respect, in this paper I have pointed at some research and development 
directions with regards to the use of simulation for accident scenario identification 
and exploration, and the reliance on data for condition monitoring-based, dynamic risk 
assessment.
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Abstract
The present paper proposes a framework for the modeling and analysis of resilience of 
networked power grid systems. A probabilistic systems model is proposed based on the 
JCSS Probabilistic Model Code (JCSS, 2001) and deterministic engineering systems modeling 
techniques such as the DC flow model. This probabilistic systems model facilitates the 
propagation of the dominating uncertainties affecting the system performances, including 
characteristics of geo-hazard disturbances, internal flow, the resistances of the system with 
respect to these and effects of internal redistribution and subsequent possible cascading 
failure event scenarios (Nan and Sansavini, 2017). The concept of direct and indirect 
consequences proposed by the Joint Committee on Structural Safety (JCSS, 2008) is utilized 
to model the associated consequences. To facilitate a holistic modeling of robustness and 
resilience, and to identify how these characteristics may be optimized these characteristics, 
the power grid system is finally interlinked with its fundamental interdependent systems, i.e. a 
societal model, a regulatory system and control feedback loops.
The proposed framework is exemplified with reference to optimal decision 
support for resilience management in the IEEE Reliability Test System-1996. 
Parameter studies are undertaken to assess the significance of decision options 
on the system performance characteristics. Finally, the presented framework 
and example results are discussed and suggestions for further developments 
are provided.
1. Introduction 
Over the last 1-2 decades, significant progress has been achieved in research on 
performances of networked systems, playing critical roles in providing societal services 
such as energy, communication and transport. Fundamental insights on the nature and 
performances of systems with random characteristics are provided through the models 
proposed (Watts and Strogatz, 1998) and (Barabasi and Albert, 1999). Modeling and analysis 
of reliability and risk performances of networked systems in engineering applications is 
addressed in e.g. (Dueñas-Osorio and Vemuru, 2009) and (Buldyrev et al., 2010).
In pursuit of optimal decision support for sustainable and resilient societal developments, 
there is a need to model and analyse system performances beyond reliability and risk and 
with an appropriate consideration of their evolution in both time and space. Recently, a 
novel decision analytical framework for the representation and quantification of resilience of 
systems was proposed in (Faber et al., In Press). A fundamental feature of this framework is 
that systems performances are modelled through explicit consideration of how the services 
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provided by the system contribute to the development of the systems capacities, such as 
social capacity, financial capacity and ecosystem capacities. Resilience failure is represented 
as the event that a disturbance or a combination of different disturbances lead to a capacity 
loss of the system beyond its accumulated reserves. This formulation facilitates the joint 
quantitative modelling and assessment of how systems perform with respect to robustness, 
resilience and also sustainability in a quantitative manner.
The present paper is organized as follows. Closely following (JCSS, 2008), (Faber, 2015) and 
(Faber et al., In Press), Section 2 outlines a decision analytical framework for the probabilistic 
modeling and analysis of robustness and resilience of networked power grid systems. In Section 
3, details are provided on how we apply the deterministic systems analysis methods from 
(Nan and Sansavini, 2017) for the probabilistic modeling of cascading failures. In Section 4, an 
example is provided illustrating the application of the proposed framework and approaches on 
the IEEE Reliability Test System-1996. Finally, in the conclusions, the presented framework and 
example results are discussed and suggestions for further developments are provided.
2. Decision Support Framework and Approach
2.1. Decision support context
Consistent decision support for strategic, operational and tactical management of electricity 
distribution systems over all phases and instances of their service lives is crucial; only then 
can their reliable, robust and resilient performance be ensured.
At the strategic level, decision support typically serves to identify how the systems 
themselves are designed, how procedures for their normal operation and maintenance may 
be optimized but also how strategies and measures are optimally prepared for different 
types of disturbances. Operational level decision support typically concerns the efficient 
management of the systems in states, which might be expected as part of normal operations. 
This includes adaptation of system functionalities to predictable variations of demands and 
management of predictable needs for maintenance, repairs and renewals. Tactical level 
decision support on the other hand aims for efficient loss reduction and fast recovery in cases 
where the systems are subject to event scenarios out of the ordinary such as excessive 
operational demands, accidents, geo-hazard events (e.g. earthquakes, strong wind storms and 
floods) and malevolence. 
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In all strategic, operational and tactical decision situations, uncertainties may significantly 
affect the outcomes of decisions and this must be accounted for when ranking different 
possible decision alternatives.
In the following, we focus on providing decision support at strategic level where as already 
indicated, all relevant operational and tactical level decision support situations should 
be accounted for. However, here we limit ourselves to address decisions on the design of 
the capacities of the major constituents of electricity distribution systems given that their 
general configurations have already been decided and given information concerning the 
demands the systems aims to fulfil. With this limitation due account is however given to 
possible disturbance events over the service lives of the systems due to extreme operational 
demands, geo-hazard events and acts of terrorism. 
2.2. Probabilistic system performance modelling
Following (JCSS, 2008) and (Faber et al., In Press) the decision analysis framework for 
interconnected systems illustrated in Figure 1 is utilized. This system representation accounts for 
both benefits and losses generated by the interlinked systems over time, and optimal decision 
alternatives may be identified by a joint consideration of their effect on system performance 
characteristics such as robustness and resilience as introduced in sections 2.3-2.4. 
Figure 1. Generic framework for decision analysis of systems (Faber et al., In Press)
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In the left side of Figure 1 the interlinked system is represented in its undisturbed 
configuration with associated benefits and in the right side with all possible scenarios of 
system damage and failure events implying losses to the system over time. It is assumed 
that a probabilistic system model is available (see also Section 3) which represents all 
relevant physical processes, engineered objects and facilities, organizational processes, 
human activities as well as all decision alternatives envisaged for designing and managing 
the performance of the system. The system modelling approach suggested by the (JCSS, 
2008) is utilized to subdivide the scenarios of events leading to consequences for the system 
into direct consequences and indirect consequences. Direct consequences comprise all losses 
caused by damage and failure states of the constituents of the system except functionality 
related losses. Indirect consequences relate only to functionality losses. 
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Two phases in the evolution of consequences are explicitly considered, namely the initiation 
phase and the propagation phase, see also Figure 2. 
Figure 2. Illustration of the two-phase scenario based failure propagation model 
(Faber et al., In Press) 
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In the initiation phase mHi constituent failures are assumed generated by the hazard event 
Hi. In the propagation phase lHi constituent failures are generated by the joint effect of 
internal redistribution of system demands and the hazard events. The two-phase failure 
propagation model facilitates the representation of cascading failure scenarios.
In accordance with (Faber et al., In Press) we assume in the following that a probabilistic 
systems model has been established comprised of all possible i = 1,2,… . , nS different 
scenarios of hazard events together with their occurrence probabilities p(i), direct 
consequences associated with constituent failure events during the initiation phase cD,I(i) and 
propagation phases, respectively cD,P(i) and the associated indirect consequences cID(i). 
2.3. Robustness modeling and quantification
Provided the availability of the system representation outlined in the foregoing it is 
possible to assess the performances of the system subject to disturbance events over time. 
Robustness is one of the system characteristics that have attracted the most attention in 
this respect aiming to provide a metric for assessing the degree to which a system is able 
to contain or limit the immediate consequences of disturbances. In (Baker et al., 2008), 
risk-based formulations for the quantification of systems robustness are first provided and 
later in (Faber, 2015) revisited and modified accounting for a more general and consistent 
scenario based approach. Following (Baker et al., 2008), the idea is to relate the robustness 
of a system to the ratio between direct consequences and total consequences. In (Baker 
et al., 2008), it is suggested to assess this through the expected values of the two terms 
individually (equivalently through the direct and total risks). The modification introduced 
in (Faber, 2015) appreciates that direct and indirect consequences are generated scenario 
wise and thereby avoids mixing of consequences in the robustness assessment which are 
not generated in the same scenarios. Accordingly a scenario consistent index of systems 
robustness with respect to a given scenario i, i.e. IR(i) may be assessed as:
 
(1)
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The direct and total consequences cD(i) and cT (i) entering Equation (1) may be interpreted 
differently depending on the objective of the assessment. If representation and analysis of 
cascading failure event scenarios is in focus, Equation (1) may be rewritten as:
 
(2)
where cD,I (i), cD,P (i), represent the direct consequences associated with the initiation phase 
and the propagation phase of the failure scenario of the system, respectively. 
If on the other hand the emphasis is directed on the ability of the system to contain the 
development of consequences from direct to indirect consequences Equation (1) may be 
rewritten as:
 
(3)
From Equations (1)-(3), it is apparent that the robustness index is random and its assessment 
must be undertaken probabilistically. Robustness indexes for a given system can furthermore, 
straightforwardly be assessed conditional on e.g. the type and/or intensity of the hazard 
event as well as the magnitude of direct, indirect or total consequences. The scenario-based 
approach facilitates for assessing which constituent damages and failures contribute the 
most to inadequate robustness performance and to the total consequences. 
2.4. Resilience modelling and quantification 
A large variety of propositions for the modelling and quantification of systems resilience is 
available in the literature; see e.g. (Cimellaro et al., 2010) and (Linkov et al., 2014). Most 
frequently, the focus is directed on the short-term representation of the ability of the system 
to sustain and recover from disturbances, fast and with a minimal loss of functionality. 
Recovery characteristics are typically accounted for through the social, organisational and 
adaptive capacities together with traditional characteristics of technical systems such as 
strength, ductility, brittleness, redundancy, segmentation, diversity and robustness (see e.g. 
(Derissen et al., 2011), (Pimm, 1984) and (Baker et al., 2008)).
Following (Faber et al., In Press) a service life perspective to systems resilience is taken in 
which scenarios of benefit generation and losses are modelled and analysed over time. 
Resilience failure is defined as the event of one or more of the capacities of the system 
(social, economical and/or environmental) are exceeded by demands/consequences of 
disturbances. In this manner resilience failure, similarly to systems robustness attains 
a random nature why requirements to resilience may only be specified meaningfully in 
probabilistic terms; e.g. in terms of an acceptable annual probability of resilience failure. 
The idea is illustrated in Figure 3 for the case of a system for which the only explicitly 
considered capacity is a financial reserve collected as a fixed percentage of the annual 
benefit generated by the system over time. 
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Figure 3. Illustration of resilience model in terms of time histories of benefit
generation and corresponding time histories of accumulated economic 
reserves (Faber et al., In Press)
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In Figure 3, two scenarios of benefit generation and accumulated economic reserves are 
illustrated. Disturbance events may both reduce the benefit generation as well as the 
accumulated reserves. The time history illustrated with a green line corresponds to the event 
of resilience failure, i.e. the disturbance event exhausts the accumulated reserves.
Following the concept illustrated in Figure 3 and as provided in (Faber et al., In Press) the 
probability of resilience failure may be written as:
 (4)
where rr(X(τ),a) is a function representing a given capacity of the system at time τ and 
sr(X(τ),a) is a function representing the demand or stress on the system caused by a 
disturbance event at time τ, X(τ) is a vector of random variables which in general depend 
on time and a is a vector containing all decision alternatives which may affect the resilience 
performance of the system. Equation (4) may be realized to involve a first excursion problem. 
The first immediate drop in the benefit rate after a disturbance event (as illustrated in 
Figure 3) may be noticed to relate directly to the systems reliability and robustness. Even 
with moderate assumptions concerning the contribution of indirect consequences to total 
consequences it is apparent that cascading failures and loss of functionality plays a 
significant role for the resilience of the system. From Figure 3, it is seen that a starting capital 
or reserve is assumed available at time t = 0. In the design and management of systems, 
sufficient resilience critically depends critically on the availability and maintenance of this 
reserve, as illustrated in the example presented in Section 4.
3. Probabilistic Modeling of Energy Distribution Systems
Performance of energy distribution systems is generally subject to significant uncertainties. 
Risk-informed decision making in general takes into account the effect of uncertainty within 
the framework of the Bayesian decision analysis (Raiffa and Schlaifer, 1961) and facilitates 
that a consistent ranking of decision alternatives may be established in coherency with the 
preferences and requirements of the decision maker. In (Faber, 2015), systems risk informed 
decision analysis is addressed and risk-based indicators for systems resilience are formulated. 
However, the systemic risk assessments and the quantification of performance indicator 
requires the probabilistic modeling of the systems characteristics and performances. The two 
main tasks of the probabilistic modeling are: (1) the formulation of the probabilistic modeling 
of the relevant variables affected by uncertainties; and (2) the probabilistic analysis of the 
systems states.
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As illustrated in Figure 2, two phases of system performance under given hazard events are 
explicitly considered, during which the loads or demands on each constituent of the energy 
distribution system are divided into two categories, namely LHj and LOj to represent the 
load on the jth constituent from the geo-hazard events j = 1,2, … ., nC and that from the 
operational demand respectively. Correspondingly, the resistances of the nC constituents in 
the system are divided into two types, namely rHj and rOj. During the service life, the system 
is subjected to the joint action of the possibly interacting geo-hazards, with loads  
LHij    j = 1,2, … ., nC (representing the load from the ith geo-hazard Hi on the jth 
constituent). The loads will have their own probabilistic characteristics and would in 
general be correlated. Also operational demands may initiate failure propagation events 
and cause changes in the typology of the system and corresponding alterations in internal 
load distribution until another equilibrium state of the system is reached. The uncertainties 
associated with both types of loads and the resistance, together with their dependency 
structure must be taken into account in the probabilistic system modeling.
In Figure 4, the potential condition states of a constituent in a energy distribution system 
subject to a given disturbance is illustrated. First, the constituents are affected by the 
disturbances, i.e. geo-hazards and/or overload by the operational demands, and they might fail 
(and effectively be removed from the grid system) directly. Subsequently, in the propagation 
phase, the topology of the system might further change in a sequence of constituent failures 
and the operational demands redistributed correspondingly. Even if the individual constituents 
survive the effects of disturbances in the first phase they still might fail due to the overload 
caused by other constituent failures. It should also be noted that even in the event that a given 
constituent survives and is in principle functional it might still loose its functionality within the 
system due to the possibility of loss of interconnection with the remaining system. These events 
are denoted as availability (A) and unavailability (U), respectively.
Figure 4. Event tree of the performance of a constituent in a energy 
distribution system without reorganization and rehabilitation
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The probability that the jth constituent is in the state Fj  may be written as:
 
(5)
Note that the load LOj might change with the topology of the system. It is generally difficult 
to write the expression of the probabilities P(Aj) and P(Uj) explicitly. The probabilistic 
evaluation of the occurrence of potential condition states is challenged by the vast number 
of different combinations of constituent failure events which must be accounted for. In the 
following we use crude Monte Carlo (MC) simulation for this purpose, but highlight that more 
intelligent and efficient approaches are needed.
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4. Example
4.1. Brief introduction
In this section, the IEEE Reliability Test System-1996 (see Figure 5 for the typology of the 
system) is utilized to illustrate the application of the proposed framework and approaches 
for assessing the robustness and resilience of a power grid system. The system is made of 
24 buses and 11 buses host generators. Each bus has a capacity to withstand geo-hazard 
disturbances LH, e.g. rH, and a capacity to withstand the internal power flow LO, i.e. rO. 
The internal flow LO is defined as the number of shortest paths passing it directed from the 
generators to the non-generator buses. 
The two types of capacity rH and rO are modeled by Log-normal distribution random 
variables. The expected value and the coefficient of variation of rH are 1 and 0.3, 
respectively; the expected value of rO is defined as the initial flow of the bus, i.e. the internal 
flow LO in the original system, and its coefficient of variation is 0.05.
The limit state functions representing the failure events of the individual buses with respect 
to the geo-hazard disturbances and the internal flows are:
 
(6)
where z1 and z2 are design parameters which may be chosen to comply with the 
requirements with respect to target probabilities (reliabilities) of constituent failures.
Figure 5. Illustration of the typology of the IEEE Reliability Test System-1996 
(Grigg et al., 1999)
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The annual probability of individual bus failure conditional on the event of a geo-hazard 
disturbance is set to pf |H = 10-2 and pf |H = 5×10-2 for generator and non-generator buses, 
respectively, and incorporated into the model through calibration of z1 (z1 is 4 and 3.3 for 
generator and non-generator buses, respectively).
The annual probability of individual bus failures with respect to operational demands (internal 
flow) is set to pf ,O = 10-3, and incorporated into the model through calibration of z2 (z2 = 1.17).
The performance of the power grid under a given disturbance, i.e. initial constituent failure 
due to operational overload or geo-hazard disturbances is modelled as a two-phase process. 
First, the buses are impacted directly by the disturbance, and might fail and be removed from 
the grid system. Subsequently, in the cascading phase, the topology and the capacities of 
the elements might change in a sequence of consecutive failures, during which the internal 
flows are redistributed correspondingly. Therefore, even if the buses survive the direct effects 
of disturbances in the first phase, they might still fail due to overload events caused by other 
bus failures. The buses are assumed to fail when internal demands exceed their capacity 
limits (see Equation (6)). Even in the event that a constituent survives and is functional, it 
might still not be operational due to the possibility of loss of interconnection with the rest of 
the system.
The non-generator buses which are still working, distribute the power to the users, i.e. they 
provide system functionality (utility). It is assumed that buses are replaced upon their failure. 
The replacement cost and the utility of different buses are provided in Table 1.
Table 1. Replacement costs and utilities of the buses.
Generators Non-generator buses
Replacement cost 2 1
Utility 0 5
The geo-hazard disturbance events are assumed to follow a Poisson counting process with 
annual occurrence rate λH = 0.1. The intensities of disturbance events acting on each bus  
is modelled by a random vector IH with constituents assumed to be log-normal distributed. 
The sequential realizations of IH are assumed independent but the disturbances acting  
on the constituents at a given time are correlated with correlation coefficient ρIH. The 
expected value and the coefficient of variation of the intensity IH, i.e. E[IH] and COV[IH] , 
are equal to 1 and 0.4, respectively; the correlation coefficient ρIH is 0.8.
The evolution of the system functionality (utility) illustrated in Figure 6. for a particular 
realization of a disturbance event shows how the functionality is reduced by ∆B1 at the time 
of disturbance. ∆T1 represents the time till the system initiates commissioning of temporary 
measures to re-establish functionality. The temporary measures are assumed to be fully 
functional after a period ∆T2 with a resulting functionality gain equal to ∆B2. In parallel to 
and after commissioning of temporary measures, permanent measures for re-establishing 
functionality are also being planned and deployed. Permanent measures are commissioned 
after a period ∆T3. 
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Figure 6. Illustration of the reorganization and recovery of system functionality 
after disturbances (Faber et al., In Press)
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The loss of functionality of the system ∆B1 for a particular disturbance is considered  
to be the ratio of the loss of utility to the total utility of the original system. The periods  
∆Ti , i = 1, 2, 3 describing the principal functionality loss and recovery curve are modelled 
by log-normal distributed random variables. Two levels of preparedness are considered, i.e. 
low and high, which affect the performance of the system during recovery. The expected 
values E[∙] and coefficients of variation COV[∙] for the random system variables are given 
in Table 2.
Table 2. Definition of the probabilistic model of the system 
with respect to preparedness and capacity
Variable Distribution model Low preparedness High preparedness
Expected value COV Expected value COV
∆T1 Log-normal E[ ∆T1]= ∆B1 0.2 E[∆T1]= 
∆B1
2
0.1
∆T2 Log-normal E[ ∆T2]= 5∆B1 0.2 E[∆T2] = ∆B1 0.1
∆T3 Log-normal E[ ∆T3]= 20∆B1 0.2 E[∆T3] = 10∆B1 0.1
∆B2 Deterministic 0.5 × ∆B1 0.8 × ∆B1
Furthermore, a reserve capital is assumed available over the life-cycle of the power grid 
system for covering the replacement cost of buses which may fail due to disturbance events. 
The starting capital reserve at t = 0 is modelled as a percentage χ % of the expected value 
of the accumulated benefits over the life-cycle of the power grid system. 
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4.2. Analysis results
In the following, we analyse the robustness and the resilience of considered power grid system. 
Robustness is quantified by the robustness index conditional on the disturbance scenarios 
due to the overload by internal flow or geo-hazards. The direct consequences are calculated 
as the replacement costs associated with buses failed due to the disturbance before internal 
flow redistribution. The indirect consequences are associated with replacement costs due to 
failures caused by internal flow redistribution, and utility loss due to the replacement and loss of 
connection with the generators of the non-generator buses. Figure 7 shows the CDF of the non-
exceedance probability of the conditional robustness index. The probability that the robustness 
index /R will be less than 0.2 for both the geo-hazard and the internal-flow disturbance is 
larger than 0.7, indicating that there would be great indirect consequences conditional on the 
disturbances. However, for the disturbance due to the overload by the internal flow, the failure 
probability of individual buses is small (less than 1x10-3) and correspondingly, the occurrence 
probability of the event that two or more buses fail simultaneously is very low. That is, there 
generally is one bus failure at first and the subsequent cascading effect will not be significant. 
Therefore, the probabilities that the robustness index /R  is less than 0.2 (corresponding to the 
event that most damaged buses are non-generators) or greater than 0.9 (corresponding to the 
event that most damaged constituents are the buses host generators) are similar to each other 
and around 0.5.
Figure 7. CDF for the robustness index of the power grid system 
for operational internal flow and geo-hazard disturbances 
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Figure 7 compares the CDFs for the robustness index of the system with different values 
of the design parameter z2 for the disturbance due to the overload by the internal flow. 
Three values of z2 are considered, i.e. 1.1207, 1.17 and 1.2, which correspond to the failure 
probability of individual buses around 1x10-2, 1x10-3 and 1x10-4, respectively. For the system 
with small value of z2, i.e. a relatively large annual failure probability of individual buses, the 
non-exceedance probability within the interval from 0.2 to 0.9 would have some fluctuations. 
That is, there would be many events captured in the simulations, in which both types of buses 
fail simultaneously. For the other two cases, the overall trend of the curves is similar, and the 
probability that the robustness index is less than 0.2 (corresponding to the event that most 
damaged buses are non-generators) for the system with larger value of z2 (equal to 1.2) is 
a little greater than that with a small value of z2 (equal to 1.17). The opposite occurs in the 
region, in which the exceedance probability is larger than 0.9 (corresponding to the event 
that most damaged buses are generators). Considering that the number of non-generator 
buses is greater than that of the buses host generators and each bus has same design 
failure probability, given that there is some failure due to the overload by the internal flow, 
the probability that some non-generator bus fails is larger than the probability that some 
generator fails. Such differences would be more pronounced for lower design annual failure 
probabilities for the individual buses.
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Figure 8. CDF comparison for the robustness index of the power grid system with 
different values of the design parameter z2 for the disturbance due to the overload 
by the operational internal flow
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The resilience of the system depends on a number of factors such as the frequency and types 
of disturbances, the capacity and robustness of the system and the level of preparedness. 
The system resilience is quantified by the probability of resilience failure (the exhaustion of 
the capital accumulated by the system of time) in dependency of the percentage χ % within 
a life cycle equal to 100 years. The results are illustrated in Figure 9 for the system with low 
preparedness. The resilience failure for the system with high preparedness is not captured 
in the total 1x103 simulations applied in the present example. As expected, the system 
experiences resilience failure, if the starting reserve is limited,  
i.e. χ % < 7.5% in this case study, and the level of preparedness is low. Furthermore, 
decreasing the target annual failure probability of the constituents reduces the probability of 
resilience failure.
Figure 9. Probability of resilience failure of the power grid system 
in dependency of the percentage χ %
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5. Conclusions
In the present paper, we adapt and apply a previously developed framework for modelling 
and assessing the robustness and resilience of systems to electricity grids. The proposed 
approach facilitates the representation and assessment of the systems characteristics of 
electricity grids, and captures the uncertainties associated with disturbance events of internal 
operational (e.g. demand overload) and external (e.g. geo-hazards and terrorist attacks) 
character as well as with the capacities of the constituents to withstand such disturbances. 
Moreover, the approach facilitates for representing scenarios of cascading failures and the 
capability of the system to recover from disturbances over time.
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The approach is illustrated through its application to the IEEE Reliability Test System-1996. 
From the example, it is demonstrated that decisions on the target reliability of the 
individual constituents of the system with respect to disturbance events may be assessed 
and optimized to reach requirements in terms of robustness and resilience. Moreover, the 
framework allows decision-making on how much of the utility generated by the system 
should be kept in reserve to ensure sufficient capacity to recover from disturbances.
The proposed approach applies also to decision support for the optimization of grid topology 
and for any operational and tactical decision context, if decision alternatives are represented 
appropriately in the systems modelling.
Since the computational efforts associated with the representation of the system 
performances are substantial (in the order of minutes on a high performance PC), further 
research and developments on optimization of computational schemes are necessary. 
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Abstract
Electrical power systems have been historically designed and operated to deal with the 
so-called credible events, i.e. N-1 or N-2 outages. However, power systems are indeed 
exposed to much less common events caused by natural disasters and extreme weather, 
which can still significantly impact the electricity supply. It is thus of growing interest to 
design power systems that are highly resilient, in the sense that they need to first withstand 
high impact low probability events (HILP) and then recover as quickly as possible. Unlike the 
well-developed concepts associated with reliability (and security in particular), there is still 
no clear and universal understanding of the concept of resilience, including its modelling, 
quantification and adaptation measures. Hence, this paper provides the fundamentals of 
first distinguishing the concepts of resilience and security and then modelling and assessing 
power systems resilience during an extreme event through a multi-phase resilience trapezoid, 
catering for both operational and infrastructure resilience. A Sequential 
Monte Carlo-based simulation engine is also presented for capturing the 
spatiotemporal impacts of HILP events. A novel resilience metric system 
is introduced to capture the actual response of a power system subject to 
extreme events. At last, quantification of resilience during an event also allows 
application of different structural and operational adaptation strategies for 
boosting power systems resilience to such HILP events. A simplified version of 
the Great Britain transmission system is used for demonstration.
1. Introduction
Electrical power systems, as a critical infrastructure, are key for the sustainability and growth 
of modern societies, since they support several critical services and infrastructures, such as 
transportation, communication and health systems. Hence, given these high and complex 
interdependencies between these critical infrastructures, a disruption in the electricity network 
can have catastrophic consequences.
However, despite the efforts of keeping the power flowing and the lights on under any credible 
events, power systems are occasionally exposed to extreme weather and natural hazards, 
which as evidenced worldwide can be so intense that they can cause the collapse of power 
systems, leading to large and sustained power disruptions. The threats of a power system 
can be broadly categorized in credible or ‘typical’ power system outages and more extreme 
events, driven mainly by natural disasters and extreme weather, whose frequency and 
severity might increase as a direct impact of climate change [1]. Table 1 shows the distinct 
differences between these two categories of events [2].
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Power systems have been traditionally designed to be reliable (secure in particular) to the 
more typical threats. Nevertheless, recent experiences are now signifying the increasing need 
for power systems to also achieve high levels of resilience to natural disasters and extreme 
weather, in order to reduce the frequency and severity of power disruptions. Table 2 shows 
some of the key features that set the concept of resilience apart from the one of security [3]. 
Table 1. Comparison of typical power system outages and extreme events
Typical Power System Outage Extreme Event
Low impact, high probability High impact, low probability
Preventive & corrective control measures portfolio 
in place
No control measures in place (typically)
Random location and time of occurrence Spatiotemporal correlation between faults and 
event
Supported by contingency analysis and 
optimization tools
Limited mathematical tools
Limited number (single or double) of faults due to 
component failures
Multiple simultaneous faults 
Small portion of the network is damaged/collapsed Large portion of the network is damaged/collapsed
Quick restoration More time and resources consuming/longer 
restoration
©
 iStock.com
/Filograph
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Table 2. Comparison of Resilience and Security
Security Resilience
High-probability, low-impact Low-probability, high-impact
Based on average indicators, e.g. loss of load 
frequency
Based on risk profile, e.g. conditional expectation
Shorter term, typically static Longer term, adaptive, ongoing
Evaluates the power system states Evaluates the power systems states and the state 
transitions
Concerned mainly with customer interruption time Concerned with customer interruption time and 
infrastructure recovery time
However, in the context of power systems as critical infrastructures the definition of 
resilience is still blur, despite the several approaches to define resilience by organizations 
worldwide in the last decade or so [4,5]. Further, there is currently not a systematic approach 
for quantifying the impact of natural disasters and extreme weather (as high-impact, low 
probability (HILP) events) on power systems using resilience-oriented metrics, as well as 
quantifying the effects of different strategies for boosting and adapting their resilience to 
such catastrophic events. This is also to be seen in the light of the need of defining and 
measuring different levels of resilience that may be achieved from an operational perspective 
and from an infrastructure perspective.
Based on a conceptual multi-phase resilience trapezoid developed in [6,7], this paper first 
provides insights on the concept of power systems resilience, while making indeed the 
distinction between infrastructure and operational resilience. This also helps understand 
the resilience performance of a power system during a HILP event. Next, a comprehensive 
approach for assessing and quantifying the fragility and resilience of power systems against 
HILP events is presented. Power systems resilience is quantified following the specifically 
developed resilience-oriented metric framework, the so-called ΦΛΕΠ resilience metric system 
[6]. The quantification of resilience allows the application and evaluation of different structural 
and operational adaptation strategies for improving the resilience of a power system to 
future (foreseen or never experienced before) extreme events. The concepts and techniques 
discussed in the paper are demonstrated using a 29-bus test version of the Great Britain (GB) 
transmission system. 
2. Operational and Infrastructure Resilience  
During an HILP Event: Conceptual Multi-Phase 
Resilience Trapezoid
A power system might reside in different states when subject to external shocks, such as 
natural disaster and extreme weather. It is therefore critical to understand and define these 
states in order to develop techniques capable of reflecting the resilience behaviour and 
performance of a power system during an HILP event.
Under these premises, and beyond the so-called resilience triangle [8] used in the majority of 
existing related literature, Figure 1 shows a conceptual multi-phase resilience trapezoid [6,7], 
which clearly demonstrates the states (or phases) of a power system associated with an 
external disturbance. Further, the operational and infrastructure resilience are clearly depicted, 
which should be quantified using different indicators, as demonstrated later. The operational 
resilience, as its name suggests, refers to the characteristics that would secure operational 
strength for a power system, e.g., the ability to ensure the uninterrupted supply to customers 
or generation capacity availability in the face of a disaster. The infrastructure resilience refers 
to the physical strength of a power system for mitigating the portion of the system that is 
damaged, collapsed or in general becomes non-functional. 
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Figure 1. The conceptual multi-phase resilience trapezoid during an HILP event
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Three phases (namely Phases I, II and III) can be clearly seen, which enable the dynamic, 
multi-phase resilience assessment:
• Phase I, disturbance progress (t∈[toe , tee]), between the time of the event toe and the end 
of the event tee,
• Phase II, post-disturbance degraded state following the end of the event and before the 
restoration is initiated (t∈[tee , tor] and t∈[tee , tir] for the operational and infrastructure 
resilience respectively), and
• Phase III, restorative state (t∈[tor , Tor] and t∈[tir , Tir] for the operational and 
infrastructure recovery respectively).
During Phase I, the resilience of the power system subject to the HILP event drops from 
the pre-disturbance operational and infrastructure resilience, R0o and R0i respectively, to 
the post-disturbance resilience levels Rpdo and Rpdi respectively in Phase II, before the 
restorative Phase III is initiated. R0o and R0i are assumed here to be 100%, but this may vary 
depending on the pre-disturbance system conditions and configuration. It also has to be noted 
that Rpdo may be lower or higher than Rpdi, depending on the system and on the severity of 
the event hitting the network, as will be demonstrated later. It is thus system- and event-
specific. Further, as shown in Figure 1, Phases II and III can be divided in two sub-phases: the 
operational and infrastructure post-disturbance degraded states (t∈[tee , tor] and t∈[tee , tir] 
respectively) and the operational and infrastructure recovery (t∈[tor , Tor] and  
t∈[tir , Tir]]), making indeed a distinguish between the two concepts. This enables the 
systematic modelling, quantification of the operational and infrastructure resilience during the 
event, and planning of optimal infrastructure that maximizes targeted resilience metrics.
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3. Fragility and Resilience Assessment of Power 
Systems Subject to HILP Events
This section explains the fragility modelling of a power system exposed to an HILP event, 
discusses the ΦΛΕΠ resilience metric system proposed in [6] and presents the simulation 
procedure for assessing the resilience of power systems against HILP events.
3.1. Fragility modelling
Different approaches have been proposed in the literature for modelling the fragility of critical 
infrastructures to natural disasters and extreme weather. In this work, the concept of fragility 
curves is used for obtaining the time- and hazard-dependent failure probabilities of the power 
system components subject to these events. A fragility function relates the probability of 
failure of a component with the loading imposed by a hazard (e.g., wind speed or earthquake 
intensity). These fragility functions can be derived through different ways, such as empirically, 
experimentally, analytically or using expert judgment. Here, an analytical approach is used for 
deriving these functions [9]. A generic example of a fragility curve is shown in Figure 2, which 
can be expressed by the following fragility function (where P is the failure probability, h is the 
hazard intensity and i is the simulation step):
Figure 2. A generic fragility curve
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3.2. Resilience metrics
In the light of recent rare and extreme events and given the fact that the traditional reliability 
indices (e.g. Loss of Load Frequency, LOLF, and Expected Energy Not Supplied, EENS) are 
dominated by expectation, capable of effectively dealing with events of high or known 
probability, they cannot be considered sufficient for characterizing the resilience of power 
systems. These indices need to be complemented by a set of resilience metrics capable of 
modelling the actual behaviour of a power system and quantifying its resilience performance 
during a HILP event. Within the context of the resilience trapezoid of Figure 1, these metrics 
need to be able to quantify particular features of a power system associated to an extreme 
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event, i.e., how fast (Φ) and how low (Λ) resilience drops in Phase I, how extensive (E) is 
the post-event degraded state (Phase II) and how promptly (Π) the network recovers to its 
pre-event resilient state (Phase III), considering both operational and infrastructure resilience 
in each phase. This set of four metrics is defined in this work as the ΦΛΕΠ resilience metric 
system shown in Table 3 (“ΦΛΕΠ” is pronounced like “FLEP”). As suggested in [6], a linear 
approximation is considered for the transitions between the resilience levels/states of the 
resilience trapezoid, to quantify the resilience metrics.
Table 3. The ΦΛΕΠ resilience metric system
Phase State Resilience metric Symbol
I Disturbance progress
How fast resilience drops? Φ
How low resilience drops? Λ
II Post-disturbance degraded
How extensive is the post-
disturbance degraded state? E
III Restorative
How promptly does the network 
recover? Π
In order to quantify the operational and infrastructure resilience during an HILP event, 
different resilience indicators are used in this work (focusing on the impacts of extreme events 
on the transmission network), as follows:
• the amount of generation capacity (MW) and load demand (MW) that are connected during 
the event are used as indicators for the operational resilience; and
• the number of online transmission lines is used as an indicator for the infrastructure 
resilience.
3.3. Modelling power systems resilience during an HILP events 
In order to model the multi-temporal and multi-spatial impacts of extreme events, the 
time- and hazard-dependent failure probabilities obtained by the fragility curves are fed to 
a Sequential Monte Carlo-based probabilistic simulation tool. A component outage occurs if 
the failure probability of a component P(hi) is larger than a randomly generated uniformly 
distributed number r~U(0,1) as follows:
where F(hi) is the failure function of the component.
Following a component outage, its Time to Repair (TTR) is randomly generated. This TTR 
mainly includes the time for the repair crew to reach the failed component and the time for 
the repair crew to complete the restoration of the component. It is thus dependent on the 
severity of the extreme event, which would affect both the accessibility to the affected areas 
and the damage on the components. 
By systematically following this approach at every simulation step, the hazard-dependent 
status and resilience of the individual power system components, and in turn of the entire 
power system, can be determined. By applying an appropriate dispatch tool, e.g. AC OPF, the 
information required for calculating the resilience indicators and metrics is recorded at every 
simulation step. This provides useful insights on the resilience performance of the power 
system during the extreme event, e.g. how low and how fast resilience drops, which would 
support the targeted resilience enhancement (such as [10]) where it is considered critical for 
building highly resilient systems to both typical and unforeseen threats.
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4. Case Study Application
The focus of the case study application is on assessing the impacts of severe windstorms 
passing across the GB transmission network. For this purpose, a 29-bus test version of 
the GB transmission network is used, shown in Figure 3. More details for this test system 
can be found in [11]. The transmission network components considered in this analysis 
are transmission lines and towers, whose wind fragility curves are shown in Figure 4 [9]. 
A simulation time of one day (24hrs) is used, with an hourly simulation step, while it is 
assumed that the windstorm hits the network at 50hr. The wind data are obtained by 
MERRA re-analysis, which are scaled-up using multiplication factors to represent extreme 
windstorms [9].
Figure 3. The 29-bus test version of 
the GB transmission network [11]
Figure 4. Wind fragility curves of 
transmission lines and towers (base and 
robust case studies) [9]
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4.1. Quantifying the resilience trapezoid using the ΦΛΕΠ metrics 
Figure 5 shows the time-dependent resilience indicators for a grid-scale windstorm with a 
maximum wind speed (wmax) of 50m/s as an illustrative example (similar analysis and 
results can be obtained for windstorms of different severity, i.e. maximum wind speed). It can 
be clearly seen that the proposed methodology can effectively model the resilience trapezoid 
of Fig. 1, as its three phases can be clearly distinguished. It can also be observed that the 
operational and infrastructure resilience indicators react differently during the event, stressing 
the fact that it is critical to evaluate the resilience of a network from both the operational 
and infrastructure perspectives. Therefore, by utilizing the approach proposed in this paper, 
the resilience performance during a HILP event can be effectively represented using a set of 
resilience indicators. It is worth-noting here that any resilience indicator can be used, given 
the focus of the specific application.
Based on the simulation results of Figure 5, the ΦΛΕΠ resilience metrics for wmax=50m/s 
are next calculated and presented in Table 4, which enables the quantification of the 
resilience trapezoid of Figure 1. Critical insights on the actual behaviour and on the 
operational and infrastructure resilience of a power system during the different phases of a 
HILP event are obtained, which can drive the application of targeted resilience enhancement. 
It has to be noted that the Φ-metric is negative as the resilience level is decreasing in 
Phase I of the resilience trapezoid. 
43 |
Figure 5. Time-dependent resilience indicators 
for wmax =50m/s
Figure 6. Transmission lines online (%) 
for wmax ==50m/s for different case studies
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Table 4. Quantifying the time-dependent system performance 
of Figure 5 using the ΦΛΕΠ metrics
Resilience 
Metric
Resilience Indicator
Transmission Lines Generation Connected Load Connected
Φ -1.083 (% of Lines tripped/h)
-0.521 (% of MW 
lost/h)
-0.249 (% of MW 
lost/h)
Λ 26 (% of Lines tripped) 12.5 (% of MW lost) 5.99 (% of MW lost)
Ε 53 (hrs) 54 (hrs) 57 (hrs)
Π 0.058 (% of Lines restored/h) 0.033 (MW restored/h) 0.072 (MW restored/h)
Table 5. The ΦΛΕΠ metrics for the case studies of Figure 6
Resilience 
Metric
Resilience Indicator
Base 20% More Robust 20% More Response
Φ -1.083 (% of Lines tripped/hr)
-0.25 (% of Lines 
tripped/hr)
-1.083 (% of Lines 
tripped/hr)
Λ 26 (% of Lines tripped) 6 (% of Lines tripped) 26 (% of Lines tripped)
Ε 53 (hrs) 53 (hrs) 44 (hrs)
Π 0.058 (% of Lines restored/hr)
0.019 (% of Lines 
restored/hr)
0.092 (% of Lines 
restored/hr)
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4.2. Quantifying the effect of operational and infrastructure strate-
gies using the ΦΛΕΠ metrics 
The effect of two resilience enhancement strategies is next evaluated using the new ΦΛΕΠ 
resilience metric system. In particular, the first strategy deals with making the transmission 
network more robust to the windstorm, which is modelled by modifying the wind fragility 
curves of the transmission lines and towers as shown in Figure 4. The second strategy refers 
to improving the responsiveness to the extreme event, which can be achieved through the 
application of different smart strategies, e.g. advanced monitoring and communication 
and advanced warning and visualization tools for achieving higher situational awareness. 
In this application, it is considered that a higher responsiveness means faster restoration 
of the faulted, damaged components. For demonstration purposes, it is assumed that the 
robustness and responsiveness are improved by 20% compared to the base case study 
demonstrated in the Section 4.1.
Figure 6 shows the transmission lines online (%) for these case scenarios for wmax=50m/s 
and Table 5 depicts the corresponding ΦΛΕΠ metrics. It can be clearly seen that the 
proposed methodology can effectively graphically demonstrate the effect of these resilience 
enhancement strategies (Figure 6), as well as quantify this effect using the ΦΛΕΠ metrics 
(Table 5). Such a comprehensive resilience assessment framework can suppor the decision-
making on the most suitable investment pathway for improving the resilience of a power 
system to extreme events, i.e. make the network stronger, more robust, or smarter and more 
responsive? 
5. Conclusions
Power systems resilience is of growing interest given recent experiences with HILP events 
worldwide, mainly driven by natural disasters and extreme weather. Despite its criticality, 
there is still no clear and universal understanding of the concept of resilience, including its 
quantification and adaptation measures. This paper provides an overview of the fundamental 
concepts associated to power systems resilience, illustrates the resilience trapezoid enabling 
quantitative assessment of the multi-phase resilience of a system during an HILP event 
and evaluates the contribution of different operational and infrastructure strategies to 
the resilience enhancement of a power system. This altogether demonstrates the need 
and importance of using resilience-oriented metrics for modelling the actual response of 
a network, rather than relying only on the traditional reliability indices. Within this context, 
the ΦΛΕΠ resilience metric system is demonstrated through the case study of the GB 
transmission network, providing useful information to the system operator on the actual 
response of the system during the event. It is also demonstrated that the ΦΛΕΠ metric 
system can provide critical insights on the benefits of different operational and infrastructure 
resilience strategies, contributing to the decision-making and planning of a system operator 
for improving the resilience of the system through targeted investment in the most suitable 
strategies. 
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Abstract
• The recent financial crisis had serious worldwide impacts. Initial resilience and good past 
performances led to the illusion that the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region was 
able to decouple from developments in advanced economies. This initial illusion was 
however immediately denied by the facts that the crisis spread to that region just with a 
lag. The CEE region was, in fact, suddenly placed at the epicenter of the emerging market 
crisis. Further, the consequences of the crisis were not uniform among countries of the CEE 
region. Strong cross-country disparities in the resistance and recovery capacities have been 
observed. 
• Our research project aims to analyze and disentangle the resilience performance to the 
financial crisis within CEE countries according to their shock isolation and absorptive 
capacities. We develop and estimate (by Bayesian techniques) a DSGE model for a small-
open economy. Our model is individually estimated for a sample of Central 
and Eastern European countries. It features nominal wage and price rigidities, 
as well as financial frictions in the form of liquidity constrained households 
and limited access to deposits for the bank system. We focus on two 
dimensions of the regional resilience: resistance and recovery. Specifically, 
by using our estimation we aim to quantify the relative vulnerability or 
sensitivity of economies within CEE region to disturbances and disruptions 
(resistance) and the speed and extent of recovery from such a disruption or 
recession (recovery).
1. Introduction
The global financial crisis had a serious impact on mature and emerging economies. The 
consequences were not uniform. Europe was characterized by strong cross-country differences 
in the resistance and recovery capacities. The economic decline was more intense in the 
countries at the periphery of the European Union and in those with fragile public finances. 
Initially, the crisis only marginally affected the Central and Eastern European region, which 
had previously observed high growth rates. The past good performance and the initial 
resilience led to claims that the region had “decoupled” from developments in advanced 
economies. However, the decoupling hypothesis was an illusion, the crisis spread to the CEE 
region just with a lag. After the Lehman Brothers crack, in fact, the CEE region was suddenly 
10 The authors are most grateful to the RSA Central & Eastern Europe Conference 2017 participants for useful comments and to 
Nicola Acocella and Patrizio Tirelli for their constructive insights on previous versions. The authors also acknowledge financial 
support by Sapienza University of Rome. The views expressed are the authors' and do not necessarily correspond to those of the 
European Commission.
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placed at the epicenter of the emerging market crisis (Roaf et al., 2014).11 
Our aim is to analyze and disentangle the resilience to the financial crisis within the CEE 
region. The impact of the crisis on economic activity has varied widely across countries, 
reflecting differences in exposure and vulnerability to the financial shocks as well as 
heterogeneity in policy responses. We plan to measure and explain the disparities in the 
resistance and recovery capacities of CEE economies by estimating and simulating medium–
scale DSGE models. Specifically, our objective is to measure two dimensions of the regional 
resilience, namely resistance and recovery. The former is the vulnerability or sensitivity of 
a regional economy to disturbances and disruptions. The latter is the speed and extent of 
recovery from such a disruption or recession (Martin, 2012).
We built a small-open economy for distinct CEE economies and estimate it by Bayesian 
techniques. The model features standard nominal wage and price rigidities, and financial 
frictions. Financial frictions assume the forms of liquidity–constrained households and limited 
access to the deposits from the bank system. The financial accelerator of external shocks 
operates on the relationships between savers and banks featured by asymmetric information. 
An agency problem introduces endogenous constraints on the leverage ratios. Then, credit flows 
are tied to the equity capital of intermediaries. A financial crisis deteriorates intermediary capital 
and raises credit costs, lowering lending and borrowing (Gertler and Karadi, 2011).
Once estimated, we investigate the effects of the financial crisis by looking at the variance 
decomposition of CEE countries. Then we use the model to compute two measures of 
resilience to financial frictions. First, we look at the different stochastic structure estimated, 
the estimated standard deviations of the financial shocks and their auto–correlation give 
us a measure of the different vulnerability (or sensitivity) of CEE emerging markets. Second, 
we impose to all the countries within the CEE region a common stochastic structure and use 
simulations to derive a measure of their different recovery capacities.
Our paper is related to research that study the resilience of regional economies and the 
recent strand of DSGE model that introduces financial frictions into a New Keynesian 
framework.
11 Comparing the performances of 183 economies, Didier et al. (2012) also claim against the decoupling hypothesis with reference 
to emerging economies and their resilience.
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Concerning the first strand of literature, notwithstanding the growing interest among macro–
economists, regional analysts, spatial economists, and economic geographers, the idea of 
resilience is associated to some ambiguities. Ambiguities are related to the different uses 
and interpretations of the term.12 However, ambiguities should not be to rush to dismiss the 
concept, they vanish once that a clear definition is assumed (Martin, 2012). 
A useful taxonomy of resilience is provided by Martin (2012). He summarizes resilience in 
four dimensions. i) Resistance as the degree of sensitivity or depth of reaction of regional 
economy to a recessionary shock. ii) Recovery as the speed and degree of recovery of 
regional economy from a recessionary shock. iii) Renewal as the extent to which regional 
economy renews its growth path: resumption of pre-recession path or hysteretic shift to new 
growth trend. iv) Re-orientation as the extent of re-orientation and adaptation of regional 
economy in response to recessionary shock. Our paper matches the first two dimensions, 
whereas is only indirectly related to the others. 
An alternative related definition of resilient society is provided by Manca et al. (2017: 5). “A 
resilient society is able to cope with and react to shocks or persistent structural changes by 
either resisting to it (absorptive capacity) or by adopting a degree of flexibility and making 
small changes to the system (adaptive capacity). At the limit, when disturbances are not 
manageable anymore, the system needs to engineer bigger changes, which in extreme cases 
will lead to a transformation (transformative capacity).” We evaluate the absorptive and 
adaptive capacities of the CEE region and, somehow, its ex-post transformative capacity, i.e., 
the capacity of CEE economies to have implemented in the past crises changes that permit 
them to cope with the recent global turmoil. 
Regarding the developments of DSGE literature in the direction of financial frictions, we borrow 
the specification of the banking sector from Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki 
(2011), explicit modeling financial intermediation. An agency problem introduces endogenous 
constraints on the leverage ratios of intermediaries. As a result, in the financial sector, credit 
flows are tied to the equity capital of intermediaries. A deterioration of intermediary capital 
raises credit costs, lowering lending and borrowing. Their approach to model credit frictions has 
become quite popular (e.g., Lendvai et al., 2013; Andreasen et al., 2013; Beqiraj el al., 2016; 
Rannenberg, 2016), especially to study the effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy in 
financial crisis (e.g., Dedola et al., 2013; Gertler and Karadi, 2013, 2015).13 
Alternative models to Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011) have been 
suggested. Other New Keynesian extensions to financial frictions are built on the external 
finance premium introduced by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Bernanke et al. (1999) or 
collateral constraints based on Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). A discussion of DSGE extensions 
to financial frictions is outside the scope of the present paper, different approaches are 
critically surveyed by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Christiano et al. (2014) and Brzoza-Brzezina 
et al. (2015). 
The different paths of the key macroeconomic variables for the three countries taken into 
consideration suggest that a further study on the role and the effects of financial crises on the 
economic activity. Based on this starting point we will investigate the effects of the financial 
crisis by looking at the variance decomposition of CEE countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly illustrates the impact of the 
global financial crisis in the CEE region. Section 3 presents our estimation results. By using our 
empirical outcomes, Section 4 discusses the resilience of CEE economies in a comparative 
perspective. Section 5 concludes. Our theoretical regional model is provided in Appendix.
12 See Christopherson et al. (2010), Hudson, (2010), Pendall et al. (2010), Martin (2012).
13 Alternative models have been suggested, other New Keynesian extensions to financial frictions are built on the external finance 
premium introduced by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Bernanke et al. (1999) or collateral constraints based on Kiyotaki and Moore 
(1997). Different approaches are critically surveyed by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Christiano et al. (2014) and Brzoza-Brzezina et 
al. (2015).
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2. CEE region and the financial crisis
Economies of the CEE region have been severally affected by recent global financial turmoil. 
External shocks, from Lehman Brothers’ collapse to the euro-zone sovereign debt crisis, had 
devastating effects, hitting CEE hardest among the emerging markets regions. The weak 
performance of CEE region resulted from the combination of initial imbalances and external 
financial shocks. The imbalances that built up in the Great Moderation period left in fact the 
transition economies highly vulnerable. However, CEE countries were differently impacted 
by global financial instability according to the strength, timing and speed of the impact. For 
instance, the crisis was managed quite well by Poland and the Czech Republic, while the 
Baltic States, Bulgaria and Romania experienced huge collapse in GDP. As a result, the debate 
on resilience capacity, i.e., the multidimensional attitude of economic systems to isolate from, 
absorb shocks, adapt or transform towards new sustainable development path, emerged with 
stronger emphasis in the aftermath of the crisis. 
The eruption of the global financial crisis triggered high risks of banking instability in CEE 
region. The expected unwinding of real estate booms and the potential disruptive adjustment 
of exchange rates, and macroeconomic imbalances were expected to wreak havoc on bank 
balance sheets. However, banking crises were generally avoided; portfolio losses in fact were 
gradually absorbed by considerable preexisting buffers and macroeconomic adjustment 
proceeded more smoothly than expected.14 Notable exceptions were Latvia, Ukraine, and 
(somehow) Slovenia.15 
Anyway, the global financial crisis hard hit the CEE region through their open economy 
channel. The crash of property prices in some countries and distressed domestic financial 
markets, where financial institutions were exposed by toxic debts, triggered a massive 
contraction of lending (global deleveraging) and reduced the willingness of financial markets 
to finance sovereign debt. The recession then reduced demand for exports in Western Europe, 
impacting on production and employment in CEE small-open economies16 and to a less 
extend to larger CEE economies, as Poland and Romania. In 2009 all CEE counties faced 
massive reduction in their exports on GDP. The best performance was that of Romania: a 
reduction of 14% on previous period (in 2008 it was instead +14%); the worst country was 
instead Lithuania, where exports fall of 27% (in 2008 the share was 29%, but the sign was 
opposite).
In the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers’ collapse, the most evident effect of the crisis was a 
decrease in GDP growth rate followed by absolute decrease in its volume. A dramatic slump 
happened in 2009. All CEE countries experienced a fall in GDP volumes compared to 2008, 
except Poland. In Baltic Republics percentage decrease was two-digit. 
The impact of the recessionary shock on the growth path of CEE economies is shown in Figure 
1. However, this national picture observes quite disparate—in fact, strongly divergent—GDP 
growth patterns among the major countries of the region. Heterogeneous trends are the 
product of multiple underlying forces and processes. CEE countries have differently reacted to 
the financial turmoil and associated recession exhibiting disparities in the degree of resilience.
The crisis strongly affected Baltic countries, which were more lively before the Lehman 
Brothers’ crash. A similar patter can be observed in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Slovenia, and Romania. Poland and Slovak Republic GDP were only moderately affected. 
Indeed, Poland has not experienced recession, keeping all the time positive rate of GDP 
growth. Already in 2009, Poland, Slovakia, and Bulgaria experienced a real GDP above its 
2007 level. Other countries take much more time to recover. In Latvia, e.g., GDP decline 
continued in the first half of 2010.
14 Several factors prevented disruptive macroeconomic adjustments; among them, lending arrangements from IMF and other EU in 
member countries; EBRD, EIB, and World Bank provided funds to the banking system. Banking systems also benefited from the 
prevalence of parent-subsidiary relationships.
15 Latvia experienced the collapse of a large bank, Ukraine had widespread problems, and Slovenia observed relatively small and 
targeted recapitalization.
16 It is worth noting that exports in the Czech and Slovak Republics, Estonia and Hungary account for about 70-80% of GDP.
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Figure 1. Growth and recessionary shocks in selected CEE economy 
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Similar patterns can be observed in the employment dynamics. As noted by Martin (2012), 
movements in employment are more significant since it tends to take much longer than 
output to recover from recession. Moreover, regional local economies may resume output 
growth after a recession without recovering in employment (jobless recovery). During the 
recession, employment fell in all countries besides Poland, though less than proportionally to 
the decrease in GDP. However, in Estonia and Latvia was two-digit, whereas in the others it 
was less than 3 per cent. In Hungary, Lithuania and Estonia some decrease took place already 
in 2008. In the first half of 2010 employment was declining in all countries besides Slovenia. 
The highest decline was registered in Baltic Republics and Bulgaria.
3. Empirical analysis
3.1. Methodology
• The model is estimated, via Bayesian techniques, using aggregate quarterly macro data 
on three CEE economies namely Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania ranging from 1996:Q1 to 
2016:Q4. The model is estimated by using 11 macroeconomic time-series: real GDP, 
consumption, investment, export, import, real wage, output deflator, consumption deflator, 
export deflator, import deflator and interest rate.
• Real GDP, real consumption, real investment, real import and export are obtained using the 
appropriate deflators. The Fed funds rate is used as a proxy for the nominal interest rate. 
In order to avoid stochastic singularity eleven stochastic shocks are considered: risk premium 
shock on domestic and foreign bond holdings, transitory technology, domestic and foreign 
price mark-up, wage mark-up, investment specific, net foreign asset process worth, exchange 
rate process, inflation. 
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Data exhibiting a trend have been filtered by the Baxter-King band-pass filter. As noted by 
Stock and Watson (1999) and Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003), this filter should capture 
medium frequency fluctuations, and eliminate both the high frequency fluctuations (periods 
less than six quarters) associated, e.g., with measurement errors and the low frequency 
fluctuations (periods exceeding eight years) associated with trend growth. This implies that 
the gain of the ideal linear filter is unitary for frequencies of the business cycle and zero 
elsewhere (see Stock and Watson, 1999, for details). Data exhibiting a non-zero mean like 
inflation, nominal interest rate and the spread have been demeaned.
Estimates are achieved in three steps. After taking a log-linear approximation of the 
equilibrium conditions around the steady state, the model solution is expressed in state-
space form and the likelihood function of the model is computed using a Kalman-filter 
recursion. By combining the prior distribution over the parameters of the model with the 
likelihood function, the posterior distribution of parameters is obtained via the Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm.
Distributions of priors are fully specified and the estimates hinge on prior assumptions about 
the range of admissible values. Bayesian estimation relies on the well-known Bayes’ rule:
where p(θ) is the prior assigned to parameter θ, denotes the likelihood and p(θ|YT) is the 
posterior density. Formally, one combines the prior distribution and the likelihood function to 
obtain the posterior distribution; however, in complex problems, this is typically not available 
in closed form and simulation strategies, like Markov Chain Monte Carlo, are necessary. Here 
we have used the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.17
From identification analysis (Iskrev, 2010) we select the subset of identifiable parameters. 
The remaining are calibrated as common practice in Bayesian estimation. Several parameters 
are calibrated and ruled out from the estimation. Calibration is illustrated in Table 1.
Table 1. Calibration
Parameters Decription Value
β discount factor 0.990
κ Kimball parameter 10.00
εdp price elasticity of demand 6.000
εmp price elasticity of demand 6.000
εxp price elasticity of demand 6.000
h home bias 0.056
α capital share 0.300
ω transfer to the entering bankers 0.002
θ bankers' survival probability 0.972
17 For a wider discussion on Bayesian methods applied to DSGE estimation see An and Schorfheide (2007) and Fernández-Villaverde 
(2010).
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3.2. Estimation results
Prior distributions are elicited according to the Table 2. For the domestic Calvo parameter 
and the probability of being able to reset prices of the export and import retail firms a Beta 
distribution has been assigned; the degree of indexation to past inflation follows a Beta 
distribution; the exchange rate elasticity to net foreign asset, the parameters for elasticity of 
substitution, the inverse of the Frisch elasticity and the relative risk aversion coefficient follow 
a Normal distribution. A Beta distribution has been assigned to the share of non-Ricardian 
households. 
Table 2. Prior and posterior distribution for key parameters
Prior Posterior Posterior Posterior
(Hungary) (Estonia) (Lithuania
Density Mean St. dev. Mean Mean Mean
γ dind Beta 0.50 0.15 0.174 0.171 0.177
γ mind Beta 0.50 0.15 0.677 0.287 0.262
γ xind Beta 0.50 0.15 0.177 0.267 0.257
γw Beta 0.66 0.1 0.793 0.889 0.853
γ wind Beta 0.50 0.15 0.586 0.288 0.613
λ Beta 0.3 0.15 0.251 0.28 0.255
η Normal 1.50 0.25 1.905 1.898 1.002
η* Normal 1.50 0.25 0.609 1.258 1.218
φ a Normal 0.01 0.005 0.009 0.001 0.009
z Normal 7.2 2.50 6.404 8.368 7.126
σ Normal 1.50 0.375 1.968 1.930 1.690
φ Normal 2.00 0.75 3.294 1.963 2.495
hb Beta 0.7 0.1 0.870 0.886 0.798
ηi Normal 5.5 0.5 6.291 5.783 5.581
γ dp Beta 0.66 0.1 0.439 0.836 0.879
γ mp Beta 0.66 0.1 0.793 0.447 0.313
γ xp Beta 0.66 0.1 0.734 0.652 0.454
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4. Resilience in CEE countries: A comparison
As expected, a negative shock to the net worth in t=1 implies a fall in investment and 
output as well due to the increase in the risk premium and volatility. Hours worked decrease 
and the real wages go up immediately after the shock with some positive effects on the 
consumption due to the non-Ricardian households. The positive effect on consumption 
due to the limited constrained households is not sufficient, given the share of the latter, to 
obtain positive responses of total consumption in which the interest rate plays a crucial role. 
Figure 1 illustrates the response of macro variables to a negative financial shock in the three 
estimated countries namely Estonia (red), Hungary (blue), Lithuania (yellow). The impact of 
the crisis was smoothed and less permanent in Hungary compared to Lithuania and Estonia 
which both experienced sharp decline in real GDP and consumption. The collapse of real 
investment was particularly marked in Estonia. 
Figure 2. Impulse response of key macro variables in selected CEE countries
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5. Conclusions 
The different paths of the key macroeconomic variables for the three countries taken into 
consideration suggest a further study on the role and the effects of financial crises on the 
economic activity. Based on this starting point we will investigate the effects of the financial 
crisis by looking at the variance decomposition of CEE countries. Then we will use the model 
to compute two measures of resilience to financial frictions. First, we look at the different 
stochastic structure estimated, the estimated standard deviations of the financial shocks and 
their autocorrelation give us a measure of the different vulnerability (or sensitivity) of CEE 
emerging markets.
Second, we impose to all the countries within the CEE region a common stochastic structure 
and use simulations to derive a measure of their different recovery capacities.
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Appendix – A small open-economy model with financial 
imperfections
We consider a simple small-open medium–scale New Keynesian economy characterized 
by nominal price and wage rigidities, consumption habits and investment adjustment costs. 
The economy is augmented with an imperfect banking sector by assuming that firms borrow 
indirectly from households through the banking sector that operates in an imperfect financial 
market. Financial frictions are twofold: i) Only a fraction of the households can access the 
credit market by financial intermediaries (limited–asset market participation assumption, 
LAMP henceforth).18 ii) An agency problem between banks and their depositors implies that 
financial intermediaries are subject to endogenously determined balance sheet constraints 
that could limit the ability of non–financial firms to obtain investment funds (Gertler and 
Karadi, 2011). 
Production
The supply side of the economy is characterized by a retail competitive sector that combine 
intermediate goods produced by labor and capital to obtain the final consumption good. 
The final sector operates under imperfect competition and is subject to price stickiness. By 
contrast, intermediate goods and capital producing firms operate in competitive markets. 
Intermediate firms borrow from the banks to acquire physical capital. 
The intermediate goods sector is composed by a continuum of competitive producers. The 
typical firm uses labor inputs and capital to produce an intermediate goods Yt sold to retail 
firms, according to the following Cobb–Douglas technology:
where α ∈ is the labor share, At represents the total factor productivity, Lt denotes labor 
inputs hired, Kt is the capital stock and ukt is the utilization rate of the capital. Capital 
acquisition is financed by borrowing from a financial intermediary. 
Denoting the real wage by Wt, the real marginal cost by MCt, the capital depreciation 
function by δ(ukt ), and the market value of a unit of capital by Qt, the firm’s first–order 
conditions are:
which implicitly define a labor and capital demand (utilization rate of the physical capital). 
18 See Galí et al. (2007).
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Capital producing firms act in an environment characterized by perfect competition. At the 
end of period t, they buy capital from the intermediate sector repairing the depreciated 
capital and building new capital stock. Both the repaired and the new capital are then sold. A 
typical capital producing firm maximizes discounted profits, i.e., 
where F(1) = F'(1)= 0 and , F''(1) > 0, β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor, Λt,τ denotes the 
stochastic discount factor between t and τ, IONt ≡ IOt  – δ(ukt )KOt  is the net capital created (IOt 
and IOSS are gross capital and its steady state) and Qt should be interpreted as the Tobin’s Q. 
As we will explain in the next section, we denote capital and investment by a superscript “O” 
to take account for the limited-asset market participation assumption. Then, Kt = (1 – λ)KOt  
and It = (1 – λ)IOt, where λ is the fraction of agents who are not allowed to access to the 
financial markets (recall that these agents do not own neither assets nor firms equity capital). 
The first–order condition for investment is then 
which describes the Q relation for net investments. 
The domestic retail firms operate in an imperfect competition environment. Aggregation is 
obtained as follows 
where Yt (j) is the domestic output by the domestic retailer j and ε dp is the elasticity of 
substitution between differentiated domestic goods. 
In this setup, prices are sticky according to a Calvo mechanism (we denote by 1 – y dp 
the probability of being able to reset prices). The corresponding optimal domestic 
price adjustment and aggregate domestic inflation are then described by the following 
expressions:19 
where ydind indicates the domestic degree of indexation to past inflation. 
The domestic auxiliary variables Υtd,p and Ξtd,p evolve as: 
19 The price inflation is π dt; Pt/Pt – 1; πt d,* is the price inflation of the adjusting firm.
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The export and import retail firms also face sticky prices (we denote by 1 – γ xρ  and 1 – γ mρ 
the probability of being able to reset prices of the export and import retail firms, respectively). 
Each of them faces the foreign demand for the domestic goods, 
 
or the 
domestic demand for the foreign consumption, C mt ,   
and investment, I mt , goods, i.e.,
  
In analogy with the 
domestic retail firms, optimal price adjustments and aggregate inflation rates for the export,  
l = x, and import, l = m, retail firms are described by the following expressions:20 
where ε lρ is the elasticity of substitution between differentiated l-type goods’ and γ lind 
indicates the l-type goods’ degree of indexation to past inflation. 
The export and import auxiliary variables γtl,p and Ξtl,p evolve as: 
where MC xt = P dt /et P xt and MC mt = P *t et/P mt  are the export and import marginal costs, 
respectively, with et defining the nominal exchange rate. 
Financial market
Limited–asset market participation
Households can be either liquidity constrained or not. However, apart from their ability to access 
to the financial market they share the same kind of preferences. Formally, there is a continuum 
of households in the space [0,1]. The household’s period preferences are defined as:
where Ct is the aggregate consumption, h ∈ [0,1) denotes the habits in consumption 
parameter, χ measures the relative weight of the labor disutility, φ is the inverse Frisch 
elasticity of labor supply and σ is the relative risk–aversion coefficient. 
20 The price inflation is π lt = Pt/Pt – 1; πt l,*  is the price inflation of the adjusting firm.
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Non–liquidity constrained households (“dynamic optimizer households” from now on) solve 
the following intertemporal optimization problem
where C Ot is the consumption of the dynamic optimizer households, Rt and Rt* are the gross 
real domestic and foreign return of one period real domestic and foreign bonds, respectively, 
Bt and Bt* are the total quantity of short term domestic and foreign debt that the household 
acquires, respectively, Πt  are the net payouts to the household from ownership of both non–
financial and financial firms and Tt is a lump sum net transfer. Finally, Φt denotes the risk 
premium on foreign bond holdings given by 
where At = et B*t+1 denotes the net foreign assets (NFA) position, Φa denotes the risk 
premium elasticity to the NFA position and uΦt is the risk premium shock on foreign bond 
holdings, which is assumed to follow a first order autoregressive stochastic process 
. 
From the non-liquidity constraint household’s optimization problem, the first–order conditions 
for consumption, C Ot , domestic and foreign bond holdings, Bt and B*t respectively, are: 
where Λt,t+1 = ρ Ot+1/ρ Ot, denotes the stochastic discount rate. 
Instead, LAMP households solve:
According to the budget constraint, their optimal consumption is equal to
and their marginal utility of consumption is
The aggregate demand for consumption goods is obtained using a CES aggregator of 
domestically produced and imported consumption, Ct, and investment, It, i.e.,
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where, from households’ cost minimization problem, the demand for domestic and foreign 
produced consumption and investment goods are given by  
C dt = (1 – v)[P dt/Pt]-η Ct, I dt = (1 – v)[P dt/Pt]-η It, C mt  = v[P mt /Pt]-η Ct and  
I mt = v[P mt /Pt]-η it respectively, where v denotes the home bias parameter and η is the 
elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods. P dt and P mt  denote the price 
indexes of domestic and imported goods, respectively, such that:
The banks’ balance sheet constraints
Each dynamic optimizer household is composed by workers and bankers. The workers supply 
labor and redistribute their labor income within their household. Each banker manages a 
financial intermediary and returns its earnings back to its family. Banks are owned by the 
fraction of households that are dynamic optimizers as well. Each period a fraction Θ of 
bankers survives while a fraction 1 – Θ exits and is replaced. 
Each banker can divert a fraction ζ of funds to its family. Diverting assets can be profitable 
for a banker who can then default on his debt and shut down, and correspondingly represent 
a loss for creditors who could reclaim the fraction 1 – ζ of assets, at most. 
Financial intermediaries obtain Bjt+1 funds from the dynamic optimizer households (short–
term liabilities) and lend them to non–financial firms (holding long–term assets). Each bank 
faces a quantity of financial claims Sjt by the non–financial firms and owns an amount of net 
worth denoted by Njt. Thus, the balance sheet of an intermediary is:
where Qt is the relative price of a financial claim. 
The bank pays back a real gross return Rt+1 on the funds obtained from the household and 
earns the stochastic return Rkt+1 on the loans to non–financial firms. Njt can be thought as 
the intermediaries’ equity capital and it is obtained as the difference between the earnings on 
assets (Rkt+1Qt Sjt( and interest payments on liabilities (Rt+1Bjt+1). Hence:
The term (Rkt+1 – Rt+1( represents the premium that the banker earns on his assets. 
Each banker’s objective is to maximize the expected discounted present value of its future 
flows of net worth Nt, that is:
Following Gertler and Karadi (2011), in order to avoid that in presence of positive premium 
the bankers will expand its loans indefinitely, it is assumed that there is a limit to do this 
represented by the presence of a moral hazard problem. 
As a consequence, depositors would restrict their credit to banks as they realize that the 
following incentive constraint must hold for the banks in order to prevent them from diverting 
funds: 
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i.e., the potential loss of diverting assets (l.h.s. of the above equation) should be greater than 
the gain from doing so (r.h.s. of the above expression). Moreover, Vjt can be expressed as
where ηt is a variable representing the expected discounted value of having an additional 
unit of net worth and vt must be interpreted as the expected discounted marginal gain to the 
banker of expanding assets Qt Sjt by a unit.21 
In this framework, the financial intermediary can acquire assets accordingly to his equity 
capital:
where φt is the private leverage ratio, i.e., the ratio of privately intermediated assets to 
equity.
Labor market
Labor markets are imperfect: sticky wages are set by monopolistic unions, who represent 
differentiated labor inputs provided by both dynamic optimizers and LAMP agents. Labor 
unions set the nominal wages facing nominal rigidities à la Calvo. Labor is aggregated by  
a Dixit–Stiglitz function, where we indicate the elasticity of substitution between labor inputs 
by εw. 
Formally, a typical union chooses the optimal nominal wage Wt*  to maximize a weighted 
utility function:
where γw is the probability to keep the wage unchanged in the future. 
Solving the above problem we obtain the adjustment dynamics for wage inflation22 
Auxiliary variables γtw and ξtw evolve according to:
21 See Gertler and Karadi (2011) for the evolution of vt and ηt and a wider discussion about the agency problem.
22 The wage inflation is ; πtw = Wt/ Wt –1; πtw* = W*t/ Wt –1 is the wage inflation of the adjusting union.
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Aggregation, resource constraint, and government policies
The economy–wide resource constraint is given by
where ψ indicates the elasticity of investment adjustment cost. 
The market clearing condition in the foreign bond market requires that, at the equilibrium, the 
equation for NFA evolution is satisfied:
As in Galì et al. (2007), the aggregate consumption is
The total value of intermediated assets is:
The law of motion of capital is
Government expenditures Gt are financed by lump sum taxes 
Finally, the nominal interest rate it follows a simple Taylor rule
where ρ denotes the degree of interest rate smoothing, Kπ measures the response of the 
monetary authority to inflation and πt = Pt /Pt –1 denotes the CPI inflation gross rate. 
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Abstract
The recent global recession and consequent slow recovery have revealed 
considerable heterogeneity in economic performance across countries, regions 
and local actors. This study aims at constructing a simple composite indicator 
to measure and monitor economic system resilience at regional level in order 
to facilitate a common easily understanding of this complex and dynamic 
process for decision makers and for the general public.
1. Introduction
In the last years the European Union (EU) has been probably hit by the worst crisis in its history. 
The roots of this crisis are the combination of a loss of competitiveness and high indebtedness23 
especially of periphery countries in the European Monetary Union (EMU) (EC, 2010; Crescenzi et 
al., 2016). The consequent instability, which has led to unprecedented turbulence on financial 
markets, has put a great challenge to the EU and to the rest of the world. 
In response to the crisis, EU has agreed upon a common strategy within the 2008 European 
Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) (EC, 2008) that essentially proposes a number of measures 
to direct short-term actions to reinforce Europe’s competitiveness24 in the long term, i.e., 
smart investment for capacity building in order to promote efficiency and innovation. These 
measures have been included in the EU2020 framework with respect to which Cohesion 
Policy has been shaped. In view of EU2020 strategy, the capacity of the European regions 
to react to external shocks is of particular interest because it has a direct implication on the 
outcomes of European Economic Policy (Milio et al., 2014). 
The crisis spread asymmetrically in time, strength, and speed across EU regions (ECB, 2010). 
Not all regions experienced economic decline and the territorial impact of the crisis has varied 
greatly also within the same country (European Commission, 2013; Martin, 2010). Similarly, 
while some regions experienced a swift return to pre-crisis levels of employment and output, 
the process of recovery has proved much more protracted for many regions entering a period 
of sustained stagnation. 
23 The government budget position, measured by debt-to-GDP ratio index, is the result of fiscal policy, which is, combined with 
monetary policy, one the main policy instruments. A healthy fiscal position would allow adjustments to taxation and expenditure 
policies to offset adverse shocks. High level of external indebtedness would also limit the ability to mobilize resources in the face 
of external shocks.
24 Competitiveness is generally agreed as the capacity of countries or regions to produce goods and services that meet the test of 
foreign competition which can be reflected in a sustainable balance of payments, while simultaneously maintaining and expanding 
domestic real income and jobs creation. The most commonly used measure of competitiveness is productivity (Camagni, 2002; 
Kitson et al., 2004). 
Keywords
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In this context, a composite policy tool is becoming key in order to identify resilience and 
design territorial development strategies (Martin, 2016). To the best of our knowledge, 
economic resilience has been conceptualized (Martin, 2012; Briguglio et al., 2009) as a 
multidimensional complex concept, but it has not been translated into a synthetic regional 
indicator. In the frame of the activities of the LUISA25 Territorial Modelling Platform, our 
research aims to: i) setup a simple indicator of regional economic resilience, ii) identify the 
resilience degree of EU regions, iii) suggest a potential instrument to draw policy implications. 
The paper is structured as follows. The theoretical framework is introduced in Section 
2. Section 3 discusses data and methodological issues concerning the weighting and 
aggregation procedures of the composite indicator. Our results are reported in Section 4 and, 
finally, Section 5 concludes.
2. The resilience framework
Recently, much work has been done to identify the drivers of crisis recovery and investigate 
the structural characteristics of the regions and determinants of resilience.  
Briguglio et al. (2009) distinguish between economic vulnerability and economic resilience. 
The former is defined as the exposure of an economy to exogenous shocks, which depends 
on permanent or quasi-permanent inherent structural characteristic over which policy makers 
can exercise limited control while the latter is defined as the policy-induced capacity of an 
economy to withstand or recover from the effects of such negative shocks.
Martin (2012) analyses the concept of resilience identifying four main dimensions: (i) resistance, 
which identifies the sensitivity of regional output and employment to exogenous shock and 
determine the demand for public policies; (ii) recovery, which measures how fast the region 
bounces back from a negative shock; (iii) reorientation, which concerns the extent to which a 
region changes after a shock by switching for example its economic sectoral composition; and 
(iv) renewal, which is the ability of a regional economy to renew its growth path. 
25 LUISA Territorial Modelling Platform is implemented by the Joint Research Centre for the evaluation of EC policies that have a 
direct or indirect territorial impact.
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More recent literature, among others e.g., Martin and Sunley (2014), Diodato and Weterings 
(2015) and Manca et al. (2017), following Martin (2012), defines resilience as the 
multidimensional capacity of regional and local economy to absorb shocks, adapt or transit to 
new sustainable development path.
2.1. The life cycle of resilience
Our approach to resilience extends the previous conceptualizations characterising it as a 
complex process with a well-defined life cycle. We borrowed the product life cycle theory that 
was first developed by Raymond Vernon in 1966 in order to conceptualize our framework.
This theory identified four stages, each with its own characteristics crucial for business that 
are trying to manage the life cycle of their particular products. In Figure 1, we identify and 
characterize the different steps of a resilience capacity building process following the product 
life cycle theory's four stages:
• Introduction Stage – This stage of the cycle is characterized by a process of learning-by-
doing that entails increasing returns to scale for the economy: a proportionate increase in 
the usual production inputs (labour and capital) gives rise to more than proportionate gains 
in output (Arrow, 1962; Romer, 1986, 1993; Lucas, 1988). It requires an active participation 
of different actors to earn enough in terms of capital accumulation and capacity building 
to escape from the spiralling mechanism of the so-called poverty trap and accumulate 
resilience capacity. According to Sachs (2005), many factors can contribute to stagnate into 
a poverty trap, including a limited access to credit and capital markets, poor infrastructure, 
lack of public services and corrupt governance, extreme environmental degradation, etc. 
Public interventions can help to reverse the vicious cycle.  
• Growth Stage – The growth stage is typically characterized by a strong growth that 
benefits from economies of scale. Innovation processes and spill-overs that increase over 
time, enhancing skill and productivity levels throughout the economy, determine the speed 
of the growth process and then the slope of our curve of the resilience capacity-building 
process (Krugman and Obstfeld, 1997). During this phase, catching up and falling behind 
mechanisms act leading to different levels of development and resilience.
• Maturity Stage – During the maturity stage, the growth and capacity building process is 
close to its steady-state value, and the aim for regional and local authorities is now to 
maintain the adaptive and coping capacities they have contributed to build up. This stage 
potentially identifies specific regions with a competitive advantage over others. 
• Decline/Renewal Stage – Eventually, if a shock hits the economy two opposite options 
might occur. The resilience capacity can start to shrink, and this is what we refer to as the 
decline stage. This shrinkage could be due to the saturation or inadequacy of that capacity. 
The alternative can concern the extent to which a regional economy reacts after a shock 
and renews its growth path leading to a renewal stage. The capacity to recover built over 
the first three stages can determine the decline, renewal or eventually a scalloped pattern.
Figure 1. The life cycle of Resilience
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2.2. An empirical overview
The first three stages identified in the previous paragraph refer to the so-called slow 
burning process (Manca et al., 2017), which measures the capacity built over time of a 
region to cope with a shock. During these phases, policy-induced changes can strengthen 
the resilience capacity of a region. The last stage, referred to as shock wave or dynamic 
process, is based on the immediate exposure to an unexpected shock over which a region 
can exercise limited control.  
A recent empirical exercise proposed by Crescenzi et al. (2016), split the time period analysis 
in pre-2008 crisis (slow burning process) and post-2008 crisis (shock wave) and apply a 
regression approach to explore the relation between post-2008 crisis regional performance 
indicators and pre-2008 national macroeconomic conditions and regional resistance factors.
In order to get a first understanding of the EU NUTS2 regions' pre and post-crisis 
performance, we explored the linkage between the growth trend before and after the crisis of 
some key economic variables i.e., GDP per capita, employment rate and productivity, defined 
as GDP per employee.26 These variables have been chosen because i) they are the best 
indicator able to synthetize economic conditions at regional level, and ii) they react quickly to 
shocks. Furthermore, GDP per capita is derived from the multiplication between employment 
rate and productivity. A lasting GDP per capita growth is sustained by productivity growth. At 
the reverse, a rising employment rate might hamper GDP per capita growth if not followed by 
productivity growth.  
We classify the 271 NUTS2 regions according if they placed above or below the EU average 
for the three variables.27 Thus, each of the points in Figure 2 represents a combination of 
performances’ value measured before (x-axis) and after the crisis (y-axis). The x- and y-axes 
divide the scatterplot into four quadrants (anticlockwise from top right): in the first and third 
(high-high, HH, and low-low, LL, respectively) a region exhibits a high (low) value of both pre 
and post-crisis indicators. In the second and fourth quadrants (low-high, LH, and high-low, HL, 
respectively) a region reveals a low (high) value of the variable before the crisis and a high 
(low) value of the post-crisis variable. 
In order to derive a classification of EU NUTS2 regions with respect to their economic 
behaviour before and after the 2008 financial and economic crises and the consequent 
potential for resilience, four different clusters of regions were identified. These quadrants, in 
anticlockwise, correspond to:
• Winners (top right) – Regions belonging to this group performed better than the European 
average before and after the crisis. The crisis hits them but the economic stability and 
resilience capacity reached before the shock occurred helped them to recover fast.
• Inefficient process (top left) – The group classifies regions that were not able to recover 
even if they were experienced a pre-crisis growth trend above the EU average. Many factors 
can contribute to negatively change the growth trend e.g., among others inefficient policies, 
lack of public services, etc. The growth and resilience capacity building process has not 
reached in the pre-crisis period such a critical mass necessary to recover from a negative 
shock.
• Falling behind (bottom left) – Starting from a position below the European average, these 
regions have been strongly affected by the negative shock and failed to recover.
• Inherent features (bottom right) – Regions in this quadrant were below the European 
average before the crises while they were able to efficiently react to the crisis revealing a 
post-crisis trend above the European average. We attribute this capacity to recover to some 
inherent structural characteristics that contributed to change past trend.
26 The time period of the analysis is 2000-2015. We consider the 2000-2008 interval to compute the trend before the crisis while 
the 2009-2015 interval is chosen for the trend after the crisis.
27 We choose the arithmetic mean as a threshold to split the sample of regions and not the median because outliers were not 
strongly affecting the distribution so that the arithmetic mean can be used as an adequate position index.
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Figure 2. Classification of EU NUTS2 over the period 2000-2015
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In terms of GDP per capita, regions are equally distributed in the third and fourth quadrants, 
losers and falling behind regions, respectively. This means that, of the 167 regions that were 
declining before the crisis, half of them continued to decline, while half of them experienced 
a renewal process. Furthermore, 25% of regions well performing before the crisis continued to 
perform positively after. The pattern of employment rate shows that around 42% of regions 
are placed in the fourth quadrant, showing that the employment trend after the crisis is above 
the average, while it was below before the crisis. Furthermore, 25% of regions show that the 
rise of employment before the crisis was not sustainable. Finally, regarding productivity it 
can be observed that 42% of regions fall in the third quadrant, highlighting strong problems 
related to their business structure. Anyway, around 25% of regions improve the productivity, 
and 22% of them continue to have trend above the average.
3. The Regional Resilience Indicator
Since the resilience of EU regions is a multidimensional complex concept, we propose a 
composite synthetic regional economic resilience indicator that considers the three variables 
above described. 
To the best of our knowledge, this approach to resilience capacity is innovative since it 
assesses in a unique indicator all the phases of the resilience life cycle. 
Weighting and aggregation approaches in composite index construction have been in detail 
surveyed by the OECD (2008). The regional resilience indicator is constructed through a 
normalization and weight elicitation based on principal component analysis that can be 
applied as a means to reduce dimensionality by transforming the multiple dimensions into a 
set of few uncorrelated dimensions. For a robustness check, equal weighting has also been 
applied. This technique is the most commonly applied approach, mainly due to the simplicity 
of the concept, computation and interpretation of selected indicators. 
The composite 'Regional Resilience Indicator' to external shocks is defined by two dimensions. 
The first measures the intrinsic capacity of a region registered over time along its resilient 
evolutionary path from a base line target point taken as a reference to the measurement 
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period to cope with a crisis and figures out its so-called slow burning process. The second, 
to whom we refer as shock wave or dynamic process, allows us to analyse the immediate 
exposure and reaction capacity to an unexpected shock.
A three-step approach was followed for the identification of regional disparities in the 
resilience capacity to the crisis: 
(i) data collection and indicators selection; 
(ii) weighting and aggregation; 
(iii) pattern and clusters analysis.
3.1. Data collection and indicators selection
This study employs annual data in 2005 constant price euros over the period 2000-2015 
from Cambridge Econometrics’ European Regional Database (GDP per capita, employment 
rate and productivity, defined as GDP per employee). 
Then, our slow burning and shock wave indicators have been selected and built for each 
variable. The slow burning indicators are:
• mean over the period 2000-2008 indicates the level over a particular period of time or in 
the steady-state behaviour of the system;
• trend over the period before (2000-2008) and after (2009-2015) the crisis:28  is the 
average sustainable rate of growth over a period of time. It is the slope of the line 
connecting the two points before and after the crisis and measures the steepness of that 
line and so the speed of the growth rate. The trend over the pre-crisis period is assumed 
to be the long run growth trend that a region would have had if the crisis did not occur. The 
trend over the post-crisis period is a proxy of the long run growth trend after the shock.
The shock dynamic indicators considered are: 
• the maximum hit of the crisis between 2009 and 2010 compared to 2008 pre-crisis year is 
conceived as the immediate reaction to an unexpected shock;
• the relative change between 2015 and 2008 pre-crisis year is assumed as the capacity to 
recover.  
The following step consists in the aggregation of the measures created for each variable, GDP 
per capita, employment level and productivity. 
3.2. Weighting and aggregation 
Two different weighting and aggregation methodologies have been used. The first approach 
relies mainly on Goletsis and Chletsos, (2011), while the second proposed methodology is 
based on equally weighting and used, for example to construct the Regional Competitiveness 
Index (Annoni et al. 2013).29
The first approach consists of two stages: (a) normalization and (b) weight elicitation.
28 The trend has been computed as follows: i) we regress the time period on the log of the selected variables, and ii) we keep the 
coefficient associated with the log of the selected variables. If it is positive (negative) and significant, it means that the slope rises 
up (falls). If the coefficient is zero or not significant, the trend is not statistically different from zero.
29 RCI aggregates indicators and sub-indices through weighted arithmetic mean.
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(a) The normalisation of the data helps to i) remove the different scale of each variable, and 
ii) identify indicators may be positively correlated with the phenomenon to be measured, 
whereas others may be negatively correlated with it30 There are different methods of 
normalization, such as ranking, re-scaling (or min-max transformation), standardization (or 
z-scores) and indicization. As suggested by Goletsis and Chletsos, (2011), we made use of 
the min-max transformation. Consider the i-th indicator for region j, Iij is transformed to Iiajdj 
taking values within the interval [0,1] according to the following equation:
 
(1)
(b) A multivariate method usually applied for space reduction, namely the Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) has been used for weight elicitation. 
PCA aggregates sub-indicators that are collinear into new ones named components, which 
are able to capture as much of common information of those sub-indicators as possible. PCA 
determines the set of weights, which explains the largest variation in the original data. Different 
criteria can be applied on the selection of number of components in order to keep the maximum 
of information. We keep the components cumulatively contribute to the explanation of the 
total variance of the data by more than 70%. The selected components are then used for the 
aggregating procedure to ensure that the variables used are not correlated.
Weights are estimated as normalized squared loadings (implying the portion of variance of 
each component explained by each variable). We apply the approach, which uses highest 
loading per variable weighted according to the relative contribution of the respective 
component to the explanation of the overall variance. The indicator is aggregated through the 
following weighted additive function:
 
(2)
where CRIj , is the Composite Resilience Index for region j, wi is the weight of indicator i and 
Iiajdj is the adjusted value of indicator Ii for region j.
The second approach shares with the first above explained the normalization procedure while 
differs for the weight elicitation since it is based on weighting equally the selected indicators 
through arithmetic mean.31
3.3. Pattern and cluster analysis 
The overall objective of clustering is to identify regions sharing common resilience features 
and, therefore, strategic geographical and thematic areas of intervention for policy makers.
We use a decile method in order to split up our ranked data into 10 equally large subsections 
and be able to capture the regional disparities in the resilient capacities to the crisis. An 
Anselin global Moran’s I and Local Moran analysis is also performed to investigate how 
clusters and outliers behave.
To analyze space dependence, the most recognized indicator is the Moran’s I (MI) (Moran, 
1950). This statistics has been widely used in the literature to describe economic phenomena 
whose distribution in the space is not random (Le Gallo and Ertur, 2003; Ertur et al., 2006; 
Dall’Erba, 2005; Gregory and Patuelli, 2015). 
30 This step is required in order to ensure that an increase in the normalized indicators corresponds to increase in the composite index
31 The weighting scheme of the EU RCI is more complex because it is based on z-scores normalization procedure and weighted 
arithmetic mean where the weights are the region’s stages of development.
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The MI relates the value of a selected variable with the values of the same variable in 
the neighbor areas, namely its spatial lag. The intuition behind is that socio-economic 
phenomena might be not isolated in space and what is happening in a certain location might 
be correlated to what is happening in the neighbor locations. The formal definition of this 
relation is as follows:
 
(3)
where N is the number of regions indexed by i and j, x is the variable of interest; x– is its 
mean, and Wij is an element of the spatial weights matrix W, which is defined as a queen 
contiguity matrix, i.e. regions are considered as neighbor if they touch themselves for at least 
a point.32 Then, as customary, the matrix is standardized by row.
The calculated MI for global autocorrelation, in the case of W standardized by row, varies 
between -1 and 1. A positive coefficient points to positive spatial autocorrelation, i.e., clusters 
of similar values can be identified. The reverse represents regimes of negative association, 
i.e., dissimilar values clustered together in a map. A value close to zero indicates a random 
spatial pattern. 
One of the advantages of this statistics is that it can be visualized in a scatterplot, the 
so-called Moran scatterplot, in which the spatial lag of the (standardized) variable is on 
the vertical axis and the original (standardized) variable is on the horizontal axis. Thus, 
each of the points in the scatterplot represents a combination of a locations’ value and 
its corresponding values in the surrounding regions, i.e., the spatial lag. The x- and y-axes 
divide the scatterplot into four quadrants (anticlockwise from top right): in the first and third 
(high-high, HH, and low-low, LL, respectively) a location that exhibits a high (low) value of 
the variable is surrounded by locations with a high (low) value of the variable as well. In the 
second and fourth (low-high, LH, and high-low, HL, respectively) a location with a low (high) 
value of the variable is surrounded by locations with a high (low) value of the variable. A 
concentration of points in the first and third quadrants means that there is a positive spatial 
dependence (nearby locations will have similar values), while the concentration of points in 
the second and fourth quadrants reveals the presence of negative spatial dependence (that 
is, nearby locations will have dissimilar values). 
A precise evaluation and identification of the levels of local spatial autocorrelation are 
achieved by Local Moran, which is a Local Indicators of Spatial Association (LISA). The Local 
Moran allows identifying the clusters of “spatial outlier regions”, i.e., the statistical hotspots 
and coldspots, the areas with a concentration of regions with high levels and low levels of 
turnout, respectively. This is possible because the Local Moran is able to identify for each 
region an indication of significant spatial clustering of similar values around that observation. 
Furthermore, the sum of the Local Moran for all observations corresponds to the global 
indicator of spatial association, the Moran’s I (Cochrane and Poot, 2008, p. 71; Le Gallo and 
Kamarianakis, 2011, p. 129).
The local version of Moran’s I statistic is a LISA and expressed as follows:
 
(4)
Finally, given that the local Moran Ii is not approximately normally distributed, a conditional 
randomisation or permutation approach is used to yield empirical pseudo significance levels. 
32 The islands have been connected to the nearest region.
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4. Results
The composite index for resilience for 271 NUTS-2 regions has been constructed considering 
to the two different aggregation procedures above illustrated. Since the correlation between 
the two approaches is very high, we reported only the results based on the first approach.  
PCA estimated the weight values for the 15 selected indices. Three components were 
extracted. The identified components account for approximately 77.1% of total variance. 
Figure 3 illustrates the resilient capacity of NUTS2 regions to the financial crisis. The Regional 
Resilience indicator varies between 0 and 1, where the smaller values (lighter) represent the 
less resilient regions, and the higher (darker) the most resilient. 
As expected, the consequences of the crisis were not uniform among EU regions. 
Well-identified territorial patterns can be observed:
• National trends are prevalent: Mediterranean countries were characterized by slow growth 
of the selected indicators before and after the crisis, while Germany and Northern counties 
experienced strong growth and coping and adaptive capacities. Baltic countries were 
experiencing fast growth in the pre-crisis period and, in spite of the economic collapse, they 
were able to recover;
• Within some countries there is a north-south regional divide that often depens on historical 
origins. These countries are Italy, Spain and Belgium;
• In the countries where NUTS2 regions have a more fine resolution, i.e., Germany, Great Britain, 
Belgium, Hungary and Austria, cities show a higher resilience than the surrounding regions.
Figure 3. Regional Resilience Indicator over the period 2000-2015 by NUTS2
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Figure 4 shows the Moran scatterplot, which accounts for spatial autocorrelation, which is a 
measure of the presence of spatial clusters of regions sharing a similar value of resilience. 
Spatial autocorrelation is due to externalities that consist in the influence that a region has on 
the neighbors as a consequence of different factors such as commuting, share of technology, 
trade, migration, and a set of intangible assets. A region can take advantage or disadvantage 
of the externality if i) it is surrounded by resilient or not resilient regions and ii) it has the 
capacity to be permeable to positive environment and impermeable to negative environment. 
It is worth mentioning that Moran’s I is equal to 0.60 and about 82% of regions are located in 
the first and third quadrant. This means that there are statistically significant well-defined and 
generally homogeneous regional patterns: high (low) resilient regions are surrounded by high 
(low) resilient regions. Among the remaining ones (18%), the majority is concentrated in the 
second quadrant, i.e., low resilient regions are surrounded by other regions with high resilient 
capacity.
Figure 4. Moran’s Scatterplot
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One limit of the global measure of spatial autocorrelation is that it is not able to give us 
information regarding the presence of local significant clusters, the so called `hot-spots’ and 
‘cold-spots’ that deviate from the overall pattern. 
The local Moran's I shown in Figure 5 identifies the statistically significant spatial clusters 
of resilient and non-resilient regions. The divide within countries detected in Figure 3 is only 
partially confirmed, highlighting the importance of using statistical tools to identify clusters.
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Southern regions of Italy, Spain and Portugal and Greece belong to group of ‘cold-spot’ 
regions. The statistically significant spatial cluster of resilient regions is located in Latvia, 
Southern Denmark, center and south Germany, the northern region of Sweden, and around 
London. 
Figure 5. Statistically significant spatial clusters of resilient and not resilient regions
Figure 6 shows the regional degree of resilience by country. With some exceptions, regions 
tend to be centered on national averages. If the country average is below the EU-28 average, 
the regions belonging to that country are below the EU-28 average, and vice versa. This 
means that there is a limited variability within countries, but there are strong differences 
among countries. Romania, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia, despite this general trend, 
demonstrate a quite high variability. The most resilient countries are the Baltic countries, 
which experienced a huge growth before the 2008 and, despite the collapse of the economy 
due to the crisis, had the capacity to recover faster than other counties. These results show 
that the degree of regional resilience varies significantly only within some countries, while the 
majority of regions tend to follow the national trend. 
Figure 6. Regional Resilience Indicator by country
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Conclusions 
The Regional Resilience Indicator is a tool that accounts for several components of economy 
related resilient capacity and combines them into a comparable, synthetic and easily 
understandable measure. The analysis shows that the resilience capacity of a region is heavily 
co-related to that of the surrounding regions. However, some countries reveal a certain degree 
of heterogeneity due to rooted historical gaps.
As suggested by Martin and Sunley (2015), an analysis of the economic resilience should 
consider, after the identification of the regionally differentiated effects of the shocks, the 
explanation of the results in terms of their determinants, including social, institutional and 
political aspects to understand the forms of assistance and governance that can help to recover 
and protect regional economies from future crises (Bristow and Healy, 2014).
The national dimension still plays a strong role, because regions tend to be affected by 
common institutional and legal frameworks, structural policies, etc. Lack of competitiveness, 
huge debt, heavily borrowing and large exposure to financial markets had plunged Greece 
into a recession deeper than in many other European countries. Similar factors affected with a 
more smoothed strength Italy, Portugal and Spain's economy but the effects were not uniform 
across regions, with some that have shown a much lower resilience. A combination of strong 
economic activity, more stable public finances and favourable political environment helped 
Germany to recover faster. In particular, western regions are the most resilient. Recent literature 
explains the different degrees of regional resilience through several channels, among which the 
most important are: the sectoral composition of the economy, the export-oriented enterprises 
and their capacity to innovate, the skills of the workforce and some institutional aspects 
(Martin, 2011; Fingleton et al., 2012; ESPON, 2014). The last point, originally not considered a 
completely satisfactory explanation for the existence of regional disparities (Overman and Puga, 
2002), recently turned into one of the key explanatory factors (Boschma, 2014). 
Our results, on the other hand, tend to support the position of Boschma for countries with 
historical well-grounded territorial development gaps such as Italy, Spain, Portugal and 
Germany. Regions belonging to other European countries do not show a so high deviation from 
the national average, highlighting that the major determinants of regional resilience mainly 
identify with the national macroeconomic conditions.  
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Abstract
In this work we present the design and development of the Critical Infrastructure Resilience 
Platform (CIRP) in the frame of the EU Research project EU-CIRCLE. The project‘s scope is to 
derive an innovative framework supporting resilience of the interconnected European Critical 
Infrastructure (CI) to climate pressures.
CIRP’s primary goal is to provide a multi-user web accessible software that will be able to 
analyse the CI’s vulnerabilities and impacts due to climate change in the form not only of 
physical damages but also service impacts, interdependencies, societal costs, environmental 
effects, and economic costs due to suspended activities. 
The CIRP is intended to be a user-friendly environment that will provide its 
users with the ability to analyse what-if scenarios: leveraging model selection, 
climate data repositories and CI inventories in order to calculate impact for any 
kind of climate hazard and CI. In this way, end users will be able to understand 
the impact of various adaptation strategies or quantify the potential impact of 
a catastrophic event on society. 
1. Introduction
It is acknowledged that climate related hazards have the potential to substantially affect the 
lifespan and effectiveness or even destroy European Critical Infrastructures (CI), particularly the 
energy, transportation sectors, buildings, marine and water management infrastructure with 
devastating sotietal and economic impacts. In this context, modeling the impact of climate 
change to CIs is of vital importance. Many risk assessment tools and platforms exist today. 
Most, however, lack the flexibility to easily add new algorithms or to extend their base features. 
This is typically due to a combination of architectural approach and closed-source licensing 
policies. Such software does not allow the community to actively contribute new algorithms and 
capabilities and, therefore, allow the software to evolve with the advancements of science.
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The Climate Infrastructure Resilience Platform (CIRP) is a collaborative software environment 
that aims to create new capabilities for CI policy-makers, decision makers, and scientists 
by allowing them to use different and diverse modelling and risk assessment solutions, 
to develop risk reduction strategies and implement mitigation actions that help minimise 
the impact of climate change on CIs. This can help improve the understanding of system 
interdependencies by providing decision makers with the latest tools, based on the best 
scientific and engineering principles, as they emerge. From the policy and decision maker 
perspective, the platform capabilities is offered as a toolbox that consists of a collection of 
diverse Risk and Resilience analyses of Critical Infrastructures that are exposed to the direct 
and indirect effects of climate change.
From the technical point of view, CIRP is primarily based on the Eclipse Rich Client Platform 
(RCP) technology and two distinct frameworks each compliant with RCP: the ERGO-CORE 
of the ERGO consortium and the Chameleon Enterprise Foundation (CEF) of Satways Ltd. 
Both frameworks are a collection of OSGi plugins (or bundles) and are briefly described in 
subsequent sections. Being modular and extensible, CIRP is able to accommodate different 
types of datasets (e.g. hazard, assets, interconnections, fragilities), file formats, and risk 
analysis algorithms and provide an intuitive user interface for scenario and data repository 
management, analysis workflows setup, intuitive results (2D/3D) visualisation and reporting. 
CIRP’s essential elements for impact assessment are hazard, inventory, and fragility. Hazard 
is considered as the descriptive parameter quantifying the possible phenomenon within 
a region of interest. The assets in a region exposed to hazards are defined by inventory. 
Finally, fragility is the sensitivity of certain types of inventory items when subjected to a 
given hazard. Assuring that the science and engineering principles behind the forecasting 
of damage probability of Critical Infrastructures (buildings, bridges, networks, pipelines, 
and other inventory items) from anticipated events is both pragmatic and state-of-the-art 
is therefore critical to minimising the impact of climate change events, reducing losses to 
economic resources, and the development of more stable communities.
Overall, the intention is for Risk management professionals to become familiar with 
identifying vulnerabilities, assessing loss reduction strategies, guiding resource allocation 
before disasters, identifying vulnerable areas during disasters, guiding recovery efforts, and 
providing information to decision-makers throughout the process.
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2. Design and Architecture
CIRP has been designed and developed as a fully modular, extensible, multi-user geospatial 
N-tier software system according the design considerations and strategies presented in 
Deliverable 5.1 (EU-Circle, D5.1). The CIRP server is based on the Java Enterprise Edition 
specification while the CIRP client architecture is based on the ERGO-CORE and CEF RCP 
frameworks. Each of the two core frameworks provides a set of discrete functionalities 
that may be exploited independently or in a collaborative manner. The ERGO-CORE is the 
base IT infrastructure of the ERGO (ERGO, 2017) an open-source project that was originally 
developed under the name Maeviz to perform seismic risk assessment. The ERGO-Core OSGi 
bundles provides the functionality related to inventory, data and metadata management, 
and the ability to wrap new analysis types and execute them on a workflow engine. The CEF 
framework on the other hand provides the User Management & Roles and Access Rights 
modules, and the 3D GIS viewer and editor modules. 
From the Risk assement point of view, CIRP follows the Consequence – based Risk 
Management (CRM) generic approach which has been selected and extensively described 
in Deliverable 3.4 (EU-Circle, D3.4). CRM has been used in climate/disaster risk reduction 
assessments allowing for the identification of uncertainty of climate risk modeling and 
quantify the risk to societal systems and functions. It also enables relevant stakeholders to 
develop risk reduction and adaptation strategies and implement mitigation actions. The CIRP 
end user application (client) is delivered via Java Web Start. CIRP users are able to create 
and store scenarios by means of selection of a chain of analysis tools. Each analysis tool 
is associated with input and output parameters and relevant datasets that conform to the 
platform supported types. It will be possible to chain analysis tools to form analysis workflows 
and each individual analysis in the workflow will be monitored as provided for by the analysis 
type, the geographical span of the scenario, and the number of CI elements analysed. An 
analysis will be able to be executed in seconds, minutes or even hours. The design of the 
CIRP provides a uniform user experience for the user input of values and selection of input 
datasets. Each analysis tool within the CIRP is described in the Extensible Markup Language 
(XML) and transformed at runtime into suitable widgets and user interface controls. 
The following UML Deployment Diagram depicts the physical layout of the various 
hardware components (nodes) of the CIRP system as well as the distribution of executable 
environments and software components on that hardware. The diagram depicts the actual 
devices (workstations, servers), along with the inter-connections, and provides an effective 
system topology. In that topology, as illustrated below, the location of executable components 
and objects illustrates where the software units are deployed and executed.
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Figure 1. CIRP UML deployment diagram
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3. Main Functionalities and User Interface
CIRP’s UI consists of one or more (in case of using multiple workstation monitors) main 
application windows. As typical Eclipse RCP application, each window includes a menu, toolbars, 
the perspective area and the main toolbar where the users will be able to navigate between 
the different perspectives. A perspective groups a number of views and supporting widgets and 
menus as well as shortcuts to relevant content creation wizards, other related views, and other 
related perspectives. The most important views of the CIRP User interface are:
• Scenario Manager: shows each scenario a user is working with. A scenario is a user 
defined case that consists of one or more selected analysis tools from the CIRP toolbox 
and the associated datasets (input and output). Each scenario can be expanded to show its 
contents (input/output datasets and map layers as well as analysis workflows). An analysis 
View is launched upon double clicking a Saved Analysis workflow from the Scenario 
Manager or upon selection of an analysis from the “Execute Analysis” wizard.
• Catalog: provides access to the local and remote file caches. A cache is a location where 
CIRP looks for and stores all of the data that is uses and produces. A cache can be located 
locally, as a file on the local machine drive, or be remote. By default, CIRP creates a local 
cache on the user’s system, where any remote data that is accessed is cached for local use.
• Loss Curves and Mappings Editor: The Loss Curve editor provides a set of tools for 
creating and editing Damage Curves consisting of a set of X, Y pairs and linear interpolation 
as well as rules associating a loss curve with an inventory (shapefile) based on DBF 
attribute values. The Curve editor is capable of manipulating curves ingested in CIRP’s 
repository (XML files), as well as files located in user’s local filesystem. By loading a Curve 
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dataset or creating a new one, user has the capability to add or edit curve’s points either 
from a raw table view or from a chart view using drag-n-drop features. This functionality 
complements other supported curve function types supported by ERGO-Core.
• 2D Map Viewer: allows the visualization of raster and vector datasets in a layered 
approach and according to the defined styles applied via the Style Editor View. The 
underlying map engine is based on the open source library (Geotools, 2017).
• 3D Map Viewer and Editor: allows view is created by fusing aerial and satellite 
photography, terrain elevation data and other 3D and 2D information sources including 
geospatial dataset layers. A basic difference from the 2D Map is the fact that feature 
and imagery layers can be streamed from the 3D GIS servers and that the underlying 
map engine (TerraExplorer, 2017) is using Graphics Card acceleration (DirectX) providing 
maximum performance. Additionally it provides tools for editing the spatial characteristics 
and attributes of shapefiles datasets (e.g. inventories) without requiring the usage of 
external GIS tools.
CIRP currently provides support for five (5) different plugin types as platform extensions.
• Type Definition Plugins: Type definition OSGi plugins make use of the extension points of 
the underlying analysis framework and can register dataset and metadata schemas. Even 
if data definitions can be included in the execution plugins described below it is a good 
practise to separate them in order not to repeat the definition in multiple execution plugins 
that require and/or produce these dataset types.
• Local Execution Java Plugin: Local OSGi plugins make use of the extension points of the 
underlying analysis framework and register analysis descriptions according to a predefine 
XML schema and a Task class which extends one of the base Task classes. The task is 
the one executed by the underlying workflow engine of the analysis framework. The base 
Task classes generally provide the means to iterate over vector or raster input datasets to 
perform calculations.
• Local Execution Hybrid Plugin: The local execution hybrid plugin has no difference than 
the previous type apart from the fact that the Task class is a wrapper over executables 
written in other languages or closed source java codes and controls their input and output. 
The executable is either bundled in the hybrid plugin or installed in the client machine. An 
example of such a plugin is presented in Section 0.
• Remote Execution Plugin: In this type of plugin the Task class submits a job to the CIRP 
Message Bus according to a predefined protocol. A remote analysis service is subscribed in 
the Message Bus and executes the job. Messages exchanged in certain time intervals allow 
the indication of the analysis progress in the CIRP analysis workflow window. 
• Local Scripting Plugin: The last plugin type provides the ability to wrap scripts instead 
of executables. Currently the R language is supported. This allows even editing of the 
parameters and logic of the script at runtime without the need to recompile the plugin.
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Figure 2. The CIRP user interface and main views
4. Flood Risk Assessment Example
In this section we demonstrate the usage of CIRP to estimate flood impact on Drinking and 
Waste water assets in the Virtual City of EU-Circle. There are various hydrological attributes 
that affect damage levels of Critical Infrastructures such as flood duration, flow velocity, 
speed of water rise, flood duration, content of water. Hydrodynamic models, along with 
detailed spatial data, are necessary for a good indication of the impact of flooding on Critical 
Infrastructure. It is generally assumed that inundation level is the most important factor 
contributing to flood damage and a useful indicator on which to base the damage levels 
(Kreibich, 2010). Thus the following models will use inundation level as the only indicator on 
which to base the damage levels.
The CIRP scenario will make use of a set of chained analysis available from the CIRP analysis 
toolbox that estimate damage, losses and functionality for selected vulnerable components 
of the drinking and waste water systems namely treatment plants, control vaults and control 
stations and pumping stations.
The assessment of direct economic damage by flooding is generally done by setting a 
replacement value on assets and using loss curves as estimations of their susceptibility 
to flood damage (Jonkman, 2008). Such curves represent the monetary damage received 
by level of inundation, expressed as a fraction of the replacement value, which represents 
maximum possible damage.
The following Figure shows the different analysis (hazard, damage and economic impact) 
chained as a workflow in CIRP. Each analysis box (in red color) requires a number of input 
datasets (light blue color) and a set of parameters all set by the user. The output of one or 
more analysis can be used as input in subsequent ones. The execution of the workflow is 
handled by the underlying ogrescript workflow engine and monitored via the user interface 
with progress bars per analysis box.
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Figure 3. Flood impact chained analysis workflow
4.1. The Flood Inundation Hazard Plugin
The Flood inundation hazard plugin is a “Local Execution Hybrid Plugin”. It acts as a wrapper 
by preparing the required analysis input from datasets and parameters chosen by the CIRP 
user to an external flood simulation application. Within the project EU-CIRCLE, this application 
is CADDIES (Guidolin, 2016), a 2D pluvial flood inundation simulator using cellular automata 
(CA) techniques instead of solving the classic shallow water equations (SWEs). The CA 
technique offers a versatile method for modelling complex physical systems using simple 
operations (Wolfram 1984). 
In CA, the change of cell status is determined by transition rules, which depend on the 
status of each cell and its neighbourhoods. This simplification dramatically reduces the 
computational load of a CA model in comparison to a physically based model. On top of 
this, the latest parallel computing techniques, including GPU processing and OpenMP, are 
implemented in CADDIES to accelerate the computational performance. Experiments showed 
that CADDIES can perform at an order of magnitude faster than a traditional hydraulic 
modelling approach (Guidolin, 2016).
The Flood Inundation Hazard Analysis in CIRP requires as input an elevation model, a 
rainfall event dataset and set of parameters. The elevation model and rainfall events can 
be selected from the local or public repository while the rest of the parameters can set by 
clicking in the Flood Inundation Hazard Analysis red box (see Figure 3).
4.2. Using External Flood Simulators
As each analysis is CIRP can be executed in standalone mode a user is able to execute a 
flood impact analysis using datasets produced by external simulation software packages 
that solve part or full Saint-Venant continuity and momentum depth-averaged equations in 
the longitudinal directions (1D models) or both longitudinal and lateral direction (quasi-2D or 
2D models) as stated in (Dimitriadis, 2016). Such software packages are the HEC-RAS, the 
LISFLOOD-FP, the FLO-2D, SOBEK, SWMM, MIKE Models, etc. In this work MIKE models have 
been applied and used for hydraulic simulations for the city of Rethymno (Makropoulos,2015), 
the outcomes of which were utilised in flood risk assessment processes fulfilled within CIRP.
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A combination of 1D-2D MIKE models (MIKE 11, MIKE 21FM and MIKE Urban) has been setup 
and coupled through MIKE Flood for the simulation of flood events and their propagation 
in space and time. The domain of models’ set up is the urban area where the flood impact 
is important due to city’s services and functions, but all river catchments that cross the 
city of Rethymno have been taken into consideration for the calculation of the total water 
volumes that drain through the city. MIKE 11 has been used for 1D hydraulic simulations 
of open channel flows, MIKE URBAN has been used for flows in closed cross sections and 
MIKE 21FM, the 2D model, was used for the simulation of surface runoff. All three models 
have been coupled with MIKE Flood, through 4 types of links, enabling combined 1D-2D 
simulation of flood phenomena (PEARL, D3.4). Several outputs are being produced for each 
simulation based on which flood risk assessment can be implemented e.g. maximum water 
depth and maximum current speed which was recorded for the whole area under study for all 
the simulated time steps, time when the maximum values were reached, duration while the 
water depth was above a defined threshold, as well as, “actual” water depths/surfaces and 
velocities values and how those values change in space and time. For the purposes of the 
current study, maximum water depth results have been used and fed into CIRP platform for 
further analysis.
Figure 4. Maximum water depth map 
4.3. Impact on Drinking Water and Waste Water Assets
The impact model estimates damage for selected vulnerable components of the drinking 
water and waste water systems. For the drinking water network these include treatment 
plants, control vaults and stations, and pumping stations. For the waste water system these 
are pipelines, wastewater treatment plants, control vaults and stations, and lift stations. 
For the impact analysis the inventory data have been prepared as four (4) different 
shapefiles, two for each system. A polyline GIS layer contains the geographical location and 
classification of the pipelines and a point layer for facilities. The classification includes the 
type of each asset, the need for electricity connection, the underground or above ground 
position of the asset, whether the asset is part of a pressurized system, the floor elevation, its 
size (small, medium, large), the year of construction of the asset, its estimated lifetime and 
the replacement cost for facilities and the repair cost for pipelines. The classification of the 
inventory follows the HAZUS-MH method (FEMA, 2010). There are two general scenarios for 
inundation damage, diked/protected and unprotected/undiked. Using the CIRP GIS editor (refer 
to Section 0) perspective a user is able to edit the attributes of assets and set for instance 
the floor elevation. In some facilities e.g. the treatment plants, there may be different 
structures with different floor slab elevations. In this case the user is required to select the 
elevation that best represents the vulnerability of the overall facility.
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4.3.1 Loss Curves
Loss curves used in this example have been developed in HAZUS-MH for the aforementioned 
inventory classes. The operational vulnerabilities, damage and restoration times can be 
considered a function of the fragility of electrical equipment, mechanical equipment and 
building damage. In many situations the operation of these facilities will be terminated on a 
management decision to shut down the facility at some threshold floodwater elevation. For 
instance a water treatment plant commonly has multiple structure on its terrain, which may 
be situated on different elevations. The functionality of a water treatment plant is dependent 
on electrical circuits and components. When determining a treatment plant’s vulnerability to 
inundation, the elevation of the buildings which house the key electrical controls can be set 
to represent the vulnerability of the entire treatment plant. Damage to electrical equipment 
is expected if inundation depth reaches 1 meter (FEMA, 2010). Nevertheless, within CIRP 
point assets, like treatment plants and pumping stations, are assessed as a whole and 
not as system of systems. In accordance with HAZUS-MH method (FEMA, 2010) there are 
several characteristics that affect flood vulnerability, such as size and type of the asset. CIRP 
chooses loss curves depending on the characteristics of the assets. These characteristics are 
available through the assets’ classification. Drinking water plants and pumping plants are 
expected to receive high levels of damage at low depths of inundation due to their commonly 
low elevation locations and basements. The HAZUS-MH method provides data for setting 
up a damage curve for water treatment plants. The loss curves and mapping files can been 
created with the Loss Curve Editor of CIRP as depicted in the following figure. The user can 
assign a different damage function to each facility class within their study region.
Figure 5. Editing the curve for closed/pressure drinking water treatment plants
4.3.2 The Impact Analyses
This analysis uses the maximum water depth results from the inundation analysis and 
calculates the percentage of damage expected for each facility used as the inventory dataset 
using the loss functions described in the previous section.
(% damage) = damage at (depth of water – asset height)
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Which is read directly from the table of depth damage values using the internal API of the 
platform. Once the expected amount of damage is known (percent %), it is necessary to 
multiply this with the replacement value to determine the amount of loss.
(€ Loss) = (% Damage) * (Inventory € value)
The following Figure depicts impact results statistics via the embedded Chart engine 
(JFreeChart, 2017).
Figure 6. Result statistics for the physical damage analysis
Conclusions
The CIRP has been designed and developed as a collaborative modelling environment where 
new risk assessment and geospatial analyses can extend the analysis workflow and where 
multiple scientific disciplines can work together to understand interdependencies, validate 
results, and present findings in a unified manner. 
CIRP offers an environment for what-if scenario analyses with the selection of model chains, 
climate data, and CI inventories in order to calculate damages and assess the resulting risk. 
The CIRP platform as designed provides a user friendly environment to enable the intuitive 
design and analysis of modelling scenarios created for any combination of climate hazard 
and CI assets. In this way, users are able to understand the impact of various adaptation 
strategies or to quantify the potential impact of a catastrophic event on society. This provides 
an efficient, pragmatic, and effective solution that integrates existing modelling tools and 
data into a holistic resilience model in a standardised fashion.
The CIRP extensible modular architecture can be shared across multiple communities to 
enable CI policy maker, owners, and scientists to leverage existing software analysis types 
and algorithms, inventory types, and fragilities while not binding the underlying platform 
to a particular scientific domain. This pluggable, open architecture is what will allow CIRP 
to support a wide variety of domain specific functionality isolated in plugins; to repackage 
different functionalities as a starting point for new applications, and to be extended to add 
new analytical capabilities in the future. 
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Abstract
In countries around the world, leaders and planners are addressing the issues associated 
with potential climate change impacts. In the majority of the discussions, the focus is on 
developing mitigation strategies. However, there are locations around the world, including in 
the United States, where engineering solutions are impractical and the only plausible long-
term mitigation strategy may be to relocate to more resilient locales.
We examine the various physical, environmental, economic, and social factors that contribute 
to developing climate impact response strategies, including the choice of migration. We 
present a brief review of historical instances of environmentally driven migrations and 
the realized consequences. We then summarize the factors that drove migrations, their 
destination, and if they were ever able to return to their original locations.
We also present a conceptual model for a system-of-systems approach for 
how climate mitigation strategies can be evaluated, including the factors and 
decisions required to evaluate migration as a plausible and implementable 
outcome. We discuss data sources that could be used with “big data” analytic 
approaches to ascertain potential emerging events that could be precursors to 
migratory pressures with potential disruptive consequences.
1. Introduction
The effects of climate change, including heavier rainfall, more intense drought, and rising sea 
levels, will likely be an impetus for widespread migration in the coming years (IPCC 2014). 
A recent analysis of populations at risk due to sea level rise in the United States points to 
potentially significant demographic shifts, with significant population losses in the coastal 
areas of Virginia, New Jersey, Louisiana, and Florida and population gains in Texas (Hauer 
2017). In the Middle East and North Africa, maximum summer temperatures could increase 
by 3°C by 2050 and 7°C by 2100, which could also lead to significant migration as people try 
to escape heat extremes (Lelieveld et al. 2016).
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However, because of the numerous factors that contribute to one’s decision to migrate, 
attributing migration to a specific environmental “push” factor can be very difficult. In social-
ecological systems, where human and environmental systems interact, environmental 
changes may create or exacerbate social, political, or economic hardships.
In addition, societal factors may contribute to environmental degradation such that 
the ecosystem services that were formerly provided by the environment are no longer 
available (Renaud et al. 2011). Thus, it is rarely straightforward to categorize a person as 
an environmental migrant or to establish a cause-effect relationship between a specific 
environmental hazard and a migration event, since environmental factors typically interact 
with social, political, economic, and demographic factors to influence a person’s decision to 
migrate (Black et al. 2011; Warner et al. 2010; Renaud et al. 2011).
Planning for the impacts of sea level rise has already begun at various locations around the 
world. While planning efforts in most areas focus on mitigation and adaptation strategies 
that will allow communities to remain in their current locations, some countries are already 
considering relocation as the most viable option. For example, in 2014 the island country of 
Kiribati purchased a 5,460-acre portion of the island of Vanua Levu in Fiji as a potential site 
for relocation (Tong 2014).
2. Environmental Migration Factors
2.1. Rapidity of Onset
The rapidity of onset of an environmental hazard has major implications for migration 
(Renaud et al. 2011). Previous research has shown that the migration response to short-term 
events, such as hurricanes and earthquakes, is much different than migration that results 
from less-rapid, long-term environmental degradation. In the case of hurricanes or floods, 
residents are often forced to leave their homes, either due to evacuation requirements prior 
to an event or in order to escape dangerous conditions and a lack of basic services after 
an event. In these cases, migration is much easier to attribute to environmental concerns 
(Warner et al. 2010). The speed of recovery after a natural disaster and the financial 
resources of the residents affected are important factors in determining whether people will 
return to their homes and rebuild or permanently relocate (Smith et al. 2011; Gutmann and 
©
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Field 2010). Fast recovery and rebuilding often leads to higher rates of return, while slower 
recovery efforts may dissuade residents from returning and lead to permanent out-migration 
(Gutmann and Field 2010). In addition, poorer residents may find it more difficult to rebuild 
and may be permanently displaced (Gutmann and Field 2010).
The frequency and intensity of natural disasters can also affect the choice to return and rebuild 
or to migrate elsewhere. Warner et al. (2010) observed that people living in the Zambezi River 
Valley in Mozambique moved temporarily during seasonal flood events before returning to their 
homes. However, after a series of severe flood events in 2001, many residents chose the move 
to resettlement areas (Warner et al. 2010). As climate change causes environmental hazards, 
such as flooding and drought, to become more frequent and severe, a similar pattern may be 
seen in other areas, where residents who had previously lived with hazards are no longer able to 
adapt to the increased frequency and intensity of these disruptions.
In contrast to rapid-onset disasters, residents often have more time to weigh social, political, 
and economic considerations when faced with gradual environmental change or degradation. 
As a result, the decision to migrate is rarely based solely on environmental conditions (Carr 
2005). For example, Carr (2005) describes the migration of residents in a village in Ghana 
due to a decline in the timber market. The migration was spread over several decades and 
was influenced not just by a decline in rainfall and loss of soil quality due to logging, but also 
by social and political conditions in the village. Similarly, the abandonment of Holland Island 
in Chesapeake Bay due to rising sea levels occurred over a period of approximately 20 years 
and was completed long before the island became completely uninhabitable, largely because 
residents who remained on the island were not numerous enough to support community 
services, such as a school or church, and thus chose to leave as well (Gibbons and Nicholls 
2006). While the original decision to migrate may have been primarily due to environmental 
factors, the final residents who left the island did so mainly due to social circumstances 
(Gibbons and Nicholls 2006). Some authors suggest that migration in response to gradual 
change comes only after a certain threshold is exceeded, perhaps marking the occasion when 
residents can no longer adapt to their surroundings and must leave (Doos 1997; Warner et al. 
2010; Renaud et al. 2011).
2.2. Characteristics of Environmental Migrants
Renaud et al. (2011) propose a new framework to describe people who migrate solely or in 
part as a response to environmental change, taking into account both the temporal evolution 
of the event and the primary push factors that ultimately lead to migration (see Table 1). 
These include “environmental emergency migrants,” “environmentally forced migrants,” and 
“environmentally motivated migrants.” Environmental emergency migrants move in response 
to short-term extreme events to ensure their personal safety and often leave only temporarily, 
returning when the event has passed and basic services have been restored. For these 
migrants, the main push factor is clearly environmental, and other considerations play only a 
minor role in the decision to migrate. In cases where environmental degradation is much more 
gradual, those who decide to migrate are known either as environmentally forced migrants 
or environmentally motivated migrants. For environmentally forced migrants, the main push 
factor is environmental, such as complete inundation of land due to sea level rise, loss of 
groundwater resources due to salinity intrusion, etc. These migrants cannot return to their former 
homes unless some sort of adaptation or change in livelihood is available. In contrast to those 
forced to migrate due to loss of land or environmental services, environmentally motivated 
migrants choose to move in response to a deteriorating environment, but do not experience an 
immediate need to relocate (Renaud et al. 2011). For example, a homeowner in Miami may 
decide to relocate because of frequent sunny-day flooding (flooding not associated with storm 
events) of his property, even though the property is still inhabitable. Socio-economics play a 
much larger role for this category of migrants, and those who are wealthier or have stronger 
social connections may be better able to migrate than those whose resources or social networks 
are tied to their current homes (McLeman and Smit 2006).
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Table 1. Type of Environmental Migrants (adapted from Renaud et al., 2011)
Type of Migrant Catalyst Push factor(s) Type of migration
Environmental 
emergency
Short term extreme 
events (i.e. hurricane)
Environmental Temporary; return  
when basic services  
are restored
Environmentally 
forced
Long term 
environmental 
change (i.e. complete 
floodinundation)
Environmental; 
socio-economic
Temporary or permanent 
depending on adaptation 
measures and economic 
means
Environmentally 
motivated
Long term environmental 
degradation (i.e. 
nuisance flooding)
Socio-economic; 
environmental
Permanent
Vulnerability to environmental hazards plays a major role in determining whether residents will 
stay in their current location and live with a lower quality of life, stay and attempt to adapt 
to changing conditions, or migrate elsewhere (McLeman and Smit 2006; Warner et al. 2010). 
Because vulnerability is highly dependent not only on exposure to environmental hazards but 
also on one’s adaptive capacity, responses to environmental change will vary, even among 
people who experience the same level of exposure (McLeman and Smit 2006). For example, 
McLeman and Smit (2006) found that tenant farmers who migrated out of Eastern Oklahoma 
during the Dust Bowl in the 1930s had modest economic means and more extensive social 
networks that allowed them to find opportunities elsewhere, as compared to poorer residents 
who lacked widespread social connections and thus had little choice but to stay. In other 
cases, wealth may help residents to remain in their homes and eliminate or delay the need 
for migration (Willekens et al. 2016). For example, many adaptation strategies related to sea 
level rise, such as elevating or waterproofing homes and access to insuranceare very costly and 
are not a viable option for low-income residents. However, wealthier families have the ability 
to implement these adaptation strategies and may be able to remain in their homes longer. 
Thus, economic status and social connections play an important role in determining migration 
behaviour (McLeman and Smit 2006; Smith et al. 2011).
Findlay (2011) suggests that migrants prefer to remain as close to their place of origin 
as possible, mainly due to social and cultural connections, particularly for international 
migration as a result of environmental stresses. Therefore, cities in the southern hemisphere 
are predicted to be the most common destinations for migrants who face environmental 
degradation in rural parts of the southern hemisphere (Findlay 2011). Hugo (2011) compared 
predictions for demographic and environmental changes and found that developing counties 
that are expected to experience the greatest population increases in the coming years are 
also highly susceptible to environmental hazards and climate change. In addition, poverty 
is a major concern in many of these countries, which may make residents more vulnerable 
and less resilient to environmental hazards (Hugo 2011). Thus, the interactions between 
demographic and environmental change could have significant implications for global 
migration patterns in the future.
3. Migration Modelling Approaches
A variety of modelling approaches have been used to predict migration behaviour, although 
fewer studies have attempted to incorporate environmental change as a component of the 
process. Piguet (2010) outlined several types of analyses that have been used: ecological 
analyses, which consider group rather than individual behaviour; surveys of individuals; 
and methods that attempt to incorporate both individual and ecological aspects, including 
time-series analysis, multilevel analysis, and agent-based modelling. Time-series analysis 
attempts to discern correlations between historical migration behaviour and other variables, 
such as rainfall amount and timing, crop yields, etc. These correlations can then be used to 
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predict future patterns of migration (Kniveton et al. 2008). Multi-level approaches combine 
individual and ecological approaches with time-series analysis, but have not yet been 
widely applied in the migration literature (Piguet 2010). Agent-based modelling methods 
simulate migration behaviour at the level of the individual or family and allow agents to 
form relationships with each other and to make migration decisions based on a variety 
of variables. This type of approach can be very valuable because it not only allows for an 
analysis of individual behaviour, but also can lead to emergent behaviours at the group- or 
community-scale that would not be discernible otherwise. However, more research into the 
decision functions embedded within the models is needed to ensure that they can accurately 
capture real-world migration responses to climate change (Kniveton et al. 2008).
Kniveton et al. (2008) applied the time-series approach to analyse Mexican migration to 
the U.S. based on rainfall patterns and found a positive correlation between migration and 
total rainfall in Durango. However, they emphasized that the lack of available data on past 
migration behaviour and the uncertainty in extending historical correlations into the future 
are major limitations to this approach. Hauer (2017) used historical time series data and 
migration systems theory, which considers all possible origins and destinations for migrants, 
to predict where coastal populations would relocate in the U.S. as a result of sea level rise. 
The analysis indicated that all states, even those without a coastline, will be impacted by 
migration due to sea level rise. Some inland areas, such as Austin, TX, Atlanta, GA, and 
Phoenix, AZ, could receive more than 250,000 in-migrants. This demonstrates that sea level 
rise will have impacts beyond the coastal communities that experience direct inundation. 
Other environmental stressors, such as drought, could have similar impacts in terms of 
changing the population distribution across the U.S.
Entwisle et al. (2016) used an agent-based model to simulate migration dynamics in 
Thailand as a result of drought and flooding. Their analysis only considered the indirect 
impact of climate change on crop yield and the resulting implications for household incomes, 
and thus did not directly model residents’ responses to droughts or heavy rainfall. While 
a regression analysis of the data showed a significant migration response to adverse 
environmental conditions, the results of the agent-based model showed only a small 
response, suggesting that incorporating socio-economic factors into the analysis, as was done 
with the agent-based model, may reduce the climate change signal. The authors suggest that 
the weak signal due to climate change may be a result of the already high migration rates in 
the area, which suggest that most people who are eligible to migrate are already doing so, 
regardless of environmental conditions (Entwisle et al. 2016).
4. Developing a Model for the Drivers of Migration
Developing a model of how environmental factors may become drivers for migration will 
require a system of systems approach to how physical, environmental, economic, and social 
factors impact the migration process. In order to understand how these interactions may play 
out, we have developed a high-level conceptual model, which is shown in Figure 1, of how 
environmental disruptions may impact migration.
Environmental disruptions can come from climate change, which evolve slowly, or can come 
from punctuated, extreme weather events. These disruptions can result in direct impacts 
on factors such as physical infrastructure, the environment, public health, food security, 
and resource availability. The response options to the impacts can involve mitigation, 
accommodation, or migration and can involve feedback relationships to the primary impacts. 
The response options can also result in secondary impacts, such as, changes to social and 
demographic characteristics, the political climate, and the economy.
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Figure 1. High-level conceptual model of how environmental 
disruptions can generate response options that can include migration.
Response Options
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Extreme Events
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The decision process for migration is a linked two-phase process: (1) “we must go”, and 
“where shall we go?” As in our introduction example with the government of Kiribati, the goal 
is to find a location that would be able to support a similar standard of living and similar 
environmental conditions. However, if the decision to migrate is based on immediate and 
extreme disruptions, the question often becomes “where can we get to?”, rather than a preferred 
migration locale. Environmental disruptions do not recognize political boundaries and the need 
to move away from an extreme event may also necessitate ignoring boundaries, as well as 
moving to non-optimal locales. This can then result in trading of one migration pressure for 
another, simply as a reaction to the most pressing factor at the time, and successive moves as 
migrants react to variable pressures. These evolving situations are not unlike the original crisis 
that caused the initial move, and are a complex interplay of external forces, met by individual 
and group capability and bounded by the available set of options.
The following steps can provide a foundation for a phased approach where modelling can 
inform policy and collective action.
4.1. Determine Locales Likely to Experience Migration Pressures
Numerous studies (e.g. IPCC 2014) have analysed where climate change impacts, such as sea 
level rise or increased occurrences of extreme events, could be a threat to people. S&P has 
analysed 116 sovereign countries in terms of their vulnerabilities to climate change. Of the 10 
most vulnerable countries evaluated by S&P (S&P 2014), only one country, Fiji, was rated as 
having high human development based on the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) 
(UNDP 2016), with the remaining nine rated with medium to low human development.
Since migration may not honour nor even recognize international governmental boundaries or 
policies, the ability to predict pressures and strategically shape migration policies or response 
would support effective mitigation and response. Modelling the interplay between evolving 
pressures and the capability of impacted persons and groups is the foundation of this 
targeted effort.
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4.2. Assess the Range of Options for Pressured Locales before a 
Crisis Hits
Through understanding of these pressured locales, options driving the move(s) and both 
mitigation and response efforts can then be explored and possibly ranked based upon ease 
and efficacy. This will inform discussions for governments, policy makers, agencies, and 
residents. Since these decisions are difficult and are often socially impactful and resource 
intense, a shared understanding assists communities in moving forward (sometimes literally) 
in the face of unwanted circumstances.
4.3. Develop an Informed Crisis Planning Process
No agency, government, or locality ever has an unlimited pool of resources. Therefore, responses 
must not only follow an immediacy orientation, but also a longer-term approach toward 
sustainable communities that are resilient to the ever-changing threats to living standards. It is 
often in the shift from immediate response to long-term rebuilding of community that efforts 
experience roadblocks, as the overall goal expands and efficacy of the effort becomes less 
definitive (e.g., applying a bandage verses improving the overall health of the system). As an 
example, the City of Miami is investing in a re-engineering of a number of coastal city blocks by 
raising the roadbeds several feet and installing more advanced drainage systems.
5. Conclusions
Modelling of migration is an important tool in the international policy arsenal, as it creates 
information for governments, policymakers, and communities to make informed choices and 
target resources most effectively. Understanding the triggers of migration can help prepare 
communities for potential migration events and the requirements needed to facilitate easy 
transitions, both temporarily and permanently.
The circumstances surrounding an environmental migration are linked to not only the 
severity of environmental events, but also to a plethora of physical, socio-economic, and 
cultural stimuli that influence individual decision-making. In this paper, we have presented a 
conceptual model of how environmental disruptions can operate on these stimuli to generate 
different response options, including the decision to migrate. We are continuing to expand 
the conceptual model, define the relevant processes that would be represented at the 
algorithmic level, and outline how to implement them at the computational level. One of the 
challenges that exists in developing a simulation of this kind of system is that the required 
physical, environmental, socio-economic, and cultural processes operate at different physical 
and temporal scales. The ultimate goal of the effort is to provide communities with a better 
understanding of the potential impacts surrounding an environmental event, so they will be 
able to prioritize response and recovery actions that might include the permanent relocation 
of displaced populations more effectively.
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Abstract
The Dutch National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) uses bow-ties 
for evaluating major hazard and occupational risk. The bow-tie is a well-known model in 
risk assessment for quantifying risk and prioritising risk reduction. Outcomes are linked to 
causes and the approach is to identify ways to eliminate or reduce causes that result in the 
realization of the risk e.g. the release of a hazardous chemical and its subsequent effects 
on workers, the public and the environment. It has been argued that risk assessment is a 
reactive approach that fails to address the positive aspects of the human resource. Humans 
are necessary for supporting the flexibility required in complex changing environments 
typified by interactions, variability in conditions and weak signals of potentially important 
events. In a European SAF€RA project “Success in the face of uncertainty: human resilience 
and the accident risk bow-tie” a start was made on developing the success components 
of the risk bow-tie. This served as a basis for understanding and developing approaches to 
resilient performance in recovering from situations that could otherwise have been disastrous. 
Disasters are frequently triggered by a surprise, something unforeseen. In the success bow-tie 
resilience was incorporated as an aspect of interventions in response to such unexpected 
events. This aspect reduces the uncertainty associated with achieving a 
successful outcome, thereby increasing the chance of success. The results 
of this SAF€RA project were further developed for the purpose of bringing 
resilience into practice with the use of workshops and tools. One approach that 
is being developed with the help of safety professionals in the Netherlands 
is a serious game that can be applied to situations of decision-making under 
uncertainty and limited time.
1. Introduction
1.1. Risk assessment and failure
For industrial hazards which threaten workers, the public and the environment a certain level 
of protection is expected to be in place. There are regulatory requirements for prevention 
and for dealing with events that could arise if prevention fails. Risk assessment is one way 
in which failure scenarios can be understood and managed. In the Netherlands a prescribed 
method for quantitative risk assessment (QRA) of chemical plants is used for land use 
planning. The method groups possible scenarios into a limited number of categories covering 
the foreseen risks (Uijt de Haag et al, 2013). There is also an occupational risk assessment 
tool, WebORCA (RIVM, 2008) and a set of bow-ties (36 occupational hazards & 1 major 
hazard loss of containment bow-tie). Together these databases currently contain around 
Keywords
Bow-tie, safety, 
resilience, 
uncertainty,  
serious game
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30,000 accident scenarios (event sequences) developed from detailed reportable accident 
investigations by the Dutch Labour Inspectorate. The bow-tie models are constructed from 
safety barriers in a tool called Storybuilder™ (Bellamy et al, 2008, 2013). The data enable 
detailed qualitative and quantitative analyses to be made of barrier failures, failures in 
human tasks that directly relate to the barriers and underlying management factors which 
deliver resources to these tasks. Identification of hazards and risks are needed in order to 
be able to prioritise risk reduction and manage the remaining risks. As the European Agency 
for Safety & Health at Work state – “Risk assessment is the cornerstone of the European 
approach to prevent occupational accidents and ill health”.33 
1.2. Resilience, uncertainty and success
Recently risk assessment and the approach to addressing safety through analysis and 
avoidance of failure has been criticised by technical and human engineers working in the safety 
field for focussing solely on failure avoidance and not also addressing successful responding 
in the normal functioning of socio-technical systems (Hollnagel et al, 2011). Resilience 
Engineering (RE) defines (safety) success as “the ability to succeed under varying conditions” 
and concentrates on how adjustments to changes and disturbances sustain operations. RE is 
particularly popular in areas like transportation (aviation and railways) and healthcare (patient 
safety) sectors. Systems, like Air Traffic Control, are considered to be too complex and dynamic 
to be sufficiently addressed by classical risk assessment (Hollnagel et al, 2013). 
Risk assessment uses historical (and in its absence also expert judgement) data, which do 
not exist with new and emerging risks and with increasing uncertainties like those in these 
dynamic and complex systems. Leveson (2017) explains that systems can fail without 
component failures due to emergent phenomena of complex interactions. With unpredictable 
futures, and ones that could even be made worse by risk-based actions, Ramírez and Ravetz 
(2011) suggest that “scenario planning” (Wack, 1985a, 1985b) is needed to address the 
hitherto unthinkable. Scenario thinking, simulation to support decision-making and signal 
watching for early detection are approaches to uncertain futures suggested by a number 
of authors (Brooker, 2010; Dinh et al, 2012; Paltrinieri et al, 2012). When considering 
safety strategies, the heart of resilience from the perspective of the human component 
33 https://oiraproject.eu/en/what-risk-assessment
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of the system is to understand as much as possible the complexities and uncertainties 
and to be prepared for what that may deliver in order to maximise the chance of success. 
Mountaineers, for example, might be considered to be very reliant on resilience. This can 
be contrasted with normative management systems like the major hazard (petro)chemical 
processing industry where the human component largely follows procedures in a standardised 
technical environment with automated supervisory systems. However, even when replaced by 
automation humans still have a role in adjustment and recovery, except that it can get even 
more complex. This is the irony discussed in the timeless paper by Bainbridge (1983) – the 
more advanced the control system the more crucial the contribution of the human operator.
Resilience and uncertainty from a human perspective was addressed in a SAF€RA (European 
ERA-NET) project which continues its aims to provide a research coordinating network in the 
area of industrial safety34. “Success In The Face Of Uncertainty: Human Resilience and the 
Accident risk Bow-tie” (Resilience Success Consortium, 2015), or “SITFOU”, was one of the first 
coordinated projects to be undertaken, starting in 2014, and had a multidisciplinary research 
team35 with expertise in risk assessment, human factors, crisis management, and in the areas 
of modelling occupational and major hazard risk. 
Using the “four cornerstones of resilience” as a basis (Hollnagel, 2009) - anticipating, 
monitoring, learning and responding - common human and organisational Factors (HOFs) 
were identified from 350 pages of transcribed interviews from top professionals working 
in major hazards, dangerous maintenance, and mountaineering and coming from the 
Netherlands, Belgium, France, UK, and Denmark (Van Galen & Bellamy, 2015). Amongst these 
were production and process managers, HSE professionals, and process safety specialists 
from installations falling under the Seveso Directive (EC Council 2012). They provided their 
perspectives on handling uncertainties in relation to unforeseen and uncertain circumstances, 
in their case concerning the possible release of major hazard (petro)chemical substances. 
In the different circumstances of mountaineering and dangerous maintenance (using rope 
access in difficult locations) similar HOFs could be identified from the case studies as the 
positive shapers of uncertainty-reducing interventions for unforeseen changes and deviations. 
In SITFOU, resilience was considered as the ability to increase the chance of a successful 
recovery or adjustment to deviations through uncertainty reduction. The SITFOU project 
pioneered a success bow-tie which could be used to evaluate successes under different levels 
of uncertainty and where the centre event of the bow-tie is successful intervention. Like the 
failure bow-tie, this can be used to collect scenarios but with the purpose to improve the 
monitoring of success and the understanding of recovery under uncertainty. The difference 
between a failure and a success bow-tie is explained in section 2 of this paper. 
Section 3 then describes the implementation in practice of the results of SITFOU by involving 
users from Dutch industry. Implementation was facilitated through the development of simple 
practical tools as well as networking events, initiated and managed by the Centre for Safety of 
the Dutch National Institute for Public Health and Environment (RIVM). The key aim was to bring 
the exploratory results into practice in response to the interest in resilience shown by Dutch 
safety professionals and the perceived lack of tools. The tool of interest in this paper is a serious 
game which can be used to help train people to understand uncertainty and analyse situations 
to support decision-making and to better understand the nature of near miss type successes.
34 http://www.safera.industrialsafety-tp.org/
35 White Queen Safety Strategies, NL (coordinator); NCSR Demokritos, GR; Technical University of Denmark, DK; Anne van Galen 
Consultancy, FR
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2. The bow-tie as a model for both normative  
and resilient safety
The understanding and representation of risk has many different models of which the bow-tie 
is one (see Figure 1). This is a graphical model which is not only important for understanding 
and improving the control of risk but also for communicating about risk. The bow-tie has been 
used since the 1970s to represent causes and effects of critical failure events in risk analysis, 
particularly in high hazard industry such as at Shell’s Pernis refinery (Zuiderduijn, 1999). Bow-
tie models may specifically incorporate the failure of safety barriers as a way of modelling 
accidents (Duijm, 2009; Papazoglou et al, 2017) and for analysing near misses (Ansaldi et al, 
2016). The centre event of a bow-tie might be quite specific or quite general. That event is 
the release of some kind of hazard-agent with various possible consequences. 
Figure 1. Failure bow-tie
Figure 2. Success bow-tie
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The underlying model for successful intervention is also a bow-tie, initially developed in the 
SITFOU project, where it was used to analyse a near miss database (Resilience Success 
Consortium, 2015). The broad framework of the success bow-tie is shown in Figure 2. The 
centre event is not a failure but a successful intervention leading to success under different 
levels of uncertainty conditions. It is intended to capture reported sequences of events that 
occur in so-called near miss or recovery scenarios triggered by a deviation or failure event 
(precursor) that ends in success (no harm and continued functioning of the system). In the 
success bow-tie pure luck would be represented by an outcome of success under a very high 
level of uncertainty. A success outcome is considered more likely the more the uncertainty 
is actively reduced in the process of intervention. The bow-tie structure captures the nature 
of the detection of the deviation or change, the evaluation of options and the selected 
response, including identification of any resilient components in the process which contribute 
to uncertainty reduction. A successful outcome under conditions where uncertainty has been 
reduced to low or medium is distinct from a success where there were large uncertainties but 
no attempt or possibility to reduce them. In practice the different types of success may be 
indistinguishable, which renders success particularly dangerous because it gives the message 
to go on doing the same. 
The difficulty of distinguishing resilience from luck is well illustrated in the report of the ditching 
of a plane on the Hudson River where “the investigation revealed that the success of this 
ditching mostly resulted from a series of fortuitous circumstances” (NTSB, 2010 p.79) whereas 
the pilot acquired hero status for his miraculous recovery after the loss of both engines. 
3. Resilience implementation project
3.1. Cards and strategy
The identified HOFs from the SITFOU study were developed as a set of cards containing 
pictures and short text descriptions for use in a serious game (see Figure 3). The game 
simulates a decision dilemma with a group of people who play different roles in the team. 
The aim is to reduce the uncertainty in the process of deciding on a response and how that 
will be monitored during its implementation. The players talk about intervention scenarios 
in uncertain situations (case studies) and use the cards as descriptors for properties of the 
decision process as subtitles to the steps taken to decrease time pressure and reduce the 
uncertainty. Time and uncertainty cards are numbered 1-6, which are coupled to the model 
described in the next section and shown in Figure 5. Decision dilemma cases are provided 
by the safety professionals, taken from their own experience, but could also be developed 
from bow-tie data. The Resilience Card Game contains 57 cards and is used together with a 
storyboard which takes the players through the five steps shown in Figure 4 and provides a 
structure for laying out the cards.
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Figure 3. Examples of cards in the Resilience Card Game (by permission RIVM)
Figure 4. The five steps (by permission RIVM)
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3.2. Resilience versus normative strategy
For the serious game, the model in Figure 5 was elaborated from SITFOU. The traditional 
approach to safety is to learn from failure and then to implement that learning through 
rules and regulation, technical and management standards and inspections, and the 
updating of models with new data and understanding. This normative approach is about 
controlling foreseen risks. Here signals indicate to a person what rule applies (IF-THEN). 
New signals (change) or surprise outcomes can suggest that a different form of responding 
is needed. Decision-making dilemmas may arise or signals may be ignored. Phenomena 
may be encountered that have never been seen before or not predicted by models. The 
decision-making process in the serious game is intended to focus on these kinds of uncertain 
situations where the normative approach does not apply. For example, when a petrol storage 
tank overflowed at the Buncefield oil storage depot in the UK in 2005, a massive explosion 
generating unexpectedly high overpressures resulted (Health & Safety Executive, 2008). 
The accident illustrated how humans are very good at ignoring signals of change and not 
resolving uncertainties. Operators treated the multiple persistent failures of the level gauge 
in the tank in a normative way. In a low uncertainty (foreseen) situation responses can be 
specified by procedures. However, under high uncertainty (in this case the unknowns of the 
repeated level failure) resilience may be required to find the best intervention option. These 
two situations, low uncertainty and high uncertainty, require different strategies.
Figure 5 distinguishes between resilience and normative safety. The figure shows two 
dimensions, uncertainty and available time, providing four quadrants for the ways in which 
safety is handled in these different combinations. When uncertainty is low and risks are 
foreseen then Quadrant A and B interventions apply. In Quadrant A, inbuilt interventions 
(like early warnings, shut off systems and back-up power) buy time before more serious 
consequences ensue. Quadrant B reflects normal day to day operations that can be handled 
by standard approaches in response to known signals. Ideally in cases of uncertainty when 
signals of change are detected it is possible to move to Quadrant C, with time available to 
think out scenarios and options. In rapidly developing scenarios Quadrant D applies. 
Figure 5. Resilience-Normative Quadrants (by permission RIVM)
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The quadrant model can be used to characterise different safety strategies, organisations and 
scenarios depending on the uncertainties and the response times available. For example crisis 
responders could be considered to be predominantly Quadrant A & D types. Major hazard 
companies are strong on A and B but still face uncertainties where they need to be in C and 
on rare occasions end up in D. 
The uncertainty line does not specifically refer to a range of variability uncertainties and 
can include scenario uncertainties and recognised ignorance which cannot be assigned 
probabilities, as in the spectrum provided by Walker et al (2003) that goes from complete 
determinism (impossible ideal) where everything could be foreseen to total ignorance where 
foresight is impossible. The numbers on the axes in the quadrants are simply to enable 
players to express their feelings of uncertainty about a situation and are not anchored in 
anything specific. The same goes for time pressure. The quadrants are used in the serious 
game to track the progress of decision-making against the uncertainty-time axes. Being 
faced with a decision dilemma under uncertainty, the idea of the game is to gain time and 
then reduce uncertainty in making the final selection of an option. Because the game has 
to be played as a team, with players taking different roles and having different individual 
perspectives, the players also experience challenges to their established views and 
experience, including confronting the dangers of cognitive bias (Kahneman, 2011) such as 
anchoring on a first piece of evidence arising in a scenario or accepting the first suggested 
plausible solution (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
4. Summary
A serious game has been described that trains people to understand the properties of a 
successful intervention through a multi-perspective collaborative approach to uncertainty 
reduction in a decision dilemma. That dilemma has to be a case where the normative 
management strategy no longer applies because of the uncertainties and so the intervention 
needs to be resilient. The issues involved in the game are also set in a more formal modelling 
perspective, the bow-tie, which can be used for data collection and analysis of real life 
successes in support of learning more about the success phenomenon.
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Method RM2: A different  
way of assessing Resilience36
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Abstract
The constant variation of the Environment (in its largest sense) where a system works, 
makes each system unique and different from the rest. Those variations may be caused 
by Disruptions of different nature (from normal accidents to black swans, passing through 
deliberated acts, acts of God or events related to climate change) but finally all of them 
impact directly the functionality level of the system because the disruption will modify the 
system’s level of performance.
Usually, the consequences of those disruptions are slight modifications of the operating 
level though remaining in the Tolerance Range (i.e. the space between the theoretical 
operating level or the attended performance of the system and the unacceptable level or the 
performance level where the service delivered by the system is under the threshold accepted 
by the stakeholders). Yet, sometimes, this Tolerance Range is reached and the operating 
level falls and crosses the unacceptable level. Then the service delivered by the system is no 
longer ensured.
After years looking for systems able to cope with all kind of possible disruptions, reality has 
demonstrated that it is impossible: ZERO risk does not exist. So, how are we able to deal with 
all those disruptions? The answer is to enhance the resilience of the system. Now the next 
question is: how can we enhance something that is an abstract capacity of a system? Or how 
can you choose amongst the different available solutions the one that will best upgrade the 
resilience of the system?
Nowadays, the most common approach to assess the resilience is to consider it as an 
equation between the loss of the system’s performance and the time needed to come back 
to the Tolerance Range after the impact of a Disruption. In this calculation, the smaller is the 
result the better is the resilience.
Nevertheless, this approach does not consider the different stages of a disruption and 
following facts: the system’s resilience might have prevented the disruption; if it happened, 
the loss of performance remained inside the Tolerance Range; or the disruption itself created 
a new Environment where the theoretical operating level is no longer accepted by the 
stakeholders.
The RM2 method takes a different approach that allows comparing the resilience between 
similar or different systems because each one is analysed with regards to its own 
Environment in a determined moment. This assessment method is based on the four notions 
of the Resilience (Resistance, Means, Rapidity and Memory), grouped in two pillars: the first 
two notions (Resistance and Means) are grouped in the Material Pillar and the second ones 
(Rapidity and Memory) in the Intellectual Pillar. This method analyses how each notion acts 
in each of the disruption’s stages. This method, besides establishing a level of 
resilience, also allows to detect if one of the notions is less developed than the 
others or if the treatment of one of the stages of the disruption needs to be 
reinforced.
36 The present article is based in the author’s Masters paper.
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1. Introduction
Answer specific needs in a specific moment. To facilitate this answer men create systems of 
all kind (from very simple as harbouring wild trees to very complex like autonomous cars). 
All of those systems are designed to achieve a certain Performance level (P) in one specific 
moment over the time, but the needs evolve over the time.
As needs evolve, the Performance level of the system might require adjustments in the 
system itself. Nevertheless, those adjustments are usually predictable and happen quite 
smoothly.
Besides these current adjustments, systems have also to deal regularly with all kind of 
disruptions. The origin of those disruptions can be external to the systems or come from the 
interior; they can be done on purpose or because of a system failure; and their source can be 
linked to acts of Gods, climate change or be caused by men. These disruptions are treated in 
the day-to-day operations of the system.
Figure 1 shows the fluctuations of the Performance Level (P) over the time. The theoretical 
operating level is in black, and the current operating level is represented in blue. A third level 
is also represented below the theoretical level. This level in red identifies the point where the 
performance of the system is below the expected level, it is the unacceptable level. Operating 
modes located between the theoretical level and the unacceptable level will be those 
typically considered as degraded modes of operation. 
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Figure 1. Different levels of performance
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In order to prevent the current operating level to fall the unacceptable level an increased 
resilience of the system is in now days considered as the solution.
1.1. Achieving Resilience
Once Resilience has been defined as the solution, the next step was to identify a way to 
measure it in order to take the actions needed to improve it.
Authors in different areas have tried to find a way to represent resilience. Bruneau et al. 
(2003), Moteff (2012), Toubin et al. (2012) Caverzan and Solomos (2014), to mention just 
a few, considerer resilience as a function more or less mathematical, that will look at the 
evolution over time of the system’s level of performance, as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Examples of Resilience representations
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Another main characteristic of these way of assessing resilience is consider that, once the 
disruption has finished, the system must recover the same operating level as before the 
disruption.
In the end, in those approaches resilience is a surface defined by the amount of performance 
lost and the time needed to recover the original level. The smaller the area, the higher the 
resilience.
But considering the time and the loss of performance, those models and methods only allow 
to measure the consequences of a disruption, and only in a partial way. They cannot take into 
account that the system’s resilience could have:
• avoided the arrival of the disruption,
• reduced the impact of the disruption to not cross the unacceptable level,
• allow the system to adapt to the new environment reshaped by the disruption.
Another weakness of those approaches is that they cannot take in account the system in its 
own environment. A system, placed in different environments and facing a similar disruption, 
does not necessary have the same resilience.
So, it might be interesting to have a resilience assessment method that both allows 
considering the system and its environment and also gives an objective information that will 
facilitate the decision making.
2. Redefining Resilience / Pillars and Notions
A common problem appears when trying to measure the Resilience: the right definition of 
Resilience. Almost each sciences corpus has its own definition, and there might be slight or 
wide differences from one definition to the others. In 2003 Bruneau et al., trying to establish 
an assessment method, considered 4 criteria as necessary to obtain Resilience Performance.
This approach by criteria allows every science to adapt the resilience definition of resilience. 
But when those 4 criteria are confronted to existing definitions of Resilience they appear to 
be incomplete. By extracting the principle concepts and ideas of those definitions, it seems 
that the choice of 4 criteria was correct because 4 notions or family of ideas get shaped.
These notions are:
• Resistance.
• Means. 
• Rapidity. 
• Memory.
They can be grouped two-by-two in 2 Pillars of the Resilience, the Material Pillar and the 
Intellectual Pillar. The first one will deal with the elements deployed to obtain the resilience of 
the system. The second one will concern the information needed to better use the Material Pillar.
2.1. Resistance
Resist, absorb, suffer, face, accept, mitigate, suffer, bear, continue to look, reinforcement, 
persist, project robustness, redundancy, maintain, future protection, minor impact, anticipating, 
withdrawal, prepare, respond, recover, collect, continue, cope, etc. The notion of Resistance 
gathers all the words mentioned previously. It has a static connotation but still with reference 
to an idea of strength and capacity to cope with disruptions without stopping to provide the 
service required.
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Resistance will refer to the various measures taken during the conception of the system. 
It will be shaped mainly on assumptions and scenarios set before the disruption occurs, 
because these hypotheses will define the protective measures to be taken.
Their principal objective will be the reduction of the probability of the disruption to occur. This 
will be done through prevention, risk analysis, management and implementation of protection 
measures. When a disruption happens, the Resistance will try to ensure, in a more or less 
degraded way, the functionality of the system. Once the disruption is over, there is a need to 
assess and remedy damages to correct the points which could not contain the disruption, and 
to strengthen the points which could have been exceeded if the disruption had requested.
The weak point of Resistance is its rigidity and difficulty to evolve over the time. Once the 
different hypotheses are set, amending them usually means large investments. If conception 
errors or sudden environment changes happen the system struggles to adapt.
2.2. Means
Resource, bounce back, recover, walk to the origin, return, react and adapt, recover, restore, 
recovery, spirit of initiative, competence, move forward, overcome, resume, to identify, return, 
respond, redundancy, maintain, reorganise, move towards the conservation, , degraded mode, 
retrieve, renew, etc.
The notion of Means would go along with the words mentioned previously. They could also 
be called the resources. It encompasses all necessary means to ascertain that the system is 
able to keep working over the unacceptable level. It refers to the provision and deployment 
of technical, human and material resources both physical and intellectual, financial and 
organisational, in their broadest sense.
This concept has a dynamic nature which refers to the measures or actions to prevent the 
disruption to occur and minimises its impact when it happens. The objective is the reduction 
of the consequences of disruption over the system functioning by forecasting and planning of 
protective measures as well as crisis management.
When a disruption happens, Means will make possible to continue with the foreseen 
contingency plans and remedy the damages caused to the system that Resistance couldn’t 
absorb. They will be the cornerstone for the survival of the system when the disruption 
happens, since they must also allow the system to adapt to unknown situations.
Their weakness is their requirement of availability at any time and in the need for 
adaptability. The moment of arrival of the disruption cannot always be predicted and at the 
same time the protection means foreseen are not completely adapted. The fact that Means 
must be permanently available requires everybody to have a thorough knowledge of the 
system and what it should do.
2.3. Rapidity
Speed, without long periods, speedy, automatic, rapidly, reduced time, be prepared, best 
delay, trained, etc.
The notion of timeliness refers to the need that the system has to shorten the time needed 
to recover an expected performance level. This time span is fully dependent on the Material 
pillar because the recovery time is tightly linked to the hypotheses defining Resistance and 
the Means allocated.
Its weakness lies the establishment of the recovery time. This time is fixed by conceptual 
approach and it’s determined by the functionality of the system, its kinetics and the impact 
that the loss of the system may have on other systems. Benchmarking is possible in similar 
systems; however, but it is only the disruption who will validate the choice made.
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Once it has finalised, it is necessary to verify whether adjustments are necessary. If the 
recovery time should be amended, revisions and adjustments shall be provided at the 
Material pillar, both at the level of Resistance and Means.
2.4. Memory
Increase skills, adapting, learn, develop capacity, previous experiences, overcome, exceed, 
enrichment, improve innovation, anticipation, memory, rebuilding sustainably, prepare, trained, 
informed, lessons learned, etc.
The notion of Memory completes Rapidity. It will seek, by permanent observation of recurrent 
adjustments of the system, at drawing lessons aiming a fairer response time determination, 
because these adjustments provide a vision of what might happen.
Another source of teaching is the ability to learn from own mistakes and those of others, 
failures or near accidents, periodic tests and return of experiences because we learn better 
with trial-error approach than successfully doing at first time.
These sources of education, largely internal to the system should be involved in a third 
source, external, that is the exchange between peers. Similar systems should have the same 
problems, but their environment and functioning methods may be different. These differences 
force them to adapt in different ways.
The weakness of Memory is that is time-consuming. It is difficult to have a short-term return, 
since Memory is projected in the medium or long term. In order for it to be effective when the 
time comes, it is necessary to have discipline to learn from small frequent errors. Petit et al. 
(2014) explain that drawing the right lessons of those situations means having a team with 
personnel possessing expertise in multiple areas, and it takes time.
This approach needs to be complemented by adequate organisational culture and rapid alert 
mechanisms in case of disruptions. For these mechanisms to be truly effective, the people 
who activated them must be recognised if they were right, but shall not be punished if the 
contrary (Sehffi, 2007). The combination of both two approaches will be beneficial to the 
human intelligence of all stakeholders which will have a positive impact on the performance 
of the system.
3. Method RM2 for resilience Assessment
Once the concept of Resilience has been determined, and having in mind the fact that it can 
intervene in any of the 3 phases of the disruption, the next step is to establish an assessment 
method that is taking in account these elements and allows the comparison of different 
systems having similar function.
Assuming that a resilient system will be able to cope with any disruption at any time, this will 
mean that two systems with a similar index of resilience (Ir) should be equally valid while 
choosing solution. Nevertheless, this assessment corresponds to a specific moment in time 
and the Performance level in that moment.
3.1. The index of resilience (Ir)
The index of resilience (Ir) is the result of the questioning the system in determined moment. 
It is the result of the analysis of the four notions of resilience, identified previously in the light 
of the existing environment at that time. We can easily agree that a resilient system will have 
an index of resilience (Ir) = 1.
As previously established, each pillar is complementary to the other, and in the same manner 
each notion, within each pillar, is complementary to the other. This complementarity of notions 
is justifying the choice to assume that each concept represents 25 % of the index of resilience.
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Each concept must be analysed with reference to the various stages of the disruption. Each 
of the three phases will have a similar importance in the resilience of the component.
The phase (bfr), before the disruption happens, corresponds to all the measures taken to 
avoid the disruption and to verify that the initial assumptions in relation to the environment 
have not change.
The phase (drg), during disruption, needs to observe if the measures planned remain valid 
with regards to the current environment and if they will be able to prevent the system 
to cross the inacceptable level. This evaluation needs to be done having in mind the 
performance levels required at this moment.
The final phase (aft), after the disruption, is necessary to the system evolving. It will take 
into account planned performance developments. These developments will occur following 
programmed upgrades, but they may also be engaged following a disruption.
Predicting disruption and understanding how the environment is changing will lead to the 
appropriate measures to be taken in the recovery phase to develop the system. This is 
necessary because the system might now operate in a new environment for a different level 
of performance. Once returned, the running phase after the disruption is becoming a new 
phase before (bfr).
The importance of each of the stages justifies the choice to consider that they contribute in 
an equivalent manner in the index of resilience determination.
After determining how the concepts and phases of the disruption affect the index of resilience, 
we can by combining them, establish the method of calculation of the index of resilience, as 
detailed in Table 1.
Table 1. Table for calculation of index of resilience (Ir)
RESILIENCE
Intellectual Pillar Material Pillar
Resistance 
Re
Means 
Mn
Rapidity 
Ra
Memory 
Me
DISRUPTION Max. 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4
Before the disruption bfr 1/3 Rebfr Mnbfr Rabfr Mebfr
During the disruption drg 1/3 Redrg Mndrg Radrg Medrg
After the disruption aft 1/3 Reaft Mnaft Raaft Meaft
Index of resilience (Ir) 1
Finally, the table is filled out with the date obtained by consulting the stakeholders (from 
newcomers to top management) and having their point of view with regards to the state of 
the system. The larger and wider the consultation, the fairest the results will be.
3.2. Representations of resilience
In order to have a better view of the resilience of the component, the results obtained in 
Table 1 can easily be graphically transformed into a model that will reflect the status of 
each notion. This index of resilience will take the form of a circle divided into four quarters, 
a quarter by concept. In the light of the results obtained following the assessment of each 
notion every quarter will be filled proportionately.
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3.2.1 Simplified representation
To establish this representation recovers the results of each concept, and converts them into 
an equivalent area for each quarter, as shown in Figure 3. This type of representation gives a 
general idea of the level of resilience of the system at a given time.
Figure 3. Simplified representation
Ra
Me
Re
Mn
Re = Resistance
Mn = Means
Ra = Rapidity
Me = Memory
3.2.2 Detailed representation
The detailed representation requires to take into account all the results obtained by the 
analysis of each notion in relation to every phase of the disruption. In this representation, 
each quarter is divided into three sectors, each corresponding to one third of the surface 
of the quarter. Depending on the outcome, each sector will be filled proportionately as 
represented in Figure 4.
Thus, representing each concept has the advantage to identify not only the concepts to 
improve, but also the phases of the disruption which are less taken into account.
Figure 4. Detailed model
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4. Conclusion
This method of resilience assessment allows decision makers to easily have an idea of 
the state of the system and to identify where reinforcements must be done. Further works 
need to be done to establish, for each value of the table of calculation, an objective data 
acquisition. Once the acquisition method is adjusted, the final step will be the confirmation of 
the “weight” of each notion and each phase in the calculation of the index of resilience.
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Abstract
Several initiatives have been proposed nationally and internationally to collect information 
on accidents in the energy sector, assuming that a detailed, integral and targeted analysis 
of them can reveal the weak points in the energy infrastructure. The influence and relevance 
of the descriptors (e.g., country, energy chain, infrastructure type) of energy accidents on 
the outcome, such as fatalities, has so far not been performed on a comparative basis. This 
paper presents the first attempt to explore these relationships. Furthermore, it contributes 
to the resilience literature by exploring the capacity of an energy accidents dataset in 
storing and retrieving information on past events to tackle the forthcoming ones with more 
awareness of the possible impacts. This research employed a knowledge extraction method 
(i.e., rough set analysis) to analyse data on energy accidents for natural gas from the most 
authoritative information source for accidents in the energy sector, i.e., the ENergy-related 
Severe Accident Database (ENSAD). The main goal of this paper is to show that the rough set 
analysis can have a substantial contribution in understanding (i) the capacity 
of the structure of ENSAD to distinguish the accidents with respect to objective 
measures of outcome; (ii) the decision rules that clearly and simply explain the 
combination of attributes’ values and outcome, in this case fatality ranges; 
and (iii) how the rules can guide the decision-making process when there is an 
interest in knowing which class (i.e., low, medium, high) of fatalities an energy 
accident with a specific set of descriptors could have. 
1. Introduction and aim of the paper
Energy is a necessary commodity that billions of people use daily to meet basic needs such 
as cooking, warming, cooling and transportation (IEA 2016). Several types of disruptions can 
undermine the reliable and efficient provision of energy and thus decrease the possibility 
of satisfaction of such needs as well as cause health, environmental, economic and social 
impacts (Burgherr and Hirschberg 2014). These disruptions can affect energy systems as well 
as community resilience and they can be triggered by different causes, such as man-made 
(e.g., lack of maintenance), technological (e.g., collapses of an infrastructure) and natural (e.g., 
earthquake, floods), resulting in events such as explosions, fires and release of toxic substances. 
These detrimental happenings can have negative outcomes that can be characterized in 
multiple forms, including fatalities, injuries, evacuees, ban on consumption of food, release 
of toxic substances and economic losses (Burgherr et al., 2015, Sovacool et al., 2016). A few 
initiatives have been proposed to consistently collect information on accidents in the energy 
sector, by employing descriptors that include the location of the accidents, the type of energy 
Keywords
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Energy accidents; 
Rough sets; 
Decision support; 
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chain and infrastructure as well as the type of detrimental events (Burgherr et al. 2015, 
Sovacool et al. 2015, Sovacool et al. 2016). Sovacool et al. (2015) proposed a dataset of 
1085 energy accidents for 11 energy systems over the period 1874-2014. The Energy-related 
Severe Accident Database (ENSAD) of the Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI) has been developed since 
the 1990s (Hirschberg et al. 1998) and currently includes 32,963 accidents covering multiple 
energy chains and their whole life cycle (Burgherr et al. 2017). The online Major Accident 
Reporting System (eMARS) of the European Commission contains information on over 700 
industrial accidents and near misses involving dangerous substances (JRC 2017). 
The development of datasets such as the one above described is necessary to guarantee 
that consistent and comprehensive information is available on the accidents that took place 
along the life cycle of each energy chain. They have been analysed so far through statistical 
methods looking at frequencies of events, ranges of fatalities, released of fuels and cost of 
accidents (Burgherr and Hirschberg 2008, Sovacool 2008, Burgherr et al. 2012, Eckle and 
Burgherr 2013, Burgherr and Hirschberg 2014, Sovacool et al. 2015, Sovacool et al. 2016, 
Spada and Burgherr 2016, Burgherr et al. 2017). 
Retrospective analysis based on traditional statistical methods has however not looked at 
and revealed the (integrated) influence and relevance of the descriptors (e.g., country, energy 
chain) of energy accidents on the outcome event, such as fatalities. The research challenges 
that have not been addressed so far include: 
(i) The assessment of the capacity of the structure of energy accidents datasets to 
distinguish the events with respect to objective measures of outcome, such as fatalities, 
injuries, release of toxic material, monetary damage, etc.;
(ii) The identification of the characteristics of energy accidents that distinguish between 
different ranges of outcomes;
(iii) The comprehensive evaluation of concern/risk level that a (future) accident can cause 
according to the potential outcome, e.g., range of fatalities.
Our multidisciplinary research has started tackling these research gaps by applying a Multiple 
Criteria Decision Aiding (MCDA) process to a subset of ENSAD. This research supports the 
advancement of pre-event strategies within the framework for infrastructure resilience 
assessment of the Future Resilient Systems (FRS) programme at the Singapore-ETH Centre 
©
 iStock.com
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(http://www.frs.ethz.ch/). More specifically, it contributes to the cognitive resilience function 
named “remember” as recently proposed by Heinimann and Hatfield (2017), which consists 
in storing and retrieving information on past events to tackle the forthcoming ones with more 
awareness of the possible impacts.
Building upon 182 severe natural gas accidents (≥ 5) of ENSAD dataset, clustered according 
to three classes of ranges of fatalities, this research achieves three objectives. 
Firstly, the accuracy and quality of classification of the information stored in ENSAD for the 
selected energy accidents are evaluated and the relevance of the strategy used to collect the 
information on the accidents is assessed.
Secondly, knowledge clustered in the form of decision rules is extracted from ENSAD. These 
rules explain the classifications within the dataset and elucidate the relationships between 
the descriptors of energy accidents and the outcome, i.e., class of fatality. 
Lastly, the rules are used as decision support instruments to classify realistic energy 
accidents in concern/risk levels according to the potential cause of fatalities. Two 
classification schemes are proposed, a standard and more visual but potentially ambiguous 
and an advanced one, which always provides a unique risk sorting.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the ENSAD dataset 
of natural gas energy accidents that was constructed for the rough set analysis. Section 3 
introduces the rough set analysis method that was used to analyze the dataset. Section 4 
presents the results and section 5 concludes the paper.
2. ENSAD dataset
This research focuses on ENSAD, which has several strengths that make it one of the most 
credible and comprehensive databases on energy accidents in the world. These include the 
trustworthiness of the stored information, the coverage of full energy chains on a global 
scale and the use of severity thresholds for different types of consequences that guarantee 
consistent information on the outcomes (Burgherr et al. 2017). In ENSAD, information on 
each energy accident includes date, location, energy chain and infrastructure typology and 
sequence of detrimental events. Consequences in the form of fatalities, evacuees, release of 
toxic material, injuries, economic damage are then associated to every accident. 
The ENSAD dataset used in this research is a set of 182 accidents37 attributable to the natural 
gas sector that caused at least 5 fatalities, on a temporal scale from 1970 to 2006. The reason 
for this choice is that the natural gas chain is currently a major focus area within the ENSAD 
team (Lustenberger et al. 2017) and consequently this research project is a complement to the 
analysis of such dataset to derive a comprehensive perspective on natural gas accidents.
3. MCDA method
The information stored in ENSAD resembles a standard starting point for MCDA, namely an 
information table, whose rows normally represent alternatives whereas columns are divided 
into attributes (or criteria if preference ordered) that characterize the alternatives and the 
decision which represents the overall “evaluation” of the alternatives. 
In the current case study, the alternatives are the energy accidents from ENSAD. Eight 
attributes were selected for the characterization of the ENSAD dataset, because they were 
considered as main characteristics that allow discerning the accidents according to their entity 
of consequences. They include country cluster (a1), energy chain stage (a2), infrastructure 
type (a3), event chain sequence from 1 up to 5 (a4-8) (see Table 1). Details on each of these 
attributes can be found in Burgherr et al. (2015) and Burgherr et al. (2017).
37 According to the definition adopted in ENSAD, severe accident causes, for example, at least 5 fatalities, or 10 injuries, or 200 
evacuees, etc (Burgherr et al. 2012). For simplicity, the adjective “severe” will be omitted throughout the paper.
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Table 1. Simplified information table for energy accidents from ENSAD
Accident Country 
(a1)
Energy 
chain 
stage 
(a2)
Inf. type 
(a3)
Event 
chain 1 
(a4)
Event 
chain 2 
(a5)
Event 
chain 3 
(a6)
Event 
chain 4 
(a7)
Event 
chain 5 
(a8)
Fatalities 
(Cl)
1 OECD (1)*
DOM/ 
COM (8)
Building 
public (32)
Mechanical 
failure (10)
Explosion 
(2)
NA (99) NA (99) NA (99)
5 – 10 
fatalities 
(1)
…
92
Non-OECD 
(2)
Transport 
(5)
Pipeline 
(10)
Corrosion 
(7)
Human 
error (1)
Fire (3) 99 99
11 – 20 
fatalities 
(2)
…
182 2 8 32 7 2 99 99 99
> 20 
fatalities 
(3)
(*) The numbers within brackets indicate the code used for the value of each attribute. 
Source: Authors, current research project, 2017.
The “evaluation” of energy accidents (decision in MCDA terms) is currently the number of 
fatalities (i.e., outcome) that each accident caused, clustered in one of three preference-
ordered (from a low to high impact) classes, Cl1 = 5 - 10 fatalities (118 accidents);  
Cl2 = 11 - 20 fatalities (40 accidents); Cl3 ≥ 20 fatalities (24 accidents). The fatalities 
were selected as the outcome for energy accidents since they are the most accurate and 
reliable information available in the dataset.
The choice for the three classes derives from an analysis of the distributions of the fatalities 
per accident within ENSAD, which lead to the definition of a set of classes that can be 
considered as informative for clustering severity for the accidents and have sufficient 
accidents to allow knowledge extraction.
The ENSAD dataset was analysed with rough set methodology, which is a powerful method 
to deal with inconsistent data, derive clusters of knowledge in the form of decision rules 
and apply these rules to provide recommendations of new and unseen alternatives. Rough 
set theory was originally introduced by Pawlak et al. (1995) and it has been proven very 
useful to identify patterns, regularities and develop decisions support tools in areas such as 
management of extreme natural events (Hu et al. 2016), economy and finance (Podsiadło 
and Rybiński 2014) and healthcare (Słowiński 1992). The novelty of this research stands in 
the application of the rough set analysis to a research area (i.e., risk assessment of energy 
accidents) it has never been used for and also to the extension of such analysis through 
decision rules that can enhance the decision support capabilities of the approach.
The dataset in ENSAD has been adapted to a “common” information table in MCDA terms 
and analysed with the rough set approach for analysis of quality in the ENSAD dataset, the 
discovery of patterns within the dataset, and development of a decision support tool. The 
rough set methodology has been implemented with the Learning from Examples, Module 
2 (LEM2) algorithm (Prędki and Wilk 1999). It identifies clusters that contain indiscernible 
accidents according to the selected attributes and it extracts from them the patterns in the 
form of decision rules. Details on the classification schemes can be found in Błaszczyński et 
al. (2007).
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4. Results
The results are presented in three sections, distinguishing dataset quality (section 4.1), 
decision rules for natural gas energy accidents (section 4.2) and, lastly, in the classification of 
“new” energy accidents to risk classes (section 4.3).
4.1. Dataset quality
The rough set analysis shows that the quality of classification for the information table based 
on the ENSAD dataset for natural gas accidents is just under 65%, meaning that close to two 
thirds (i.e., 121) of the 182 accidents can be classified without ambiguity. In other words, 65% 
of the accidents can be surely described by the selected attributes and classified according 
to the three severity classes. Considering that this is a first application of rough sets to a part 
of ENSAD, the quality of classification can be considered as a promising (though preliminary) 
outcome (Rawat et al. 2016).
4.2. Decision rules for natural gas energy accidents
79 rules were discovered by the LEM2 algorithm: 48 for Cl1, 20 for Cl2 and 11 for Cl3. The 
rules represent pieces of objective knowledge contained in ENSAD that are characteristics 
of the energy accidents that caused certain classes of fatalities. Standard rules contain 
the attributes values (i.e., conditions) of the energy accidents that result in certain outcome 
(i.e., decision), having caused between 5 and 10 fatalities, between 11 and 20 and above 
20. In this manner, it is possible to perform a mapping of the patterns that characterize the 
accidents that surely represent each class. 
An example of rule for the least risky class (i.e., Cl1) states that:
“If (country cluster, a1 = OECD) & (event chain 1, a4 = human error) & (event chain 2, a5 = 
explosion) & (event chain 3, a6 = not available), then the class of fatalities is Cl1”. 
The rule is supported by two accidents within the ENSAD dataset, which are n. 5 and 99, 
and represents a block of knowledge that derives from consistent accidents in the dataset, 
meaning that there are no other accidents that have the same attributes values as the ones 
for these accidents and which caused more than 10 fatalities (i.e., Cl2 or Cl3).
An example of rule that is supported by an accident causing the most risky class of fatalities 
(i.e., Cl3) reads as follows: 
“If (country cluster, a1 = non-OECD) & (infrastructure type, a3 = pipeline) & (event chain 1, a4 
= human error) & (event chain 2, a5 = explosion), then the class of fatalities is Cl3”. 
The ENSAD accident that supports this rule is n. 169, which indicates that there is no other 
accident that has such values of the attributes and causes fewer than 21 fatalities (i.e., Cl1 
or Cl2). Hence, the recommendation from rough set analysis is that the accidents with these 
characteristics should be handled with extreme care as they have the potential of causing the 
worst level of fatalities, according to the selected attributes and classification scheme.
4.3. Classification of “new” energy accidents to risk classes
The rules can be used as instruments to guide the decision-making process when there is an 
interest in knowing which type of potential consequences, expressed as classes of fatalities, 
an energy accident can have. 
(i) Rules are useful as they can support the understanding of the role of:
(ii) Individual values of the attributes that might provide a warning sign;
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Classification of potential energy accidents in a risk class according to the possible 
characteristics of country cluster, energy chain, infrastructure type and event chain sequence.
The possible use of the decision rules for the classification of new accidents is illustrated 
with three realistic accidents (n1-n3) in Table 2, together with the standard and advanced 
recommendation schemes applied with rough set methodology. 
Table 2. Examples of energy accidents and risk class assigned by standard and 
advanced classification schemes
New 
accident
Country 
(a1)
Energy 
chain 
stage 
(a2)
Inf. type 
(a3)
Event 
chain 1 
(a4)
Event 
chain 2 
(a5)
Event 
chain 3 
(a6)
Event 
chain 4 
(a7)
Event 
chain 5 
(a8)
Fatalities (Cl)
Std. 
scheme
Adv. scheme
n1
Non-
OECD
DOM/
COM
Building 
public
Rupture Explosion Fire NA NA Cl1 Cl2 Cl3 (0.017)^
n2
Non-
OECD
Storage Pipeline
Human 
error
Explosion Fire NA NA Cl2 Cl3 Cl3 (0.017)^
n3 OECD Storage NA Explosion NA NA NA NA Cl1 Cl1 = (0.025)^
(^) highest scorenet for the class.
Source: Authors, current research project, 2017.
The standard scheme provides the range of classes that are recommended by the covering 
rules, i.e., the rules that match the values of the conditions of the energy accidents. The width 
of the individual classes in the standard scheme column in Table 2 is used for representation 
of the strength of the rules, which is the n. accidents that satisfy the conditions of the rules 
and which are assigned to the class under consideration. The even distribution for Cl1 and 
Cl2 for n1 and Cl2 and Cl3 for n2 indicates that the same n. accidents (one) is in favour for 
each class. On the contrary, Cl1 is the only one recommended in the case of n3 because both 
rules that match the conditions of the accidents suggest Cl1.
The ambiguity of the standard scheme shows the limitation in its decision support potentials. 
Consequently, the advanced classification scheme was introduced to offer a unique 
recommendation, by accounting for the supporting rules for each class. Each single class is 
shown with the associated highest scorenet, which is a measure of the strength of the support 
for the most certain class recommendation (for details of score calculation see Błaszczyński 
et al. (2007)).
Figure 1 shows the working procedures of the classification schemes for accident n1. 
The matching rules for this accident are two, indicated here with rule A and B. On the 
one hand, rule A supports the assignment to Cl1 with accident n. 12 from the ENSAD 
dataset as support for such recommendation. On the other hand, rule B advances Cl2 as 
recommendation, with ENSAD accident 147 as its support.
As far as the advanced classification scheme is concerned, the operating process is more 
elaborate and it can be described as follows. In the case of Cl1, there is only one accident 
(n. 12) that supports the rule and considering that there are 118 accidents in Cl1 then the 
support for such a class is weak. In this case, score+ = (1 accident satisfies the rule / 118 
accidents belong to Cl1) * 100 = 0.008, which is the strength of Rule A. The support for 
Cl2 is higher, because even if only one accident (n. 147) satisfies the conditions of the rule, 
the accidents in Cl2 are fewer than for Cl1 (i.e., 40), hence the support for such a class is 
stronger. In this case, Score+ (1 accident satisfies the rule / 40 accidents belong to Cl2) * 100 
= 0.025, which is the strength of Rule B.
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Figure 1. Working procedure of standard and advanced classification schemes for 
accident n1 from Table 2
Standard scheme Advanced scheme
Rule A.
Rule A Rule B
Rule B.
= Cl1 → (a2 =  DOM/COM) &
(a4 = rupture) &
(a5 = explosion);
1, 0.8% 12, , 
= Cl2 → (a1 = non-OECD) &
(a4 = rupture);
1, 2.5% , 147, 
Cl1 Cl2 Cl3
Cl1
Score + = 0.008  →  Acc. 12 & # 118: Cl1
Score – = 0.025  →  Acc. 147 & # 40: Cl2
Scorenet = – 0.017
Cl2 → Recommendation
Score + = 0.025  →  Acc. 147 & # 40: Cl2
Score – =  0.025  →  Acc. 12 & # 118: Cl1
Scorenet = – 0.017
Source: Authors, current research project, 2017.
It must also be noted that the rules which recommend a class different from the one under 
consideration “play against it” through the score–. Cl3 has no rules that are matched by the 
new accident, therefore only a negative score can be expected due to the rules A and B that 
are not in favour of such class. The combined effect of score+ and score– allows calculating 
the overall scorenet that justifies the allotment of n1 to Cl2.
The same procedure can be applied to any other accident and the overall recommendation 
for the level of risk associated is shown in an intelligible and justifiable format, through the 
standard and advanced classification schemes.
5. Conclusions
One of the key factors for the successful development of resilient energy systems is the 
capacity of learning what caused deadly accidents. This competency would empower 
decision makers learning how to possibly avoid them in the future, or to at least mitigate 
their consequences. Decision support systems for the classification of energy accidents in 
risk levels can help decision makers foreseeing the potential concern that they could cause 
and the effort required to re-stabilize the affected system. This paper has presented the first 
attempt to provide such a decision support system, with the application of rough set analysis 
on a subset of energy accidents for natural gas from ENSAD. It was demonstrated that rough 
set analysis is a valuable approach that can shed light on the challenge of “seeing behind the 
curtain” of the ENSAD dataset, to unveil the hidden objective relationships that are unique 
for energy accidents causing a certain range of fatalities. These relationships are expressed 
with simple and intelligible decision rules that can be used to disclose the patterns that could 
not be otherwise identified. It was confirmed that storing information on energy accidents by 
accounting for the country, energy infrastructure and energy chain sequence the event took 
place, like it has been within ENSAD from the early 1990s, is relevant to discern among the 
concern they can cause. What is more, the provision of a set of energy chain events is also 
confirmed as a relevant accidents’ characterization strategy. Lastly, the rules can be used for 
the classification of new energy accidents in risk classes, which has the added advantage 
of providing a characterization of the possible outcome by objective information using the 
ENSAD information. 
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Abstract
Establishment of temporary shelters are most widely used method for protecting or 
sustaining the lives (in an optimum level of standards) of the victims who may have suffered 
from disasters, social congestions or wars. UNHCR (United Nations Refugee Agency) is one of 
the efficient organizations acting in this area and their reports are important guides in means 
of supplying expertise in designing, maintaining and selecting the right locations for shelters. 
Similar to UNHCR, Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response-
Sphere Project is concerned with the righteous conditions in shelters and the Sphere 
Handbook is a valuable product that describes the details of sheltering processes gained by 
the experiences of the initiative. In addition to these international bodies, temporary shelters 
established after 2012 Van Earthquake and camps for Syrian refugees are good examples 
for showing the awareness of a reminder for the importance of the issue. It is shown by 
several scientific studies that Istanbul may face a big scale earthquake in near future. The 
main axis of these studies is to assess the vulnerability and estimate the possible results 
due the adverse conditions of the earthquake. These studies claim that one of the most 
important issues is the requirement of temporary shelter for the victims. To meet the needs 
of the victims there are several physical conditions in addition to social components that 
need to be considered. It was estimated in the study (A Disaster Prevention / Mitigation Basic 
Plan in Istanbul-2002) carried out by Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (IMM) and Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) that in a case of the possible earthquake 330000 
tents and 120 km2 area will be needed (JICA, 2002). It is almost impossible to estimate 
the physical conditions and social problems that may occur in such a situation. Although 
there have been many improvements following the aforementioned study, the rise of the 
population, situation of the current building stock, infrastructure is still questionable, and it 
can be assumed that requirement for huge amounts of shelter will be needed.
In this aspect, one of the critical challenges is the determination of the optimum locations 
for these shelter areas. In this study, authors developed a decision support model, which 
generates solution for the problem of temporary shelter site selection in the aftermath of 
a disaster. A spatial multi-criteria decision support model and methodology through a GIS 
software was the foundation of this study. Thus, the correct locations for these areas was 
determined before the disaster and it is now available for the decision makers to develop 
strategies to enhance and rehabilitate those areas. The system is also efficient in post-
disaster situation for evaluating the currently selected sites. Moreover, it is also available 
to re-evaluate the efficiency of the shelter locations based on the new conditions that arise 
because of the earthquake. Therefore, decision makers can update the criteria simultaneously 
and new locations based on these optimum conditions can be assessed. Inexistences of 
such a study in Turkey proves the importance of this study and highlights the emergence of 
the situation. This study is funded by the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency 
(AFAD), National Earthquake Strategy and Action Plan Support Program with the award 
number UDAP-Ç-12-03.
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Introduction
Site selection, planning and the preparation of shelters have a direct bearing on the 
preparation of other assistance. These are important considerations in the overall needs 
assessment and planning of response. Decisions must be made using an integrated 
approach, incorporating both the advice of specialists and the views of the refugees (UNHCR, 
2007). Sources of information for site selection and planning should include local authorities 
and communities, government offices, educational institutions and UN agencies. UNHCR 
Headquarters, through the focal point on Geographical Information Systems (GIS), can also 
support operations with maps, aerial photographs, satellite images and a special geographic 
database. Furthermore, the Technical Support Section (TSS) at Headquarters, upon request, 
could assist in the process of site selection and planning (UNHCR, 2007)
Istanbul lies on an active seismic zone ranging from Java – Myanmar – Himalaya – Iran 
– Turkey and Greece, where many large earthquakes have occurred in the past. Based on 
worldwide historical earthquake catalogues, Istanbul has experienced earthquakes equal 
or greater than intensity 9 at least 14 times from 5th century. This means Istanbul has 
suffered damages due to earthquakes every 100 years, on average (Segawa et al., 2004). 
Looking back to Turkey’s earthquake history, there are two recent strong earthquakes. 1999 
Kocaeli, which occurred with a moment magnitude of 7.4 on 17 August at about 3:02 a.m. 
local time. The event lasted for 37 seconds, killing 17,127 and injuring 43,959 people and 
leaving approximately half a million people homeless (Marza, 2008). 2012 Van, earthquake 
was a destructive magnitude 7.1 earthquake that struck eastern Turkey near the city of Van. 
According to Disasters and Emergency Situations Directorate of Turkey AFAD on 30 October, 
the earthquake killed 604 and injured are 4,152. At least 11,232 buildings sustained damage 
in the region, 6,017 of which were found to be uninhabitable. The uninhabitable homes left 
as much as 8,321 households with an average household population of around 7.6 homeless 
in the province; this could mean that at least around 60,000 people were left homeless. It is 
obvious that, the expected earthquake for the Istanbul will cause inescapable and irreversible 
consequences for human life. That is why, temporary shelter sites should be estimated that 
which regions will be safer, to be prepared as good as possible to the expected earthquake.
©
 iS
to
ck
.c
om
/A
le
xt
yp
e
123 |
Shelters
Shelter is likely to be one of the most important determinants of general living conditions 
and is often one of the significant items of non-recurring expenditure. While the basic need 
for shelter is similar in most emergencies, such considerations as the kind of housing needed, 
what materials and design to be used, who constructs the housing and how long it must last 
will differ significantly in each situation (UNHCR, 2007).
When locating or planning emergency settlements, their long-term economic, social and 
environmental impacts on the surrounding area should be carefully considered. In many 
situations, such as in northern Iraq and several countries of Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union during the 1990s, people may independently seek shelter in buildings such as 
schools, community centers, offices, sports facilities, and even railway carriages and wagons 
(WHO, 2002).
The important part of the shelter establishment is to select the optimum sites that are 
suitable for shelters. When establishing post-disaster shelter recovery and reconstruction 
operations, site selection is the most consequential decision that must be made. No other 
decision has as profound and lasting an impact on the lives of victims or on the likelihood 
of long-term project success and sustainability (Haddow and Copolla, 2010). Site selection 
should focus on keeping recipients as close to their land as is possible given risk reduction 
goals (Benson, et al., 2007). When a site assessment determines that relocation is the only or 
best option, government must first identify and secure viable land, and then undertake what 
amounts to a comprehensive yet accelerated (urban or rural) development-planning effort 
(Haddow ve Copolla, 2010).
Criteria for Shelter Site Selection
Water
The single most important site-selection criterion is the availability of an adequate amount 
of water on a year round basis. This most important factor is also commonly the most 
problematic. A site should not be selected on the assumption that water can be acquired 
merely by drilling, digging, or hauling. Drilling may not be feasible and may not provide 
adequate water. A professional assessment of water availability should be a prerequisite in 
selecting a site (OFDA, 1998). Where water is readily available, drainage is a key criterion. 
For effective drainage, the entire site should be located above flood level at a minimum of 3 
m above the water table, preferably on a gently sloping area. Flat sites can present serious 
problems for the drainage of waste and storm water. Marshes or areas likely to become 
marshy or soggy during the rainy season should be avoided. Conditions within the watershed 
may be a consideration (OFDA, 1998). The accessibility of the water supply from the shelter 
areas must not exceed 500 meters in pedestrian walking distance. In addition, a clean 
drinking water supply center should serve at most 250 people (Oxfam GB, 2004).
Topography and Drainage
The whole site should be located above the flood level preferably on a gently sloping area. 
Flat sites can present serious problems for the drainage of waste and storm water. The 
watershed of the area itself will be a consideration (UNHCR, 2017). For temporary planned 
camps, the site gradient should not exceed 6%, unless extensive drainage and erosion control 
measures are taken, or be less than 1% to provide for adequate drainage. Drainage channels 
may still be required to minimize flooding or ponding. The lowest point of the site should 
be not less than 3 meters above the estimated level of the water table in the rainy season 
(Oxfam GB, 2004).
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Open Space
The site must provide a sufficient amount of usable space for the displaced population to 
engage in communal and agricultural activities, livestock husbandry, or other activities (e.g., 
recreation, meeting spaces, etc.). Although camp planning should be based on a known 
design capacity (e.g., shelter and other facilities sufficient for approximately 20K people), the 
possibility always exists that more people may arrive. To the extent possible, the site should 
be planned to accommodate a major influx of additional people. If the population has been 
displaced because of civil strife, the site should be removed from areas of potential conflict 
too (OFDA, 1998). However, in order to prevent and control contagious disease the maximum 
human capacity of those areas should not exceed 12K people (Oxfam GB, 2004).
Surface Area
The site must allow sufficient usable space for the refugees too. WHO (2002) recommends 
30 sq. meters plus the necessary land for the agricultural activities and livestock. More 
refugees may arrive and it is essential that the site allow for a major expansion beyond 
the area theoretically required for present numbers. It is particularly important that having 
allowed space for expansion, this be safeguarded until really needed. Otherwise, the initial 
settlement will occupy all the space, and major upheavals of existing arrangements will be 
necessary as more refugees arrive (UNHCR, 2007).
Land Usage Rights
The land should be exempt from ownership, grazing, and other uses by local populations. 
Using such land can be a cause of local resentment. Authorities proposing the site may be 
unaware of customary rights exercised by local populations. Sites are often provided on public 
land by the government. Any use of the land must be based on formal legal arrangements in 
accordance with the laws of the country (OFDA, 1998).
Accessibility
The site must be accessible by vehicles and close to communication links and sources of 
supplies and services such as food, cooking fuel, shelter material, and national community 
services (OFDA, 1998).
Hazard
The aim of the shelter areas is to provide physical conditions to the refugees or homeless 
people to settle for a limited period. Another aim of the shelter areas to provide psychological 
support to the people following the disaster situation. The effect of the disaster is one 
of the most important psychological trauma sources. According to United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (2007), shelter sites should be selected both away from the 
disaster area and should not be in a zone that may be effected from secondary or other 
disasters or emergencies too. That is why, first the possible hazards on the candidate sites 
should be determined and the hazard maps should be analyzed with the risks on the site. By 
this way, the sites with the lowest hazard risk should be registered as the shelter areas. 
Site suitability assessments should be conducted to assess hazard risk, environmental impact, 
topography, geology, hydrology, soil structure, and several other factors in order to determine 
the best location and layout of structures, and the housing design and construction materials 
to ensure safety and sustainability (Haddow and Copolla, 2010).
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AHP
The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is a multi-criteria decision-making approach and was 
introduced by Saaty (1980). Since the 1970s, AHP has been applied in a wide variety of 
application areas such as location analysis (Min 1994), allocation (Cheng and Li 2001), 
marketing (Davies, 2001), energy policy (Kim and Min 2004), education (Saaty et al. 1991), 
risk analysis (Millet and Wedley 2002), environmental impact assessment (Ramanathan 
2001), suitability analysis (Banai-Kashani 1989), and site selection (Erden and Coskun 
2010). AHP assists the decision making process by providing the decision makers with 
the opportunity to organize the criteria and alternative solutions of a decision problem 
in a hierarchical model (Karaman and Erden, 2014). In AHP, the decision problem is first 
decomposed into a hierarchy of more easily comprehended sub-problems that can be 
analyzed independently. The elements of the hierarchy can relate to any aspect of the 
decision problem. Once the hierarchy is built, the decision makers systematically evaluate 
its various elements by comparing them to one another two at a time (Saaty, 1980). In this 
study, the importance of each criteria was considered according to its weight after calculating 
from the questionnaires using pairwise comparison and AHP, which obtained from various 
experts given in Table 2.
Table 1. Surveyor Institutions for the Questionnaire
Institutions Responded to Questionnaire
Ministry of Family and Social Policies
GEA: (Gesellschaft für Entstaubungsanlagen)
AKUT: Search and Rescue Association
MAG : Neighborhood Disaster Volunteers
Istanbul Technical University Civil Engineering Faculty
Istanbul AFAD (Disaster & Emergency Management Presidency)
Kızılay (Red Crescent)
DASK (Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool)
Istanbul Provincial Directorate of Health
Technical University of Wien Department of Geography
Middle East Technical University Department of Social Sciences
University of Tebriz Department of Geomatics Engineering
Bogazici University Department of Economy
Bogazici University Kandilli Observatory
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Criteria and Sub-Criteria
Criteria for decision-making processes with AHP should not be correlated to each other. That 
is why six independent criteria were selected as main criteria and half of the main criteria 
included at least four sub-criteria as seen in Table 2.
Table 2. Shelter area criteria and sub-criteria with the weights
Sub-Criteria Main Criteria
Natural Gas
(0.063) (GZ)
Electricity
(0.152) (EL)
Sewage
(0.489) (KN)
Potable Water
(0.234) (SU)
Communication
(0.063) (IL)
Infrastructure
(0.173) (AL)
Railways
(0.233) (DM)
Heliports.
(0.140) (HP)
Maritime Lines
(0.085) (DN)
Road Network
(0.542) (KR)
Accessibility
(0.207) (ER)
Fire
Hazard Map
(0.361) (YT)
HAZ-MAT
Hazard Map
(0.227) (KT)
Flood
Hazard Map
(0.132) (ST)
Landslide
Hazard Map
(0.132) (HT)
Tsunami
Hazard Map
(0.074) (TT)
Earthquake
Hazard Map
(0.074) (DT)
Hazard
(0.313) (TH)
No Sub-Criteria Topography
(0.095) (TO)
No Sub-Criteria Capacity
(0.155) (KA)
No Sub-Criteria Land Use
(0.057) (AK)
Accessibility sub-criteria acquired from Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, and all applied to 
Near analysis, then reclassified to 7 classes. After these steps weighted-sum analyses was 
applied to each sub-criteria. 
Infrastructure sub-criteria obtained from Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality as Natural Gas 
and Wastewater and respectively, near analysis, reclassification and weighted-sum analyses 
were applied. For communication data, receptions of GSM base station of various providers 
in Turkey were used. Respectively, near, reclassification and weighted sum analyses were 
conducted. For electricity, the data from underground and electric lines were merged and 
then been a near analysis was used. For potable water two maps of water lines and water-
connections were merged together as water supplies. Respectively, near, reclassification and 
weighted-sum analyses were applied.
Hazard maps were acquired from different sources. For all kind of hazard maps, classification 
analysis done by considering being far from these areas as an advantage. Earthquake hazard 
map was obtained from HAZTURK program, and classified into 7 classes as the other maps. 
Tsunami hazard map was acquired from Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality and reclassified 
to 7 classes. Flooding hazard map was a combination of flooding areas and distance from 
riverbeds. First, they were reclassified and then combined with weighted-sum analysis. Fire 
hazard map was received from Erden T. and Coskun M.Z. (2012) study. Since it was for a 
specific part of Istanbul, in reclassification section for empty land were given the value of 1 
as those areas are not suitable according to Fire risk. 
Topography map was obtained from HAZTURK program (Karaman et al., 2008). For 
classification, all the values were applied manually from 1% slope to 30% slope. 
Land usage maps were obtained from two separate maps. Both of them were provided by 
Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality. For reclassification, each class was given a value manually 
according to their suitability for a shelter site. For example, parks had the most suitable score 
while, forests and urban facilities had the least score in the classification.
Capacity map was obtained from Landsat 8 satellite images, which were taken on 30.07.2013. 
To detect the empty areas with the proper size first the areas covered with buildings were 
eliminated by using Manno-Kovacs and Sziranyi (2015) building detection method. Then, 
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NDWI (Normalized Diff erence Water Index) (Gao, 1996) used to detect water bodies, and NDVI 
(Normalized Diff erence Vegetation Index) (Rouse et al., 1973) used to detect vegetation areas. 
Aft er the bare area analysis, suitable bare areas were detected as in Figure 1.
F igure 1. Bare area map of Istanbul in vector formatted data
Model builder tool of ArcMap Geoprocessing was used to create the Optimum Shelter 
Location (OSL) model. The Figure 2 shows the process of each criteria and sub-criteria within 
the model. Model works the following procedure. First classifi cation applied to the raw raster 
data. Then the weights of the sub-criteria, which were calculated from the questionnaires 
results, are inputted to the weighted sum analysis. In addition, capacity and topography maps 
directly applied to weighted sum because they do not have sub-criteria. Aft er all the raster 
data of the main criteria generated following the fi rst set of weighted sum. Then, main criteria 
raster data were classifi ed into seven classes again and the second set of weighted sum 
analysis applied to them. At the end, the resulting raster map extracted by using the vector 
bare area map and the optimum shelter areas determined and represented as raster map.
Fi gure 2. Model algorithm of the OSL
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Figure 3 presents the user interface of the model tool. The standard input data type and 
format is designated as seven classed raster data and for extraction process a vector bare 
area data. 
Figure 3. Graphical user interface of the OSL model
After the reclassification of the result map to seven classes, the result map added to the 
extend showing from the best to the worst sites for the optimum locations for shelter site 
following an earthquake in the city of Istanbul as in Figure 4 below.
As a result, in 2002 total areas of shelter sites in Istanbul was 4.616 km2. Now it is 2.503 
km2. In other words, if we consider the most suitable areas (class 7), total area is 0.683 km2 
with a possibility to settle 22 thousand people. The capacity was 153 thousand people in 
2002 and today, 131 thousand people will not be able to use shelter areas.
Figure 4. The resulting map of the model showing the seven class optimum shelter 
locations (OSL) for Istanbul
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Abstract
In the last years in the framework of risk analysis, there has been a progressive recognition 
of the importance of vulnerability of the built environment, especially related to resilience 
concept, adaptation and response capability. In fact, the actual impact of last natural 
disasters, especially earthquake, has highlighted the inability of the environment to react 
to them and the presence of non-resilient cities, above all in Italy. In fact the last Italian 
seismic events, despite moderate magnitude, have shown that, compared with other natural 
disasters, paralyze societies and their economies for a long time. 
In this context, the authors propose a procedure to establish quantitative measures useful 
to support the assessment of structural resilience of masonry buildings in a seismic area, 
determined by the integration of loss and downtime assessment. In particular, the paper 
is focused on the procedure for the computation of the direct loss, following a component-
based approach and developed within a probabilistic framework. It is based on: numerical 
and analytical models, static and dynamic nonlinear analyses. In the paper, the procedure is 
proposed for a single building, but it can be extended for portfolio analyses since it is mainly 
aimed to resilience assessment.  
1. Introduction 
The consequences of an earthquake as the physical damage to buildings and other facilities, 
the casualties, the potential economic losses due to the direct cost of damage and to indirect 
economic impacts, the loss of function in lifelines and critical facilities and also social, 
organizational and institutional impacts, are just a number of significant Decision Variables 
(DV) that need to be considered in the assessment of the seismic risk. 
Until now, in the field of risk analysis at the European scale, the DV has generally been 
a damage scenario. Nowadays the scientific community shows an increasing interest in 
a seismic risk analysis developed in economic terms, recognizing that it could be more 
effective for different scopes: i) cost-benefit evaluations, comparing the costs of a mitigation 
tactics, such as retrofits, to the benefits achieved from improved seismic performance; ii) the 
calibration of insurance premia; iii) the “Building Seismic Performance Classification” (Calvi et 
al. 2014, D.M. 28/02/2017); iv) the development of seismic resilient society. 
Focusing on the last issue, it is important to note that the concept of resilience has several 
definitions, due to its employment in ecology, social science, economy and engineering 
fields, with different meanings and implications (Cimellaro et al. 2016). In the framework 
of the engineering field, the resilience is the ability of a given area to bounce back after a 
negative shock (Cavicchi 2015). Bruneau et al. (2003) developed a conceptual framework 
for quantifying seismic resilience of a system based on: its probability of failure during an 
earthquake, the consequences of failure and the time to recovery. 
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The resilience is defined using a mathematical function Q(t) describing the serviceability of 
the system, which is described as functionality (Cimellaro et al. 2010) and captures the three 
abovementioned features (Figure 1 from Bruneau and Reinhorn 2006). The functionality Q(t) 
is measured as a non-dimensional (percentage) function of time. If an earthquake occurs at 
time t0, the system could be damaged and the quality measure, Q(t), decreases (from 100% 
to 50%, as an example, in Figure 1). After that, the system could return to normal over time, 
as pointed out in that figure, until time t1 when it is repaired and functional as before the 
event (quality of 100%). Therefore, the resilience R, with respect to that specific earthquake, 
can be quantified by the size of the expected degradation in quality, over time (that is, time to 
recovery). Mathematically, it is defined by:
 
(1)
Figure 1. Representation of seismic resilience (Bruneau and Reinhorn 2006)
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The resilience rests on four properties: robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness and rapidity. 
The vertical and horizontal axis in Figure 1 measure, respectively, the robustness and the 
rapidity of a system. They can be defined as the results of a loss and downtime assessment 
(Almufti and Wilford, 2013). 
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In this framework, the paper presents a procedure to support the quantification of the seismic 
resilience of a particular system that is the masonry built environment, focusing herein to the 
direct loss as explained in the §3. It is worth noting that, the resilience concept is applicable 
at multiple levels within the scale of the built environment, progressing from structural 
components to single structures to networks of structures to entire communities (Marjanishvili 
et al. 2014). The paper is focused on the quantification of the resilience for a single structure. 
The notion of seismic resilience began to acquire importance in the United States hazard 
management in the late 1990s and at the international level in the 2005 World Conference 
(Bonstrom and Corotis 2015). Only in the last years, it reached Europe and later Italy, 
therefore the paper aims to present an innovative approach to the vulnerability assessment 
and risk analysis in Italy, following a resilience-based approach, even if until now only for the 
loss assessment.
2. The resilience approach for masonry buildings
The interest in the resilience of masonry structures arises from two issues. 
The first is the importance of the resilience approach since, the recent seismic events 
occurred in Italy, despite their low magnitude, have pointed out once again that they 
paralyze communities and their economies for a long time in terms of lack of trade, tourism, 
production, and service management. This is due to the fact Italy is a medium-high seismicity 
region, for frequency and intensity of the events, with a high vulnerability, for the fragility of 
the built environment, and extremely high exposure, for housing density and the presence of a 
unique historical, artistic and monumental heritage in the world. 
The second issue is related to the masonry built environment. This structural typology 
represents a significant portion of the existing built environment in Italy, as in many other 
earthquake prone countries. They are usually ancient buildings, often of cultural value, 
with a complex structure and without engineering design, but rather built following rules-
of thumbs, based on the experience of the builders of the past. Moreover, they have often 
undergone many transformations in the course of their lives, for example enlargement or 
rising up works, which have made them more complex and often vulnerable. Furthermore, 
due to the above-mentioned reasons, in general existing masonry structures have not the 
characteristics of regularity, symmetry, simplicity and good connection between the structural 
elements required today for new constructions in order to improve the seismic response and 
guarantee a box-behavior. In fact, they are in general irregular structures, both in plan and in 
elevation, with flexible floors that in many cases are not able to provide a box-behavior. These 
characteristics have made them particularly vulnerable to the earthquakes.
The masonry is the structural material of the oldest existing buildings, the monumental 
heritage (Figure 2.a, Figure 2.b) and the historic centers of the cities (Figure 2.c). For this 
reason, it plays a key role in the evaluation of the seismic resilience of a society. In fact, the 
historical centers of medium and large cities are often the headquarters of strategic function 
(Dolce 2012) whose operability during and after seismic events is fundamental for the civil 
protection activities (e.g. hospitals), as well as those of great importance in relation to the 
consequences of their collapse (e.g. schools). Figure 2.a shows a bad example of this issue, 
since the Government Palace of L’Aquila was collapse during the 2009 earthquake, but it 
should have been one of the key elements for the recovery.
The monumental heritage and the smallest towns are instead the socio-cultural identity of 
a country (Figure 2.b and Figure 2.c), whose conservation is needed for the recovery and the 
improvement of the social and economic life. 
For these reasons, the safety and conservation of the masonry structures guarantee the 
development of resilient society.
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Figure 2. a) The Government Palace of L’Aquila collapse during the 2009 earthquake
(Wikipedia); b) Basilica of St. Benedict in Norcia, 2016 (source: http://www.atg-oxford.co.uk; 
c) Pescara del Tronto before and aft er the 2016 Amatrice Earthquake (SkyTG24).
Among the categories of existing masonry buildings the paper is focused on palace that can 
belong to heritage buildings or residential ones as well.
3. Direct fi nancial loss assessment for masonry buildings
In the analysis of seismic consequences in terms of direct losses, the lack of literature and 
tools is particularly noticeable, above all for masonry buildings of the Italian and European 
built environment. In fact loss estimation in general is based on the defi nition of consequence 
functions that relate Limit States or Damage States to Repair Cost. These functions can be 
derived from diff erent approaches: experimental data, empirical data and analytical data, 
from the structural response of a building. In literature, most consequence functions are 
determined from the fi rst two approaches, but they are more addressed to other types of 
construction. The masonry structure, in fact, are based on a technology that varies a lot 
from region to region, dependent from the local seismic culture and the available materials 
in the area, for this reason also the losses can vary a lot according to the diff erent country 
and typologies. Therefore, the advisable approach is the analytical one, which is based 
on the defi nition of a cost function directly dependent on the damage level identifi ed by 
specifi c engineering demand parameters (EDP), related to the response of diff erent structural 
elements (as proposed for example in CNR-DT 212/2013 for the Signifi cant Damage LS). For 
this reason, the paper proposes a loss estimation analytical model, that can be applied to any 
single-building or classes of masonry buildings with homogeneous seismic behavior. 
It is worth noting that the collapse mechanisms observed in a masonry structure can be 
traced back to two groups: the global response activation, with prevailing in-plane damage 
modes, and out-of-plane mechanisms, mostly occurred only on local portions of the structure. 
The methodology proposed considers both responses and it is described in detailed in 
Ottonelli 2016 and Ottonelli et al 2017. 
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In particular, the loss assessment process proposed follows a logical process of steps starting 
with the characterization of hazards and continuing through analysis simulations, damage 
modeling, and evaluation of the associated consequences (Bonstrom and Corotis 2015). It 
is based on a rigorous probabilistic framework that allows consistent characterization of the 
inherent uncertainties. In fact, the procedure complies with the aims and general framework 
of FEMA P-58 (2012) and it is aligned to the PEER (Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research) 
PBEE (Performance-Based Earthquake Engineering) procedure (Porter 2003), based on the 
integral (2):
 (2)
It is an example of total probability theorem that allows the disaggregation of the 
assessment problem into the four basic elements of hazard, structural, damage and 
loss (decision) analysis, by the introduction of the intermediate variables DM (damage 
measure), EDP (engineering demand parameter) and IM (intensity measure of the 
hazard). The four stages allow for each aspect of the seismic assessment to be treated in a 
probabilistic way. Equation (2) implies the computation of λDV, the mean annual occurrence 
of a certain decision variable, DV, relative to a particular building, or class of buildings, 
and site, characterized by a specific hazard curve, λ(IM). Furthermore, the general term 
p(x|y) represents the probability density of x given y. The outcome λDV of the PEER PBEE 
methodology represents only one metric of performance (annualized repair cost due to 
damage), yet the seismic performance can consider numerous sources of loss expressed in a 
variety of metrics. These metrics can be annualized, such as expected annual loss (EAL) in 
the Equation (3):
 (3)
The loss assessment procedure, in fact, is firstly based on the selection of a representative 
DV that measures the seismic performance of the facility in terms of losses and 
consequences. In the proposal, the EAL, representing the likely loss for any given year (seen 
as fraction of the overall value of the building), is chosen as DV, together with the internal 
parameters of it that can include loss due to repair costs, called direct losses. 
The methodology for estimating the overall loss to a building is found on the losses to its 
individual components, according to the Component-Based approach (Mitrani-Reiser 2007). 
The components are the parts, structural and non-structural, that all together comprise 
a building. For this approach, the direct loss is calculated by summing the losses over all 
damageable components in the building. In particular, the contribution of the damageable 
building components to total repair cost is represented by a vulnerability function, that is the 
relationship between repair costs and intensity measures levels. After the evaluation of this 
curve, the loss assessment is performed through the construction of the loss curve for each 
component, defined by the mean annual frequency of exceedance of each intensity measures 
(λ) and, relative, loss ratio (LR, the percentage of the replacement cost). The area under the 
loss curve is the EAL. In particular, the total EAL in a building is equal to the sum of the 
EALj of each component (Equation 4) that derives from the repair and replacement costs of 
them damaged during seismic events properly weighed:
 
(4)
Where αj is the economic weight of each component in a masonry building. At the base of the 
research, in fact, the awareness of the weight of each component (structural, non structural 
and contents) in the overall loss of a masonry structure has been analyzed. From which 
emerged that the repair costs of non-structural elements are not significant, because, unlike 
the reinforced concrete building, they have a marginal impact since substantially almost all 
walls are structural.
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In this framework, the methodology developed for the loss assessment is based on the 
following steps:
1. the construction of the inventory of the building, where the components to be considered 
for a masonry buildings are listed. For each one component the following parameters are 
reported: the corresponding EDP assumed as representative of their seismic response; the 
unit of measure for the costs; the cost Cx for each element (x) per square meters or per 
unit; the total loss of each components (L); the percentage of the loss of each component 
than the overall losses. The Cx correspond to the maximum repair value, equivalent to 
the reconstruction value;
2. the definition of the hazard (Figure 3.a) in terms of: seismic hazard curve, with i values of 
IMs and sets of accelerograms (j) with which perform nonlinear dynamic analysis (NLDA); 
3. the definition of a numerical model, to carry out structural analyses. The proposal is based 
on a 3D equivalent frame (EF) modeling strategy, which belongs to the structural element 
models (SEM), Figure 3.b. For this reason, the structural components are divided in piers 
and spandrels (elements through which the wall is discretized in an EF model and where 
the nonlinear response is concentrated, connected by rigid area, nodes), if other strategies 
of modeling are adopted the components for the structural part may change. In fact, it is 
important to note that the methodology herein proposed maintains a certain generality 
and could be properly adapted to other modeling strategies;
4. the construction of the vulnerability curve (relationships between expected loss and 
seismic intensity) through the structural analysis of the building that may be established 
in two ways (Figure 3.c): i) passing directly from the intensity measure to repair cost  
(IM-LR); ii) passing through the incremental dynamic analysis IDA curves, that implies 
a IM-EDP relation. Furthermore the vulnerability curve can be drawn also in simplified 
practice-oriented way, the latter passing through the identification of the limit states LSs;
5. the performance calculation, that entails the determination of the probable loss 
distributions and the computation of the expected annual loss (Figure 3.d). It is important 
to note that, to account for the many uncertainties for this type analysis, the methodology 
uses a Monte Carlo procedure to compute loss calculations. According to the practice-
oriented procedure, the simplified vulnerability curve allows construing also a simplified 
loss curve (Figure 3.d), correlating the mean annual frequency of excedeence of each LSs 
and its economic losses (LR,LS).
In the following the procedure for the construction of the rigorous vulnerability (the step 4) 
curve is detailed.
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Figure 3. Steps of the loss estimation procedure developed for masonry buildings 
in seismic area
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As introduced above, once defined the inventory and the structural model of reference, the 
nonlinear analyses have to be executed in order to define the vulnerability and, consequently, 
the loss curves, following two ways:
• passing directly from the intensity measures to repair costs (IM-LR). This is based on the 
definition of a cost function built on the diffusion of damage (Figure 5) in piers and spandrels 
(according to the structural modeling strategy adopted) and dependent on a specific EDP as 
a function of the given examined component (Figure 4.a). In the case of vertical structural 
elements the assessment is based on an analytical cost function dependent on the drift of 
piers and spandrels, instead, for the floors, the variable that describes the replacement cost 
is the angular deformation. Figure 4.b shows the cost function for the piers based on actual 
repair costs, differentiated with the prevailing failure mode occurred, if associated to a flexural 
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or shear response. This is justified by the fact that the spread of damage is different in these 
two cases: mostly concentrated at the end sections in the flexural response and more spread 
on the whole panel in the shear one (Figure 4.b);
• passing through the IDA curves, that implies: a IM-EDP relation that is a description of 
the structural seismic response or “demand” versus the IM; the estimation of the seismic 
capacity of the structure; the determination of a probabilistic characterization of the 
variability of capacity and demand, and therefore the fragility function for the structural 
model considered (Iervolino and Manfredi 2008). After the definition of the fragility, the 
consequence functions (Damage Level, DL – Loss Ratio, LR) are introduced to estimate the 
repair costs. 
Figure 4. a) Repair cost function related to the constitutive models of the elements 
of the EF model of reference Tremuri (Cattari and Lagomarsino 2013); 
b) Pier cost function and pictures of the two collapse mechanisms involved 
in the function: shear (left) and flexural (right) (Ottonelli 2016)
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Figure 5. Example of damage pattern of a wall after a Nonlinear Dynamic Analysis (NLDA)
d [m]
-0.1 -0.08 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1
V 
[K
N
-1000
-500
0
500
1000
Direction X DAMAGE
LEGEND
Failure mode:
Damage level:
Shear
Flexural
Mixed
0<DL<1
1<DL<2
2<DL<3
3<DL<4
4<DL<5
DL>5 
23 24
20 21
25 26
19
15
16 17 18
1 4
7
10
119
86
6
N3 N19
N18 N26
N27
N6
N7
N2
N1 N17 N25
| 138
For some components, for example the non-structural ones, both approaches can be followed, 
since for them it is possible to define an EDP representative of their structural behavior 
directly related to their cost. Vice versa for the structural ones, only the first approach is 
feasible, because, it is limitative to consider their response in terms of loss described by a 
single EDP, in fact the losses are the sum of the costs of individual elements but also the 
result of the interaction of the response of the various structural elements.
From the first approach, the vulnerability curve (IM-LR) on structural elements is obtained 
immediately (Figure 3.c). Introducing the hazard curve that reports the Mean Annual 
Frequency (MAF), λIM, of the relevant IM (with which the NLDA are performed), the loss 
curve (λΙΜ(im)-LR) can be construed (Figure 3.d). By taking the area under the loss curve the 
EAL is computed (Equation 2).
From the second approach, the IDA curve (IM-EDP) is computed (Figure 3.c). Introducing 
the occurrence of DLs in the IDA and the SAC/FEMA approach (Cornell et al 2002, 
Vamvatsikos 2012), the mean annual frequency of the different DLs, λDL, are evaluated. 
The introduction of the DLs or LSs and the SAC/FEMA formulation is also essential for the 
evaluation of the simplified loss curve, that correlates the λLS and its economic losses (LR,LS) 
that are chosen from reliable consequence functions.
4. Conclusion 
The seismic resilience of a built environment is based on the evaluation of three elements: its 
probability of failure during an earthquake, as well as the consequences from such failures 
and the time to recovery. In this framework, this paper investigates the first two elements 
for the masonry buildings for which the literature is particularly limited, proponing for them 
a numerical and analytical procedure. It allows to determine the robustness of a system in 
economic terms, and it is an essential step to future development in the definition of the 
downtime assessment and complete the resilience evaluation for a masonry structure.
The main advantage of the proposal is the possibility to be applied in different types of 
masonry structures, representing different classes of homogeneous seismic behavior, 
to establish limit states (or damage levels) and repair cost relationships, on which 
the consequences functions are based. The availability of cost functions for buildings 
characterized by different collapse mechanisms and damage distribution would be a useful 
reference for the literature. This step is essential to perform portfolio risk analyses, essential 
to determine a resilience of a built environment. 
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Abstract
Resilience is the ability of a community to respond to and recovery from disaster. The 
characteristics of a community that impact resilience include demographic statistics, built 
infrastructure, the natural environment, economic robustness, and community planning 
efforts and can number in the hundreds. Critically, these characteristics are not often linked 
to the hazards to which a community is at risk, limiting the ability of a community to make 
risk-informed, targeted investment decisions. To help communities prioritize investments in 
resilience, we describe here a method to define hazard-specific risk based on hazard impacts, 
correlated with the resilience characteristics aligned with community priorities and rank these 
investments based on their relative benefit. Using flood as the proof-of-principle hazard, we 
describe a method and corresponding decision support tool, in development through an effort 
funded by the US Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate 
(DHS S&T), to perform a rapid flood risk assessment to support data-driven investments in 
resilience enhancement. Flood impacts are described in either cost or population common 
units and are cross-referenced with a short list of resilience characteristics chosen by the 
community from an inventory collated from the resilience literature. This approach ensures 
the list of community resilience characteristics chosen for analysis are limited to those 
directly linked to flood risk, known to have a direct effect on resilience, and of priority to the 
community. The decision support tool provides communities support in defining investments 
to address and enhance resilience related to each community resilience 
characteristic and evaluate these investments based on relative benefit as 
defined by the cumulative probabilistic impacts across a range of flooding 
scenarios. This proof-of-principle effort is designed specifically to support flood 
resilience, but is designed to be transferrable to any other hazard for which a 
community can perform a rapid risk assessment – to our knowledge, the first 
of its kind to be specifically tailored to evaluating and communicating risk to 
community-level end users.
Keywords
flood risk, risk 
assessment, 
community, 
decision support, 
investment, 
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1. Introduction
Resilience is defined as “The ability to prepare and plan for, absorb, recover from, or more 
successfully adapt to actual or potential adverse events” by the Committee on Increasing 
National Resilience to Hazards and Disasters at the US National Academies (National 
Research Council, 2012). Community characteristics related to resilience include demographic 
metrics (social factors), built infrastructure, and the natural environment as well as economic 
robustness and community planning efforts. Methods to measure resilience on the basis 
of these characteristics within communities have been developed (Cutter et al., 2010, 
2003; Flanagan et al., 2011; and others), but principally provide a baseline assessment 
of community resilience and are not intended to be a framework for prioritizing actions to 
improve resilience. Indeed, communities tasked with improving resilience often have little 
practical guidance, and this limited guidance is rarely based on locally-relevant risk. Here 
we present a method to support informed, risk-based decision making for flood resilience 
investments at the community level. 
Community resilience is directly linked to hazard risk. Flooding is the most frequent, wide-
spread, and costly natural hazard in the US. Estimates place 2016 flood-related financial 
losses in the tens of billions (Benfield, 2015; Bevere et al., 2011)an amount 21 percent above 
the 16-year average of USD174 billion. The losses were an even more robust 59 percent 
higher on a median basis (USD132 billion and floods caused a significant number of fatalities 
each year both in the US and internationally. Therefore, enhancing community flood resilience 
is a central focus for resilience and flood risk mitigation investments to protect lives and 
reduce financial losses, whether caused by smaller, more frequent floods (e.g., 10-year return 
interval events) or large, catastrophic flooding (e.g., 500-year return interval events).
Here we present the framework for a decision support tool, including graphics developed to 
communicate results and provide context for community decision makers in choosing the 
most effective resilience investments. The method provides communities with a data-driven 
approach to focus investments in resilience enhancement to efforts that address flood risk 
and are of priority to the community.
©
 iStock.com
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2. Methods
2.1. Identification of resilience characteristics
Community resilience characteristics were identified through a review of published literature 
and other open source reports. Though hundreds of community resilience indicators have 
been reported in the literature, we found that resilience indicators are not directly linked to 
underlying hazard risk faced by the community (see results in Table 1 for selected examples). 
Community resilience indicators identified in this literature review formed the basis for 
a crosswalk from flood risk to community resilience to fill this gap in available tools for 
investment prioritization. 
Table 1. Translating flood risk profile into resilience characteristics 
Community characteristics at risk  
to flooding
Resilience characteristics (risk-resilience crosswalk)
Population impacted Financial losses
Hospitals inundated Number of patients to 
relocate
Cost to repair inundated 
hospital and replace contents
Inundated substations serving 
population using electricity-dependent 
medical equipment (EDME) 
Population using EDME 
without power
Cost to repair inundated 
substation
Socioeconomically vulnerable 
population in inundation zone
Vulnerable population 
requiring evacuation and 
resource support
Cost of food and water 
support for 3 days
Schools inundated Number of students likely to 
have education disrupted
Cost to repair inundated 
school
Residential building stock inundated Population predicted to be 
displaced
Cost to replace residential 
buildings and contents
2.2. Converting flood impacts to common units
Using a rapid assessment flood risk modelling method (Longenecker, et al, in preparation) 
community characteristics are identified that are at risk to the flooding events of greatest 
concern to the community, are included in the resilience characteristics defined in the 
literature, and of priority to the community. The relative impacts of flooding to these 
characteristics are defined by common units (i.e., population or cost) and calculated for a 
range of flooding events. For example, relocating patients from a hospital can be calculated 
by multiplying the number of beds by the percentage occupancy to define the number 
of people impacted. The cost of inundation to the same hospital may be calculated by 
multiplying the total cost to replace the interior of the basement and first floor by the depth 
damage function to determine a total cost of impact for each event type.
2.3. Investment benefits calculation
Investment benefits are calculated using a counterfactual approach that compares “before 
and after” flood risk for each investment. The method is designed to predict the difference in 
outcomes under two conditions (C versus C*), where C is the factual (i.e., current reality) 
and the system operating with the hypothetical C* is the counterfactual (i.e., the alternative 
reality reflecting a new resilience investment) (Bottou et al., 2013). Benefits are adjusted to 
account for the difference in likelihood between events using expected value decision analysis 
(Albright et al., 2010), a method designed specifically to assess aggregate benefit across a 
probabilistic range of scenarios used to inform decision-making in a wide range of fields.
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The expected value of each decision D is equal to the probability-weighted sum of the 
outcomes’ benefits. Here, decisions correspond to a specific investment, outcomes correspond 
to the benefits provided by the investment across a range of probabilistic flood events, and 
the expected value of the decision corresponds to the expected benefit of the investment 
across the cumulative risk of flood in the community. Mathematically, the expected value of 
decision Di, denoted E[Di], is given by the equation
where pi is the probability of outcome Oj, and bi,j is the benefit of outcome Oj under decision 
Dj . Additional details of how this method is used to rank and prioritize resilience investments 
using flood event probability are described in the results section below. 
3. Results
The list of community characteristics at risk to flooding can be extensive; likewise, the 
comprehensive list of characteristics associated with resilience is hundreds long. In addition, 
communities have unique local priorities: some are focused on protecting a robust small 
business community; some are specifically concerned about an economic hub – a factory, 
community college, or regional hospital; some view themselves as a transportation hub and 
are primarily concerned with maintaining access to transportation infrastructure. By cross-
referencing characteristics associated with resilience, at risk to flooding, and aligned with 
community priorities, a list of target characteristics and corresponding investment strategies 
can be prioritized. Starting from a list of community resilience characteristics linked to the 
population and infrastructure at risk of flooding focuses community resilience investment 
efforts to where they best address flood risk.
3.1. Applying flood to target resilience priorities
To assess flood risk, communities need to map predicted inundation for a range of flood 
event severities faced by the community and overlay these maps with population distribution 
and infrastructure locations to determine predicted flood impacts across scenarios. The 
core requirements for inundation maps used in this method are inclusion of point-depth 
estimates at regular intervals (i.e., in a 10-meter by 10-meter grid) and include each of the 
recurrence intervals of concern to the community (e.g., 10-, 20-, 50-, 75-, 100-, 200-year 
floods). Potential sources of inundation maps in the US include the FEMA RiskMAP program 
(US National Flood Insurance Program), detailed flood studies previously conduced in the 
community, and local flood modelling subject matter experts using publicly available tools 
(e.g., models from the US Army Corps of Engineers Hydrologic Engineering Center). Population 
and infrastructure are available from national-level sources and by applying locally collected 
data. In a related effort, we are also developing a rapid flood risk model in collaboration with 
FEMA to directly support flood modelling required for the investment prioritization method 
and improve access to flood risk information for communities that do not have ready access 
to flood risk assessment methods.
Figure 1. shows an example of flood modelling outputs – an inundation map with 
nationally-available infrastructure and population datasets. Impacts are described graphically 
on the map (Figure 2 A) and in a linked table (Figure 2 B) to provide additional detail. 
Importantly, the slider bar indicates the ability of the end user to evaluate a wide range 
of events, from frequent, less severe events to rare, but catastrophic events, including 
an overview of the impacts, as defined by the infrastructure and population affected by 
inundation. The primary goal of the visualization is to provide non-experts in flood modelling 
an intuitive sense for the severity and impacts both to infrastructure and population for 
flooding events defined both by water depth above flood height and annual exceedance 
probability (AEP).
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Figure 2. Modelled flood impacts to infrastructure.
(A) Map of infrastructure inundated by a moderate flood (+3 feet above flood stage). 
Inundated infrastructure is circled in red. (B) Detailed infrastructure impacts table with 
inundation depths and damage to specific infrastructure. 
3.2. Linking flood impacts to resilience in common units
Prioritizing investments in resilience first requires quantification of flood impacts in common 
terms. Impacts are described in two common unit types: financial loss and population impacts 
(see Methods) forming the quantitative basis to compare resilience investments to address 
flood impacts. Financial losses are calculated for both infrastructure and population impacts. 
In the case of infrastructure like a hospital, investment in sandbags, relocation, or drainage 
ditches can prevent inundation for smaller floods or lower local inundation depths and wider-
scale protection from a levee may be the only effective investment to protect a hospital 
at risk of more significant flooding. In Figure 2A, an example is shown for a community 
concerned with protecting the local hospital during a flood. The inset table in the graphic 
shows the quantified resilience characteristics for an example hospital, calculated for each 
flood severity, for patients needing relocation (population impacted) and repair costs (financial 
loss). As shown in Figure 3, investment options can alternatively be targeted to address 
infrastructure or populations of concern. An option to build a levee to protect a hospital 
is shown in Figure 3A. As shown in Figure 3B, deploying generators or planning effective 
evacuation routes could significantly reduce impacts to the general population or sub-
populations of special concern (e.g., elderly or those reliant on electricity-dependent medical 
equipment-EDME). 
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Figure 3. Defining target resilience investments for impacted infrastructure and population. 
(B) The impacts to the population using electricity-dependent medical equipment (EDME) for 
different flood levels, and potential investment options. The option “Update evacuation plans” 
is selected, and the interface guides users in defining how many people are supported by the 
updated plan and the cost to update it.
3.3. Modelling investment benefits 
Communities can most effectively improve resilience by targeting investments that 
also reduce risk. Figure 4 shows examples of how the method developed here can be 
implemented to assess risk-weighted investment benefit by iteratively modelling the effects 
of each target investment under a range of flood conditions. In the example show in Figure 4, 
power outages due to flooding impact a subset of the population in a community with EDME 
populations at particular risk. This method calculates the benefit of raising a substation as the 
reduction in power outage impacts to the EDME population for a range of flood events (e.g., 
different flood depths). A three foot elevation of the substation protects against a 10-year, 
50-year, and 100-year flood, but not against a 200-year or larger flood. 
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Figure 4. Population protected by investments. 
(A) Map of population inundated by a moderate flood (+3 feet above flood stage). US Census 
tracts inundated are darker. (B) Flood impacts to population using electricity-dependent 
medical equipment (EDME) before and after investment. (C) Flood impacts to general 
population before and after investment.
Investments may reduce flood impacts either by decreasing the likelihood of the event 
occurring (e.g., reinforcing a dam, building or raising a levee) or specifically by targeting 
specific impacts (e.g., sandbagging a specific piece of infrastructure, writing and implementing 
evacuation plans). Evaluating the benefit of investment in flood control structures (e.g, levee 
or drainage ditch) that alter the flood event itself are calculated by comparing the results 
of event characterization and consequence modelling to compare inundation levels and 
corresponding impacts. Investments related to specific population or infrastructure protections 
or enhancements are calculated by comparing impacts as determined by consequence 
modelling alone, as there is no chance in the flood event itself. 
Investment benefits depend upon the severity of the flood and this method applies a 
risk-weighting approach to calculate the aggregate benefit across flood severities. Table 
4 demonstrates the risk-weighting of benefits using flood event probability. Each event 
is assigned a probability weight equal to the difference in AEP between that event and 
next event of greater severity. To produce the results in Table 4, the first-order flood risk 
assessment method was used to model each flood recurrence interval shown, both in the 
absence of a levee and after construction of a levee that protects that hospital. The hospital 
was not inundated by the 10-, 20-, or 50-year flood events. It was inundated by 75-, 100-, 
and 200-year events, with the levee providing protection for the 75- and 100-year events, 
but not the 200-year event. Benefits are shown for the 75- and 100-year floods as the 
financial loss prevented by the levee. The levee has no financial benefit for the hospital at 
less severe floods because they do not cause inundation and no benefit for the 200-year 
event because the hospital was inundated despite the levee. The benefits for the 75-year 
and 100-year floods are weighted using their respective probability weights. By applying the 
same method to all target investments under consideration, the risk weighting step provides 
a common framework to compare disparate types of investments using a common, flood risk-
based estimate of investment benefits.
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Table 2. Calculating the mean weighted investment benefit (expected benefit) 
for a levee protecting a hospital.
Flood 
recurrence 
interval 
(years)
Flood 
annual 
exceedance 
probability
Cost to 
replace 
interior  
(no levee)
Cost to 
replace 
interior 
(with levee)
Investment 
benefits 
(losses 
prevented) 
Probability 
weight
Weighted 
investment 
benefits
10 0.10 $0 $0 $0 0.050 $0 
20 0.050 $0 $0 $0 0.030 $0 
50 0.020 $0 $0 $0 0.0067 $0
75 0.013 $20.0M $0 $20.0M 0.0033 $0.067M
100 0.010 $45.5M $0 $45.5M 0.0050 $0.23M
200 0.0050 $47.3M $47.3M $0 0.0050 $0 
Expected investment 
benefit
$0.30M
Based on modelled flood impacts, this method provides communities to link to flood risk 
with community resilience characteristics and develop a short list of potential investments 
that reflect both an assessment of what drives local flood risk and the selection of local 
priorities for resilience enhancement. Once the statistical method is applied to calculate 
a risk-weighted sum of benefits for each target investment (Table 4), these benefits are 
considered on a relative scale where the investment with the greatest benefit is set to 1 
and all other investments are plotted as a relative comparison either based on population 
or cost (Figure 6A and 6B). This format supports best practices in risk communication 
identified in the research literature, including limiting quantitative information to only that 
most relevant to the decision, using clear terminology and plain language, and driving 
toward the end-goal – namely selecting resilience investments (Melkonyan, 2011; National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2016; Vaughan and Buss, 1998). These results can 
then be applied in the context of other factors important to the local investment decision 
making process, including budgetary constraints or alignment with other ongoing resilience 
enhancement efforts (see Figure 6C).
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Figure 5. Ranking target investments by population benefits.
(A) Target investments are ranked by relative population benefit. Toggle to view relative 
benefits by population or cost not shown. (B) Detail of population benefits provided by 
updating evacuation plans for different flood levels. (C) The list of target investments ranked 
by relative population benefits, with user-provided implementation cost shown.
4. Discussion
Communities worldwide have been asked to improve their resilience. The method described 
here is a critical proof-of-principle effort demonstrating how rapid risk analysis for a single 
hazard can be applied to support risk-based investment prioritization at the community level. 
The method and corresponding web-based tool in development is specifically designed to 
inform decisions in the absence of more robust modelling or local subject matter expertise 
and is designed to inform more in-depth analysis once a community has established initial 
investment priorities. This community-focused approach presents the results of a complex 
flood risk modelling and statistical analysis in a way that communicates these priorities to 
support practical decision making by members of the community and stakeholders involved 
in resilience and disaster planning efforts. Though flood was used here as a proof of principle 
hazard, the approach is broadly applicable for other hazards for which risk assessment 
models are available including earthquakes or disease outbreaks for which epidemiological 
models are available. 
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Abstract
Disaster risk reduction and adaptation to climate change considering economic, social, and 
environment issues, are the objectives of an integrated, interdisciplinary and multi-sectoral 
disaster risk management. Sustainability and transformation of development are only 
possible if there is a suitable strategy of vulnerability reduction and resilience improvement; 
i.e. through the governance strengthening and its capacity to anticipate, cope and recover. 
From this perspective, the best way to assess resilience is implementing a methodology to 
evaluate the disaster risk management performance and effectiveness.
This article presents the Disaster Risk Management Index, DRMi; developed to assess 
and benchmark the risk management performance, providing the overall set of targets 
and actions to be implemented improving resilience and safety from natural harzads point 
of view. The DRMi provides a quantitative measure of the degree and effectiveness of 
management based on predefined qualitative targets (benchmarking) that risk management 
efforts should aim to achieve. The design of the DRMi involves establishing a linguistic 
scale of achievement levels or determining the ‘distance’ between current conditions and 
objective thresholds in a country, subnational region, or city used as reference. The DRMi 
was built using a fuzzy logic approach by quantifying four public policies, each of which being 
described by six composite indicators. The policies include the risk identification (RI), risk 
reduction (RR), disaster management (DM) and governance and financial protection (FP). 
In addition, this paper presents some results to illustrate the application of the DRMi as a 
method to give account of the resilience level of the countries.
The DRMi is an innovative indicator for the measurement of the performance 
and feasible effectiveness of risk management, developed in the framework 
of the Program of Indicators for Disaster Risk and Risk Management in the 
Americas of the Inter-American Development Bank. It has been applied to 
evaluate twenty-six countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. The FP7 
project on Methods for the Improvement of Vulnerability Assessment in Europe, 
MOVE, applied the DRMi to the city of Barcelona, Spain, as an example.
Keywords
risk management, 
performance of  
risk management, 
risk management 
index,  
decision making.
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1. Introduction
Several methods based on composite indicators and other approaches have been proposed, 
mainly, to evaluate vulnerability and disaster risk issues. The contributions of Bates (1992), 
Cutter (1994), Tucker et al. (1994), Davidson (1997), Puente (1999), Cardona et al. (2003 
a,b; 2012), UNDP (2004), World Bank (2004), Carreño et al. (2005, 2007a, 2017), Khazai et 
al. (2015), Salgado et al. (2016) and Jaramillo et al. (2016) among others, have attempted 
to measure vulnerability and risk-related aspects using quantitative or qualitative figures. 
In these methods, vulnerability or disaster risk is evaluated from different point of views, 
using techniques which are, certainly, similar in approach but different in purpose and scope, 
particularly if the objective is to measure the performance of risk management or the degree 
of resilience. The attention in the resilience concept has been increased in recent years in 
several sectors, each one defines it according to their interests and objectives. The concept of 
resilience has developed in different schools of thought, such as ecology (e.g. Holling, 1973), 
psychology (e.g. Bonanno et al., 2006), social-ecological systems research (e.g. Berkes et al., 
2003; Folke, 2006) and critical infrastructures (e.g. Boin and McConnell, 2007). In few words 
resilience is the capacity to anticipate, absorb and overcoming adverse change. The UNISDR 
(2017) defines resilience as “the ability of a system, community or society exposed to 
hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate, adapt to, transform and recover from the effects of 
a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration 
of its essential basic structures and functions through risk management”.
Integrated Disaster Risk Management involves the disaster risk reduction and the adaptation 
to climate change considering economic, social, and environmental issues. These require 
a suitable strategy of vulnerability reduction and resilience improvement. This article 
presents the Disaster Risk Management index, DRMi, and shows how the best way to 
assess resilience is implementing a methodology to evaluate the disaster risk management 
performance and effectiveness. The DRMi was designed as an indicator transparent, robust, 
representative and easily understood by public policy makers at national, subnational and 
urban level. The DRMi involves data with incommensurable units or information that only 
can be valuated using linguistic estimates. The calculation methodology uses the fuzzy sets 
theory as tool to evaluate the effectiveness of risk management and by this way the degree 
of resilience.
©
 iStock.com
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2. Disaster Risk Management Index, DRMi
The DRMi was designed to assess risk management performance and, by this way, its 
effectiveness (Carreño et al., 2007b). It provides a quantitative measure of management 
based on predefined qualitative targets or benchmarks that risk management efforts should 
aim to achieve. The DRMi was constructed by quantifying four public policies, each of 
which having six indicators. Risk identification index, DRMRI, comprises the evaluation 
of individual and social perception, risk knowledge and understanding and the appropriate 
assessment of risk. Risk reduction index, DRMRR, the implementation of corrective 
and prospective prevention and mitigation actions and measures to reduce vulnerability. 
Disaster management index, DRMDM, comprises the advances on preparedness, response 
and recovery and governance and financial protection, DRMFP, measures the degree of 
institutionalization and risk transfer strategies to financial protection (Cardona, 1990, 2005). 
The four public policies and their indicators were defined after an agreement with several 
stakeholders and evaluators. The DRM is defined as the average of the four composite 
indicators.
Six indicators are proposed for each public policy, they are presented in Figure 1. Following 
the performance evaluation of risk management method proposed by Carreño et al. (2004, 
2007b). The indicators for each type of public policy (RI, RR, DM, FP) are obtained by 
means of the following equation,
where, wi is the weight assigned to each indicator, for the country (or city) in consider-ation c 
and the time period t –normalized or obtained by the defuzzification of the linguistic values. 
Each indicator is estimated based on five performance levels (low, incipient, significant, 
outstanding, and optimal). This methodological approach permits the use of each reference 
level simultaneously as a performance objective or target and allows for comparison and 
identification of results or achievements. Government efforts at formulating, implementing, 
and evaluating policies should bear these performance targets in mind. Such linguistic values 
are the same as a fuzzy set that have a membership function of the bell or sigmoidal (at the 
extremes) type, given parametrically by the following equations,
where the parameter b is usually positive and a controls the slope at the crossing point, 0.5 
of membership, x = c. 
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Figure 1. Component indicators for DRMi
RI1 Systematic disaster and loss inventory wRI1
RI2 Hazard monitoring and forecasting wRI2
RI3 Hazard evaluation and mapping wRI3 RMIRI
RI4 Vulnerability and risk assessment wRI4
RI5 Public information and community participation wRI5
RI6 Training and education on risk management wRI6
RR1 Risk consideration in land use and urban planning wRR1
RR2
Hydrographical basin intervention and environmental 
protection wRR2
RR3
Implementation of hazard-event control and protection 
techniques wRR3 RMIRR
RR4
Housing improvement and human settlement relocation 
from prone-areas wRR4
RR5
Updating and enforcement of safety standards and 
construction codes wRR5
RR6
Reinforcement and retrofitting of public and private 
assets wRR6
DRMi
DM1 Organization and coordination of emergency operations wDM1
DM2
Emergency response planning and implementation of 
warning systems wDM2
DM3 Endowment of equipment, tools and infrastructure wDM3 RMIDM
DM4
Simulation, updating and test of inter institutional 
response wDM4
DM5 Community preparedness and training wDM5
DM6 Rehabilitation and reconstruction planning wDM6
FP1
Interinstitutional, multisectoral and decentralizing 
organization wFP1
FP2 Reserve funds for institutional strengthening wFP2
FP3 Budget allocation and mobilization wFP3 RMIFP
FP4 Implementation of social safety nets and funds response wFP4
FP5
Insurance coverage and loss transfer strategies of public 
assets wFP5
FP6
Housing and private sector insurance and reinsurance 
coverage wFP6
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Membership functions for fuzzy sets are defined, representing the qualification levels for 
the indicators better than crisp values. The value of the indicators is given in the x-axis 
of Figure 2.a and the membership degree for each level of qualification is given in the 
y-axis, where 1.0 is the total membership and 0.0 the non-membership. Risk management 
performance is defined by means of the membership of these functions, whose shape 
corresponds to the sigmoid function shows in Figure 2.b, in which the effectiveness of the 
risk management is represented as a function of the performance level. Figure 2.b shows 
that increasing risk management effectiveness, that can be considered as well as a resilience 
proxy, is nonlinear; since it is indeed a complex process. Progress is slow in the beginning, but 
once risk management improves and becomes sustainable, performance and effectiveness 
also improve. Once performance reaches a high level, additional (smaller) efforts increase 
effectiveness significantly but, at the lower levels, improvements in risk management are 
negligible and unsustainable and, as a result, they have little or no effectiveness.
Figure 2. a) Functions that represents the qualification level, b) Effectiveness degree of 
the risk management. It provides an equivalent level of Resilience.
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Source: Carreño et al. (2007b).
Assessment of each indicator is made using the performance levels: low, incipient, significant, 
outstanding and optimal, which corresponds to a range from 1 to 5. The Table 1 illustrates 
the benchmark description of the performance levels for one of the indicators, where 1 is the 
lowest level and 5 the highest. In this methodological focus, each reference level is equivalent 
to a “performance objective”, and hence it allows for the comparison and identification 
of achievements towards which governments should conduct the efforts of formulation, 
implementation and evaluation of policies.
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Table 1. Example of performance levels of one sub-indicator of the DRMRR 
Indicator and performance levels 2017
RR5. Updating and enforcement of safety standards and 
construction codes
1. Voluntary use of norms and codes from other countries without 
major adjustments.
1. Low
2. Adaptation of some requirements and specifications according 
to some national and local criteria and particularities. 2. Incipient
3. Promulgation and updating of obligatory national norms based 
on international norms that have been adjusted according to 
the hazard evaluations made in the country.
X 3 Significant
4. Technological updating of most of security and construction 
code norms for new and existing buildings with special 
requirements for special buildings and lifelines.
4. Outstanding
5. Permanent updating of codes and security norms: 
establishment of local regulations for construction in most 
cities based on microzonations, and their strict control and 
implementation.
5. Optimal
Once performance levels of each indicator have been evaluated, the value of each 
component of the DRMi determined through a non-linear aggregation model based on 
fuzzy logic. The value of each component ranges between 0 and 100. The evaluation is 
based on opinions from local experts who provide qualifications of the indicators and assign 
relative importance between them for each public policy according to their experience and 
knowledge. This relative importance is processed using the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
to assign weights (Saaty, 1980). Weights assigned sum 1 and they are used to give height to 
the membership functions of the fuzzy sets corresponding to the qualifications made.
Qualification for each public policy (RMIRI , RMIRR , RMIDM and , RMIFP) is the result of 
the union of the weighted fuzzy sets
where w1 to wN are the weights of the indicators of Figure 1, μC(C1) to μC(CN) are 
the membership functions of the estimates made for each indicator and μRMI p is the 
membership function of the RMI qualification of each public policy p. The risk management 
index value is obtained from the defuzzification of this membership function, using the 
method of centroid of area, COA
The value of each composed element is between 0 and 100, where 0 is the minimum 
performance level and 100 is the maximum level. Total DRMi is the average of the four 
composed indicators that admit each public policy.
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Figure 3. Example of union of fuzzy sets and defuzzification to obtain 
the crisp value of a RMI
Source: Carreño et al. (2007b).
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As abovementioned, the DRMi or total index is the average of the four composite indicators 
that represent each public policy.
3. Evaluation for the Latin-American and  
Caribbean Region
The DRMi has been used by the Inter-American Development Bank to assess the 
performance of the disaster risk management in 26 countries of the Latin-American and 
Caribbean region. The countries included are: Argentina (ARG), Bahamas (BHS), Barbados 
(BRB), Belize (BLZ), Bolivia (BOL), Brazil (BRA), Chile (CHL), Colombia (COL), Costa Rica (CRI), 
Dominican Republic (DOM), Ecuador (ECU), El Salvador (SLV), Guatemala (GTM), Guyana 
(GUY), Haiti (HTI), Honduras (HND), Jamaica (JAM), Mexico (MEX), Nicaragua (NIC), Panama 
(PAN), Paraguay (PRY), Peru (PER), Suriname (SUR), Trinidad and Tobago (TTO), Uruguay (URY), 
and Venezuela (VEN). Figure 4 shows the comparison of the components for different years.
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Figure 4. RMI for 26 countries of the Americas considering Risk Identification, 
Risk Reduction, Disaster Management, and Governance and Financial Protection. 
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Figure 5. presents the DRMi considering the four public policies. These results indicate 
that still there is a lot of work to do in all the evaluated countries regarding disaster risk 
management. 
Figure 5. Disaster Risk Management Index for all countries of Latin America and 
the Caribbean
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ᵜ The results presented for these countries for the year 2010 correspond to the assessments conducted for the year 2008, since 
assessment for that year was not available.
β The results presented for these countries for the year 2013, correspond to the assessment conducted for the year 2010, since 
assessment for that year was not available; that is to say a most recent assessment that is consider useful inasmuch as the 
difference could not be significant.
γ For Surinam, results from 2013 in this figure, correspond to a 2012 assessment.
φ For Barbados, results from 2013 in this figure, correspond to a 2014 assessment.
On average, according to this methodology, the risk management performance in the region is 
about 30 to 40. Figure 6 illustrates that effectiveness, in the best cases, and by this way, the 
resilience, is still very incipient (0.2). This suggests that considerable efforts are required to 
promote effective and sustainable risk management, even in the more advanced countries. 
Figure 6. Disaster Risk Management Index for all countries of Latin America and 
the Caribbean
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The results of this type of assessment are also useful to formulate integrated disaster risk 
management or adaptation plans or to identify the needs to improve relevant aspects of 
disaster risk management in a country or a city. The next actions or steps to achieve are 
easily identified. Figure 7 shows the results of a participative evaluation in a prospective 
way, thinking to provide inputs for the formulation of future steps to improve disaster risk 
management in a country. 
In summary, the DRMi has been a systematic and consistent technique developed to 
measure risk management performance and, by the way, it can be useful to measure 
resilience as well. The conceptual and technical bases of this index are robust, even though 
it is inherently subjective. Although the method may be refined or simplified in the future to 
deal with resilience and adaptation, its approach is quite innovative because it allows the 
measurement of disaster risk management effectiveness.
Figure 7. Prospective exercise for Risk Reduction for a country.
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Additional information related to the methodology and the previous results of DRMi is 
available at: can be found at:  
http://idea.unalmzl.edu.co  
http://idea.bid.manizales.unal.edu.co/ and at:  
http://www.iadb.org/es/temas/desastres-naturales/indicadores-de-riesgo-de-
desastres,2696.html
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Abstract
The EU-CIRCLE project (H2020 GA:653824) has defined a holistic framework, that identifies 
and assesses the risks caused by several climatic hazards and climate-change stressors 
to heterogeneous, interconnected and interdependent critical infrastructures (CI). This risk 
management framework is the first step in ensuring the resilience of vulnerable technological, 
social and economic infrastructure systems to climate change impacts and 
in climate proofing the existing critical infrastructures (in terms of identifying 
indicators and reference states, anticipated adaptive / transformation 
activities, and investment costing). The framework enables the identification of 
climate-driven CI risks and the strengthening of relevant resilience capacities 
(anticipation, absorption, coping, recovery, and adaptation) that are vital for 
ensuring the resiliency of CI. 
1. Introduction
Most existing infrastructures have been designed under the assumption of stationary climate 
conditions, where key variables are considered as fluctuating around an unchanging mean 
state. This assumption of stationarity is still common practice for design criteria for new CI 
(CEN, 2014), even though the notion that climate change may alter the mean, variability and 
extremes of relevant weather variables is acknowledged.
The aim of EU-CIRCLE project is to use a validated scientific approach to:
• Assess climate risks to CI using improved methods and new knowledge, from the literature, 
partners expertise and opinions of stakeholders.
• Identify how climate risks to CI interact with other socio-economic factors to affect the level 
of risk or risk mitigation or climate change adaptation.
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• Estimate the multi-hazard effect, either due to concurrent timing, acting on the same 
location or the same receptor (coincidence).
• Assess the magnitude of impact to interconnected CI and their importance on society. 
• Assess the uncertainties, limitations and confidence in the underlying evidence, data used 
and analyses for different risks.
• Develop of resilience estimates, CC adaptation and risk reduction options, that can be 
directly communicated to CI operators, governments and other stakeholders
2. EU-CIRCLE methodology
The EU-CIRCLE project has defined a holistic framework, to identify and assess the risks 
caused by several climate-change stressors and climatic hazards to heterogeneous 
interconnected and interdependent critical infrastructures. This is considered to be the first 
step to ensure the resilience of vulnerable technological, social and economic systems to 
climate change impacts and improve climate proofing of existing critical infrastructures (in 
terms of identifying indicators and reference states, anticipated adaptive / transformation 
activities, and investment costing). 
The assessment of impacts in the multi-hazard risk framework is directly compatible with 
National Risk Assessments, EU Disaster Management Guidelines (EC SWD 1626 final/2010) 
(EC, 2010) and EPCIP Directive (114/2008) as well as with International initiatives (Sendai 
Framework) and related standards (ISO 31000), accounting for impacts directly affecting 
CI and the corresponding consequences to society, the environment and other sectors of 
the economy. The developed approach for estimating and modelling risk is based on the 
Consequence – based Risk Management (CRM) generic approach the can be 
used to support the entire project’s objectives and scope of assessing an interconnected 
infrastructure’s exposure to climate stressors and determining which hazards carry the most 
significant consequences. (Shand et al., 2015; Wennersten et al., 2015).
The sectors considered within the EU-CIRCLE framework include energy, water, ICT, transport, 
chemical and governmental services, as they are all highly sensitive to relative thresholds of 
hydro-meteorological extremes. The analysis of such extreme events and how they will be 
affected by changing climate patterns can be used to assess between different options for 
improving resilience of CI to climate change. 
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3. CI and assets
EU-CIRCLE has created, for each of the six CI sectors, a registry of CI assets which are 
considered essential for the operation of each CI and the provision of its critical services. The 
registry was prepared in cooperation with CI operators and experts in the field. It includes a 
characterisation of the key attributes of each asset, its function and role within the CI (sub)
sector it belongs to; including its role in the provision of critical CI services. As modern CI are 
found in interdependent networks or ‘network of networks’, the registry further identifies the 
interconnections between the assets; both within individual CI sectors and across them. These 
interconnections have been described as per (Rinaldi et al., 2001) and are characterised as uni-
directional (dependency) or bi-directional (interdependency) and as physical, cyber, geographical 
or logical (inter)dependencies. 
The registry enables the case study partners to construct a detailed CI network or ‘network of 
networks’ in order to implement and validate the EU-CIRCLE risk assessment methodology. 
In order to support the risk assessment process, information on the natural hazards that can 
impact the operation of the asset (e.g. flood, extreme temperatures, wildfire etc.) has been 
collected in the registry and an estimation of the potential impacts different natural hazards 
may have on the CI operation is provided using tools such as fragility curves and damage 
functions, as collected from available literature sources (including grey literature) and 
contribution from subject-matter experts. 
4. Climate data capturing and processing
The climate data needed to conduct the risk CRM modelling approach are obtained through a 
sequential procedure customised to each specific application.
• Identification of the required climate data for risk assessment. 
• Identification of the relevant datasets 
• Data gathering and collection
• Estimate Likelihood of future climate / extreme event
For conducting the latter, different data processing tools have been are implemented, which 
include models for production of localized climate projections (statistical ESD - and dynamical 
downscaling), spatio-temporal processing of climate information and/or hazards parameters 
in order to account for the exposure of the CI(s) under question, climate scenario selection 
and secondary hazards models, facilitating their precise introduction into the computational 
platform (see the workflow on Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Climate processing overview
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5. Risk Management Framework
The EU-CIRCLE risk management framework, consists of the following steps (Figure 2):
Figure 2. Detailed view of EU-CIRCLE risk and resilience framework
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1. Establishment of CI (or regional) climate change resilience policy, or specific business 
oriented decision that will be addressed. Exemplary policy questions to be answered can 
be: What must and what should be protected? Which potential consequences are relevant 
(economic, social, environmental etc.) for this appraisal? Which are the priorities? What is 
an acceptable risk and what is a non-acceptable risk?
2. Identification, collection and processing of climate data and secondary hazards.
3. Identification of assets, systems, networks, relations and functions. 
4. Assessment and evaluation of risks. 
5. Selection and implementation of adaptation programmes and resilience enhancements 
options.
6. Measurement of effectiveness of the examined solutions
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5.1. Risk matrix approach
Within EU-CIRCLE and in accordance with ISO31000, National Risk Assessments (NRA), JRC 
initiatives Risk has been defined as: Risk = Likelihood x Consequences
Likelihood (probability of occurrence) refers to the initial probability of the climate 
scenario to occur and is usually defined as:1/ frequency of one or more incidents at 
various time scales (as defined by CZ, IE, LT, NO, PL, HU in their NRAs) 2/ probability of 
occurrence within 1 year (as defined by EE, EL in their NRAs)
Consequences – Impacts are the result of the realization of a hazard (Sect 5.3). 
With the Likelihood and Consequences/Impacts being classified into 5 distinct categories 
each, an original risk matrix consisting of 25 cells and five irregularly shaped zones is built to 
determine the overall risk (Table 1). 
Table 1. Risk matrix
CONSEQUENCES/IMPACTS
LIKELIHOOD NEGLIGIBLE SMALL MEDIUM HIGH SEVERE
VERY HIGH Low Medium High Critical Critical
High Very Low Medium Medium High Critical
Medium Very Low Low Medium Medium High
Low Very Low Very Low Low Low Medium
Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Low
5.2. Describing the event – Likelihood
The levels of likelihood, in the framework of EU-CIRCLE, are defined by the internationally 
accepted descriptive terms, classified into a set of five categories, corresponding to numerical 
values from the NRAs and IPCC (Table 2):
Table 2. Examples from classifications of likelihood by the MS and IPCC.
Country Very Low Low Medium High Very High
CZ < 1 in 1000 y 1 in 100 – 
1000 y
1 in 10 – 100 
y
1 in 1– 10 y >1 in 1 year
EL less than 0.001% 
per year
0.001% to 
0.01%
0.001% to 
0.01%
0.01% to 0.1% > than 1%
IPCC Except. 
unlikely
Very 
unlikely
Unlikely Medium Likely Very 
likely
Virtually 
certain
IPCC <1% 1-10% 10-33% 33-66% 66-90% 90-99% >99%
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5.3. Impacts
Impacts are defined as a quantifiable measure of the damages and performance disruption 
on a single asset, and to society in general. Within the EU-CIRCLE framework for the 
determination of the incident consequences builds upon a two tier approach. 
• Direct impacts to the interconnected CI network 
• Indirect impacts to society, that directly resulting from the CI not being able to operate 
according to their intended scope 
Table 3. Impact description
Direct Impacts Indirect Impacts
Damages to CI assets Impact on societal groups
CI performance Casualties
Casualties Economic impacts
Economic and Financial Perspectives
Environmental Losses
CI reputation
6. Resilience Framework
Based on a comprehensive review of resilience definitions, the term resilience in the 
context of critical infrastructure for EU-CIRCLE has been defined as the ability of a CI 
system to 
• PREVENT: predict and resist the impact – prepare for / anticipate / preservation 
• WITHSTAND: sustain the damage – absorb / withstand / accommodate / robustness 
• RECOVER: damage can occur but the system will recover – respond to / rapidity
• ADAPT : modifications to system – change / restoration / improvement / learn
6.1. Resilience Layers
Taking into account the nature and incorporation of multidimensional components within a 
resilience framework, a layered approach is chosen as it has the flexibility to modify each 
layer (each component) independently and yet the collective output will be based on the 
interconnection between the layers.
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Figure 3. Layers of resilience 
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6.1.1. Resilience Capacities and the Resilience Assessment Tools (RAMTs)
The capacities of critical infrastructure is one of the main ingredients for infrastructure 
resilience. The different types of capacities, are defined as: 
Anticipatory capacity: is the ability of a system to anticipate and reduce the impact of climate 
variability and extremes through preparedness and planning (Bahadur et al., 2015). As such it 
has close links to vulnerability, hazards and prevention. 
Absorptive capacity: is the ability of a system to buffer, bear and endure the impacts of 
climate extremes in the short term and avoid collapse (Béné et al., 2012), acting as the first 
line of defence (Biringer et al., 2013).
Coping capacity: is the ability of people, organizations and systems, using available skills and 
resources, to face and manage adverse conditions, emergencies or disasters (UNISDR, 2009). 
The absorptive is immediately after a disaster whereas coping can be for a comparatively 
longer period.
Restorative capacity: is the ability of a system to be repaired easily and efficiently (Biringer et 
al., 2013), associated with recovery too. 
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Figure 4. RAMT and the calculation of resilience capacities. 
Adapted from Hughes and Healy (2014). 
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Adaptive capacity: is the combination of assets, skills, technologies and confidence to make 
changes and adapt effectively to the challenges posed by long term trends, such as future 
climate change (UNISDR, 2009). 
The Resilience Assessment Model and Tools (RAMTs) has been developed on the basis of the 
defined resilience capacities. The only difference here is that they are first divided into the 
broad categories of Organizational Capacities (Anticipative and Adaptive) and Technical 
(Absorptive, Restorative and Coping). 
Within the project a specific RAMTs spreadsheet has been defined which goes into the details 
and describes how the indicators can be measured and generates scores on a scale of 10 
(very high resilience) to 0 (very low resilience). An individual capacity score is generated in 
RAMTs and shown below in Table 4. The resilience index is generated for overall resilience 
for this example. The RAMTs also generates a web diagram showing the relative scores 
of the five resilience capacities. It provides a summary dashboard for users to view the 
various scores and also has the capacity to add weights to the scores to reflect the relative 
importance of each capacity for the asset, network or NoN. 
Table 4. Overall resilience score in RAMTs
The resilience framework is converted into the conceptual SD model using the diagram 
shown below in Figure 4 introducing the feedback and interaction between resilience and 
system performance that interact across the 4 resilience layers. In SD, stocks are variables 
that accumulate over time, represented by a box, while flows are represented by arrows with 
“spigots”. The flows are connected to stocks and can either add to or take away from stocks 
over time at a controlled rate. Other texts and arrows provide additional information and 
connections between variables. 
For the analytical framework as a whole, where several layers are combined for analysis, we 
will need to use a two stock model that can demonstrate the feedback present in the system 
and also demonstrate the ability of SD simulation methods to capture CI interdependencies 
as well. Figure 4 illustrates how resilience can be conceptualized as a stock over time (box 
titled resilience capacity) with flows coming in to denote the level of resilience at this point 
in time (t1). The “spigot” on the incoming flow represents the contribution to overall resilience 
of the scores generated from the RAMTs process indicating that the overall resilience is a 
function of RAMTs. The “flow out” show how the size of shocks or impact of a hazard event is 
related to the level of resilience present at (ti) in the system.
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Figure 4. The layers combined in a stock and flow model of 
the final resilience framework
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7. Validation
EU-CIRCLE methodology has been validated in a workshop held in Cyprus and organised by 
the European University of Cyprus, CI operators from the energy, ICT, water and public sectors 
identified for the first time the various interconnections between them and realised the 
importance of being prepared to respond to future extreme weather conditions. The operators 
acknowledged that more needs to be done by them to build-in resilience to climate change. 
8. Conclusions
Thus far EU-CIRCLE has achieved important objectives such as:
Establish a Holistic framework for defining climate resilience into Europe’s interconnected 
infrastructures, bridging multiple temporal and spatial scales. The EU-CIRCE process of climate 
risk management, adapting the NIPP framework for different temporal and spatial scales.
A multi-hazard risk modelling approach, where an asset based approach is used to 
identify damages to CI from climate stressor’s leading to the identification of the impacts 
on CI operations using network simulation for the modelling of critical services within 
interconnected CI. This is compatible with national, EU and International initiatives (NRA, 
EPCIP, Sendai Framework) and standards (ISO 31000). 
The identification of resilient capabilities (anticipation, absorption, coping, restoration, 
adaptation) and its introduction to a systems dynamic model.
Move from response & prevention to resilience. EU-CIRCLE introduced a high level concept 
for assessing CI resilience which is a collective process to “ensure that they remain safe, 
effective and operational during and after disasters in order to provide live-saving and critical 
services”38. 
38 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, Priority 4
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Abstract
Civil infrastructure and community systems can be classified into different resilience-
related configurations, depending on their post-disaster reaction. After a disaster, the supply 
capacity of civil infrastructure systems as well as the demand of a community for services 
and, consequently, effective service consumption, may be impacted in different ways. 
Eight resilience-related configurations are herein identified, differing in their vulnerability 
and recovery paths. Notably, it is shown that Lack of Resilience can also be 
observed for systems that are characterized by low vulnerability. In addition, 
this classification allows to identify a system post-disaster behavior, indicate 
how best to increase its resilience, and, therefore, support an optimal resilience 
based design strategy of both civil infrastructure systems and communities 
they serve.
1. Introduction
Modern societies rely on the services supplied by civil infrastructure systems (CISs) to 
maintain their living standards. Services provided by CISs include, for example, electric power, 
(potable) water, health care, and transportation. CISs are, however, vulnerable to external 
excitations, especially when exposed to exceptional disaster loads. To give some examples, 
in 2005 Hurricane Katrina led to extensive damage of the electric power supply system in 
several states of the United States (Reed et al., 2010), and during the 2015 Gorkha (Nepal) 
earthquake the electric power supply system of Nepal (Didier et al., 2017a), and the water 
and cellular telecommunication systems of the Kathmandu Valley (Didier et al., 2017b) 
were damaged, causing financial losses of more than 500 million USD. In addition to direct 
(physical) damage to components of the CISs, persisting service black-outs can cause indirect 
costs (e.g. due to business interruptions), delay recovery efforts, and, thus, put additional 
strain on the already weakened society. Therefore, in a holistic approach, it is important to 
not only quantify the vulnerability of CISs or a community to disasters, but to include their 
recovery, and, thus, to quantify their resilience (e.g. Bruneau et al., 2003).
Different CISs and communities can react quite differently to disasters. CIS service supply 
capacity is often expected to drop after disasters, due to damage to the CIS components. 
For example, if a water pump of a water distribution system is damaged, the system may 
not be able to provide the same amount of water supply as before the disaster. In some 
cases, CISs can, however, be designed to increase their supply capacity: e.g. hospitals can be 
prepared to set up temporary emergency rooms to handle a probable increase in patients 
after major disasters. In fact, demand for service may increase or decrease after disasters: 
demand to cellular communication system or hospitals often raises after major disasters 
(e.g. ASCE, 2011), while demand for electric power might decrease due to damage to the 
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building stock and its contents (i.e. electric appliances, Didier et al., 2017c). These evolutions 
can lead to different demand/supply configurations, leading to different behaviors of the CIS-
community system. In addition to quantifying a possible Lack of Resilience (LoR) of a CIS, it 
is essential to identify different system resilience-related configurations with respect to their 
vulnerability and recovery paths. The Re-CoDeS framework (Didier et al., 2017d) allows to 
quantify the resilience of such CIS-community systems and to identify possible post-disaster 
configurations. In the following study, different resilience-related configurations identified in 
the Re-CoDeS framework are presented, and their implications on the resilience of a CIS-
community system are discussed. 
2. The Re-CoDeS framework
The Re-CoDeS framework (Didier et al., 2017d) allows to quantify and qualify the resilience of 
a CIS-community system. It distinguishes two system layers, namely the supply system layer 
and the demand system layer, and the following metrics on a component and system level 
(composed of i ∈ {1...I} demand components or nodes, and j ∈ {1...J} supply components 
or nodes):
The component demand Di(t) and the system demand Dsys(t) are the demand of the 
community for the service of the CIS at interest at a given demand node i at time t (e.g. an 
electric distribution substation) and the demand to the entire CIS at time t, respectively.  
Note that .
The component available supply Siav(t) is the service supply available at a node i at time t to 
satisfy the demand at the same node. It depends on the system service model, describing the 
operations of the CIS at interest. The system service supply capacity at time t is denoted by 
Scsys(t). Note that due to the influence of the system service model and the network topology, 
.
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• The service consumption at node i at time t, Ci(t), and the consumption of service in the 
entire CIS at time t, Csys(t). The consumption is the minimum of the available supply and 
the demand for service at a given node and time, Ci(t) = min (Di(t), Siav(t)). Csys(t) is, 
then, the sum of all component consumptions, . 
Using the metrics described above, the Lack of Resilience of the CIS observed at a node i over 
a given time period t0 ≤ t ≤ tf, LoRi, is defined as:
where t0 is the start time of the resilience assessment (often set to the moment of 
occurrence of the disaster), tf is the end time of the resilience assessment (e.g. a given time 
period, or the control time of a system, etc.) and 〈.〉 is the singularity function. The Lack of 
Resilience of the entire CIS over a given time period, LoRsys, is defined as the aggregation of 
the LoR at all the nodes of the system:
Both metrics can be normalized by the component and system demand respectively, and the 
resilience observed for at a given node i, Ri, and for the system, Rsys, is defined as:
The supply reserve margin at a component i at time t, SRi(t), can be defined as  
the difference between available supply and demand at component i at  
time t: SRi(t) = Siav(t) – Di(t). The system supply reserve margin at time t, SRsys(t),  
is the difference between the demand to the entire CIS and the system supply capacity 
at time t: SRsys(t) = Scsys(t) – Dsys(t). The supply reserve margin is a measure for the 
redundancy and the robustness of the CIS, as a supply reserve can be used to substitute for a 
loss of supply at the component or system level. 
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3. Resilience-Related Configurations
The Re-CoDeS framework allows not only to quantify the resilience of CISs but also a clear 
classification of post-disaster system configurations. The amount of service demand and 
supply is expected to change after major disasters. Both metrics can increase, decrease 
or stay constant, depending on various factors, including the impact of a disaster on the 
community and the CISs. Depending on the magnitude and the rate of change of these 
metrics, different CIS-community demand-supply configurations can be identified. Some 
configurations are more, and others are less prone to a high value of LoR. Every configuration 
can lead to a good or a bad disaster resilience performance, depending on the arising LoR. 
The classification allows to qualify a possible reaction of the CIS-community system and to 
estimate the potential risk to observe a high value of LoR after a disastrous event.
Table 1. Resilience-related system configurations, t0 corresponds to the moment 
of occurrence of the disaster (adapted from Didier et al., 2017d).
Configuration Scsys(t) Dsys(t) Csys(t)
Classical Scsys(t) ≤ Scsys(t0) Dsys(t) ≤ Dsys(t0) Csys(t) ≤ Csys(t0)
Inefficient Scsys(t) > Scsys(t0) Dsys(t) ≤ Dsys(t0) Csys(t) ≤ Csys(t0)
Fragile Scsys(t) ≤ Scsys(t0) Dsys(t) > Dsys(t0) Csys(t) ≤ Csys(t0)
Anti-Fragile Scsys(t) > Scsys(t0) Dsys(t) > Dsys(t0) Csys(t) > Csys(t0)
Reserve-Margin Scsys(t) ≤ Scsys(t0) Dsys(t) > Dsys(t0) Csys(t) > Csys(t0)
Cliff-Edge Scsys(t) > Scsys(t0) Dsys(t) > Dsys(t0) Csys(t) ≤ Csys(t0)
Inadequate Scsys(t) > Scsys(t0) Dsys(t) ≤ Dsys(t0) Csys(t) > Csys(t0)
Under-Designed Scsys(t) ≤ Scsys(t0) Dsys(t) ≤ Dsys(t0) Csys(t) > Csys(t0)
To classify a component, the knowledge of the evolution of the available supply and the 
demand for service at the component level are usually sufficient. The reaction of systems 
to disasters is more complex and, therefore, difficult to assess. In fact, systems can include 
components with very different disaster resilience-related configurations. Additionally, the 
effect of the distribution/transportation system and the system service model (determining 
the allocation and distribution of service) needs to be considered. In fact, CIS supply is often 
produced or enters the system at different locations than it is consumed (e.g. electric power 
produced at generation plants consumed in cities or by industries). Distribution/transportation 
links can fail, and the allocation of the supply might change in post-disaster situations (e.g. 
due to different prioritization strategies for service dispatch or potential transmission losses). 
It is, thus, possible to observe a supply reserve margin and a LoR on the system level at 
the same time. For example, suppose that the post-disaster system supply capacity is still 
larger than the demand of the whole community for the services provided by the CIS. Despite 
broken links, some nodes can still be supplied and have a large supply reserve margin. 
Others, however, are disconnected and cannot be supplied anymore at all, thus, having a 
high LoR. On a system level, it is, therefore, important to consider additionally the system 
consumption to include such effects. To classify the system resilience-related configurations, 
the 3 system variables Dsys(t), Csys(t) and Scsys(t) are employed. Table 1 lists the different 
system resilience-related classifications. After disasters, it is possible to observe different 
configurations over the various absorption and recovery phases (e.g. Figure 5b).
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3.1. Classical configuration
The classical configuration has been often observed after major disasters in the past: the 
demand for a CIS service decreases (e.g. due to damage to the community), as well as the 
supply capacity of the system (e.g. due to damage to the system components). Consequently, 
the consumption decreases as well (or stays constant). Depending on the supply reserve 
margins available prior to the disaster and on the magnitude and rate of decrease of the 
demand and supply, a LoR can potentially be observed (Figure 1a)). If the supply reserve 
margins are large enough, the decrease of supply can be substituted to a certain extent. 
Finally, the dispatch of service depends on the distribution/transportation system. Scenarios 
like the one shown in Figure 1b) indicate link failures or an inefficient service dispatch: a 
high LoR is observed at the same time as a supply reserve margin. An example of a CIS-
community system expected to show such a resilience-related configuration is the electric 
power supply system: some generation plants are damaged during a disaster and the amount 
of electric power that can be supplied decreases. At the same time, the demand for electric 
power decreases due to damage to the community: buildings collapsed and industries are 
shut down. In an extreme scenario, demand and supply capacity can even decrease to zero 
(e.g. Fukushima region after the 2011 Tohoku earthquake, or Pompeii after a large volcano 
eruption and earthquake).
Figure 1. a) Classical configuration (from Didier et al., 2017d), 
b) Classical configuration with a LoR and a system supply reserve margin at the same time
3.2. Inefficient configuration
A CIS-community system is classified as inefficient, if an increase in service supply is 
observed at the same time than a decrease of the service demand after a disaster (Figure 
2a)). Similar to the classical configuration, the demand can decrease, for example, due 
to extensive damage to the community. The system supply capacity, however, increases, 
for example, since the CIS has been designed to increase its supply after disasters. This 
configuration is not very prone to large LoR during disasters, however, the supply reserve 
margin is likely to increase unnecessary and inefficiently. An example for such a configuration 
are donations of food and clothes, as often observed after major natural catastrophes: after 
the 2012 hurricane Sandy, large quantities of clothing were generated through donations and 
wasted, since they could not all be allocated to any people lacking thereof (Fessler, 2012).
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Figure 2. a) Inefficient configuration, 
b) Fragile configuration (both from Didier et al., 2017d)
3.3. Fragile configuration
The fragile configuration (Figure 2b)) is, like the classical configuration, another configuration 
that is observed relatively often after disasters. This configuration is characterized by an 
increase in community demand for service at the same time as a decrease in the supply 
capacity of the CIS. The decrease in the supply capacity can, again, be attributed to damage 
to the CIS supply or service generation facilities. In this scenario, the increase in community 
demand is often related to emergency actions and reactions immediately after the disaster. 
Examples of systems likely to belong to the fragile configuration are cellular communication 
and transportation systems. In the immediate aftermath of a disaster, there is a sudden 
increase of communications causing a congestion of the cellular communication system. 
This has, for example, been observed after the 2011 Tohoku (Japan) earthquake, after which 
the call rate rose to up to 10 times the demand during normal conditions (ASCE, 2011). This 
configuration is very prone to large LoR, as has been observed after past disasters (e.g. for the 
cellular communication system of the Kathmandu Valley after the 2015 Gorkha earthquake, 
Didier et al., 2017b). Another example are water distribution systems dealing with post-
earthquake fire situations: the demand increases due to firefighting, while the supply cannot 
be assured anymore due to a damaged distribution system. 
An important observation can be drawn from this particular configuration. Even in the case 
for which the system is designed to be effectively not vulnerable, there can be a large LoR. 
Therefore, in a resilience design approach not only the reliability of the system is of interest, 
but also the one that directly affects the demand. In addition to this, a reserve margin should 
be considered as a key element of the design.
3.4. Anti-Fragile configuration
The anti-fragile configuration (Figure 3a)) distinguishes itself from the fragile configuration 
such that the CIS supply is designed to increase after a disaster. The demand still increases, 
but in relation with the increase in supply, this configuration is less prone to situations 
resulting in a LoR. In fact, if the supply was sufficient before the disaster, anti-fragile systems 
will never have a LoR if the service supply capacity is designed in a way that it exceeds the 
increase in demand and if there are reliable and efficient supply distribution systems. An 
example for such a configuration is the health care system that can be designed to react 
to disaster related increases in the number of injured patients, for example, by setting up 
temporary emergency rooms and additional beds at the different hospital locations. The 
challenge is similar than for the reserve-margin configuration (see below): an excessive 
increase in the CIS supply capacity and/or an excessive supply reserve margin might increase 
costs.
179 |
Figure 3. a) Anti-fragile configuration, 
b) Reserve-margin configuration (from Didier et al., 2017d)
3.5. Reserve-Margin configuration
Reserve-margin system configurations (Figure 3b)) are characterized by large supply reserve 
margins available to absorb potential shocks and to cover post-disaster increases in service 
demand. The system supply reserve margin can be used to substitute for a possible loss 
of supply capacity due to damage to the system and to prevent a LoR. The large supply 
reserve margins are usually combined with a highly redundant and reliable distribution 
system and efficient service dispatch strategies to prevent delivery failures. This configuration 
is characterized at the same time by an increase in demand, and consumption, since the 
increase in demand can (in part or completely, depending on the exact magnitude of the 
changes in demand and supply and the available supply reserve margin prior to the disaster) 
be covered. However, if supply reserve margins are not high enough or the distribution system 
are not reliable enough, a LoR is still possible. Such a configuration can, for example, be found 
in nuclear power plants: they are designed to cover increases for reactor cooling demand even 
if there are many failures in the reactor cooling system(s). The possible high consequences of 
a nuclear reactor overheating justify such costly investments in large supply reserve margins.
3.6. Cliff-Edge configuration
Systems classified as cliff-edge (Figure 4a)) exhibit sudden dramatic failures due to non-
redundant vulnerable elements or due to cascading failures. Even though the supply capacity 
can be designed to increase after a disaster to cover an increase in demand (similar to 
anti-fragile systems), the supply cannot be delivered to the consumers due to failure of the 
transmission system or due to inefficient or inadequate system service models. The post-
disaster system service consumption will consequently decrease. A simple example for such 
a system is a hospital that can only be reached by a highly vulnerable link, for example 
a bridge. However, after a major earthquake, the bridge may be severely damaged and 
impassable. While there is a large increase in potential patients due to injuries during the 
earthquake, and even though the hospital has been designed to provide a large number of 
additional beds and to setup temporary emergency rooms, the patients cannot be treated, 
as they are unable to reach the hospital. Therefore, the consumption (i.e. the number of 
treatments effectively provided) will decrease if compared to the pre-disaster level. Another 
example is, to some extent, the large 2003 Northeast US power blackout, which was partly 
due to an overloaded line of the transmission system. Even though the generation plants 
were not damaged and emergency power generators could be set up and the demand was 
large, the consumption went down due to blackouts related to the failure of the transmission 
system. Observe that likewise the fragile configuration, a large LoR can occur even if the 
supply system is invulnerable and the reserve margin adequately designed.
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Figure 4. a) Cliff-edge configuration, 
b) Inadequate configuration (both from Didier et al., 2017d)
3.7. Inadequate configuration
Inadequate systems (Figure 4b)) are characterized by an increase in the post-disaster supply 
capacity of the system and a decreasing community demand. However, in difference to 
the inefficient configuration, the post-disaster consumption is higher than the pre-disaster 
one. This indicates an inadequate or poor system design, a bad system service model, or a 
(damaged) distribution system with high losses prior to the disaster. In fact, such systems 
may have supply reserves at some components before a disaster, but at the same time 
(large) LoR in other parts of the system. After a disaster, the (often costly) supply reserves 
are activated and/or distributed to other points in the network with service deficit to limit 
the supply gap. A hypothetical example may be a city with a poor water distribution 
system: already before the disaster, a main pipe was damaged and a part of the city was 
disconnected from water delivery. After the disaster, it is decided to deliver water to this part 
using (costly) water tanker trucks requested from other cities in the region in order to not put 
additional strain on the community. The supply capacity of the system and the consumption 
raise, but at a high distribution cost. Another hypothetical example of such a scenario would 
be the use of emergency power supply generators to supply a residential neighborhood with a 
power service deficit, i.e. LoR, even before the earthquake. In such a case, due to extraordinary 
but costly post-disaster measures and the general decrease in demand, the post-disaster LoR 
may decrease compared to the pre-disaster one. 
Figure 5. a) Under-Designed configuration (from Didier et al., 2017d), 
b) subsequent configurations during different phases of the absorption 
and recovery process
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3.8. Under-Designed configuration
The under-designed configuration (Figure 5a)) is similar to the inadequate configuration. 
Before the disaster, a supply deficit is already observable in (some parts of) the CIS. Again, 
the service consumption increases after the disaster, despite a decrease in demand and, in 
this case, combined with a decrease of the supply capacity. This is again an indication of poor 
system design or inefficient and costly supply generation or distribution. This configuration was 
observed for the Nepalese electric power supply system after the 2015 Gorkha earthquake 
(Didier et al., 2017a). The transmission and large parts of the electric power generation system 
were damaged during the earthquake, inducing a decrease of the system supply capacity. The 
building stock was severely damaged and industries were shut down, leading to a decrease of 
the demand for electric power. Already before the earthquake, electric power was only available 
for a few hours a day in many parts of the country. After the earthquake, the operator decided 
to run fuel generation plants, which are usually shut down in normal condition due to high 
operation costs, and to run the remaining hydropower plants at the maximum possible capacity 
in order to limit the load shedding after the earthquake. In fact, this led to a welcome raise of 
the consumption of electric power after the disaster as well as a reduction of the LoR.
4. Conclusion
CIS-community systems have different resilience-related configurations, depending on the 
nature of the disaster and the post-disaster evolution of their system supply capacity, the 
community demand and the effective service consumption. Some configurations are more, 
others are less prone to a LoR. However, every configuration can lead to a good or a bad 
system performance in terms of the observed LoR. The potential magnitude of the LoR 
depends, additionally, on the pre-disaster supply reserve margins and on the system service 
model. The main challenge is to find a balance between reliable and redundant system 
design, the size of the supply reserve margins, and the system design and maintenance 
costs. An anti-fragile system configuration can be a resilience-based design target, since 
such systems resourcefully adapt to the new post-disaster conditions to minimize a LoR. 
In combination with the quantification of a potential LoR for different possible hazards, 
classification of the CIS resilience-related configuration is an important step in CIS-community 
system resilience assessment and a first step in a CIS resilience-based design process.
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Abstract
Societies can be represented as flows of goods and services between companies and 
households. Typical flows are transportation, power, communication, water, which are 
delivered by infrastructure systems. Whereas considerable amount of research exists on 
response and recovery of infrastructure systems, we are only at the very beginnings of 
studying their impact on societal entities i.e. firms, households, and economic systems. There 
is a need to better understand this type of impact.
Taking up the above challenge, in this paper we develop an agent based modeling 
system that mimics the behavior of companies and households, being able to transform a 
multitude of service inputs into a set of service outputs, while interacting with services that 
infrastructure systems are providing.
We designed and implemented a prototype environment, and ran a series of simulation 
experiments. The prototype represents a set of production nodes, each implementing a 
production function, and a set of demand nodes. Production nodes use a subset of 6 types 
of resources to produce another resource in accordance with their production function, while 
demand nodes only demand a subset of these resources from the network. The allocation 
of resources is based on combined cost of production and cost of transportation. We have 
developed a proof-of-concept network of agents based on 5 production nodes 
and 9 demand nodes, and ran a series of simulation experiments to investigate 
sensitivity of the network, which has proved feasibility of the concept.
Based upon the prototype, in the future, we will investigate the effects of 
changing the demand of the nodes dynamically. Moreover, we plan to explore 
the consequences of failing edges, i.e. edges that are disrupted and disappear 
from the network, or whose capacity decreases. Finally, we intend to look 
at multi-layer networks, and research how such networks may influence the 
systems’ performance.
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1. Introduction
As societies become more and more interconnected and dependent on different services 
and each other for their daily survival, it becomes crucial that their weaknesses are studied 
and understood in more depth, in order to prevent threats to these societies. Similarly, 
resilience of infrastructure and economic systems is becoming of immense importance 
to communities across the globe. More frequent and more impactful shocks to various 
systems are threatening societies and businesses (Boin & McConnell, 2007). These 
shocks materialize in numerous regions, both in rural, and in urban areas. Moreover, these 
shocks emerge on both macro and micro scales. Today, even small, micro shocks, due to 
multitude of interdependencies, can have catastrophic outcomes. This is especially true as 
disruptions are constantly becoming more and more random. Therefore, predicting these 
shocks, establishing their impact, and subsequently responding to them and preventing 
their consequences is becoming central to many societies’ existence. To achieve this, we 
need to be able to model interactions between physical, economic, and social systems to 
understand links between these systems, and to see how a shock emerging in one system 
can affect other systems.
Presently, there exist models that describe recovery and response to disruptions of 
infrastructure systems; however, these models do not incorporate impacts of these systems 
on societal entities such as households and businesses. Current models primarily focus on 
a single type of infrastructure system. For example, these models include power system 
simulation (Eusgeld & Nan, 2009), water supply system simulation (Liu, Liu, Zhao & Tang, 
2013), transportation systems (Tamvakis, Pavlos & Xenidis, 2012).
We believe that societies can be represented as a model of flows of goods and services 
between households, businesses and infrastructure systems. Developing such a model can 
enable us to better understand how infrastructure systems should be designed, and what are 
the consequences of their failures. Moreover, we can better prepare societies for failures of 
these systems, when we recognize what types of disruptions are especially dangerous, and 
what causes their occurrence in infrastructure systems. Finally, we can design mechanisms 
for societies, businesses and infrastructure systems to recover faster after any failures 
occur. (Vugrin, Warren, Ehlen & Camphouse, 2010) The development of a robust simulation 
©
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of modeling flows of goods and services in an economy will have a huge impact on 
understanding the resilience in the economy.
In this paper, we describe the agent based modeling system that we propose for  
the modeling of flows of goods and services between households and businesses in  
an economy.
2. Model framework and design
In this section, we present the framework used for modeling the flow of goods and 
services. Firstly, we describe the high level overview and the motivation of the framework. 
Subsequently, we describe the mechanics of each agent. Finally, we describe how agents 
interact with each other under this framework.
2.1. Conceptual framework
The flow of goods and services can be used to represent a society. Under such model, the 
agents exchange goods and services with each other, while producing particular resources 
and demanding resources from other agents to be able to perform their tasks. To produce 
raw resources these agents interact with infrastructure systems. The conceptual framework is 
shown on Figure 1.
The workings of individual infrastructure systems are widely researched and well understood. 
However, modeling how a set of businesses and households responds to infrastructure systems’ 
disruptions and how these businesses and households exchange goods and service is still 
an area that requires further research. Better understanding of the recovery and response to 
disruptions of these systems is needed. Therefore, we attempt to achieve this through the 
development of a model for the interaction of households and businesses among themselves, 
and with infrastructure systems through the exchange of flows of goods and services.
We look at how infrastructure systems might impact societal entities and economy. Flows 
of goods and services might be disturbed through disruptions in infrastructure systems such 
as breakages in transportation network or power distribution network. These failures can be 
represented as destruction of links between agents, or changes to the production process 
within the agents. Such failures might have profound effects on a society, which relies heavily 
on these systems to provide basic services to their communities.
2.2. Agent specification
A single agent represents a producing unit or a demand unit. Each agent represents a 
functionality of a production process. It abstracts a production process of a particular set of 
goods and services. These production processes can represent a company, a household, or at 
a larger granularity a set of households and businesses.
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Figure 1. Overview of the framework. Different agents exchange goods and 
services in a network while interacting with infrastructure systems. 
The infrastructure systems are represented by raw material providers and link 
to agents that introduce these resources.
Supplier
Raw
materials
provider
Raw
materials
provider
Raw
materials
provider
Producer
Consumer
Each producing unit agent mimics a behavior of companies and households, being able 
to transform a multitude of input resources into a set of output resources. Additionally, 
each agent can simply transport the resources further in the system without providing any 
operations on these resources. Moreover, the producing agents can introduce raw materials 
into the system with a given cost. This means that an agent can not only perform production 
in the form of transforming one set of resources into another set of resources, in what 
is called a production process, but they can also perform mining or introduction of new 
resources into the system. An outline of a producing agent is shown on Figure 2. 
The above model description is based on an input-output model, where the input-output 
matrix describes the inputs to the system, and the outputs of the system (Leontief, 1986). 
Here, the input-output matrix associated with each agent describes the production process, 
which takes place in this particular agent. These input-output matrices vary between the 
agents to represent different production processes depending on the agent. The input-output 
matrix can represent a production process of a company, a household, or a region or society.
Furthermore, the demand unit agents simulate external demands of the system. They only 
demand resources from the system. Consequently, these are treated as sinks of the system 
that define in aggregate what is the total need for production in the system, and what is 
the need at each particular node. These agents can represent the end consumers such as 
households in their consumer capacities, or external connections of the system with their 
demands or a loss of resources at each producing unit.
2.3. System-of-systems configuration
Finally, the agents are combined together to form a system-of-systems (Keating et al., 2003). 
These agents exchange goods and services with each other. This is achieved through combing 
the individual agents in a network of agents. In such network the links between agents, i.e. 
edges of the network simulate the transportation of resources between the agents.
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Each link in the network has a cost associated for a unit of each resource transported through 
this link. The cost is specified for each resource, which can be transported using that particular 
link, separately. Thus, we include links that can transport different types of resources at different 
costs between the same two agents. A sample of a whole network is shown on Figure 1. Arrows 
between the nodes represent the links on the figure. These links have a vector associated with 
each, specifying the cost of transportation of each production resource over this link.
Figure 2. Overview of the internal function of a producing agent. 
The agent takes inputs and transforms them according to a production process 
specified in the matrix. Subsequently the products are passed onwards 
to the following agents.
Transportation without production
Production process
0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.5
0.2 0 0.3 1 0 0.2
0.1 0.4 0.3 0.2 0 1
0.7 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.8 1
1 1 0.7 0.7 0 1
1 0 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.3
To allocate the distribution of goods and services in the network, we use the mechanism 
of minimizing of costs. The goods and services are allocated and consequently produced 
in such a way as to minimize the total cost incurred in the whole network. The costs are 
primarily incurred in the process of obtaining raw materials and in transportation, however 
this model also allows for money to be included as one of the resources transported between 
the agents. Thus, effectively including the monetary costs in individual production processes 
associated with producing unit agents too.
3. Model application
In this section we describe the application of the framework that we have designed, where 
we implement the framework with a particular network.
We have developed a network of 5 producing units and 9 demand units. These units produce 
and interchange 6 types of resources. The producing units produce resources. This production 
can happen either in the form of raw materials being created from nothing at the unit, 
thus mimicking the process of obtaining raw materials e.g. at mines, forests, farms etc. 
Alternatively, the production can be an effect of a production process. On the other hand, we 
have the demand units, which only demand resources from the network and cannot perform 
any production. The demand units represent the end-users of resources that the particular 
network produces. 
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These units are incorporated in a network. In such network, the production and demand 
units are represented as nodes, while the edges represent transportation links between the 
production and demand units. Each link represents a method of transportation between the 
two units that this link connects. The links can be limited in the types of resources that they 
transport. Moreover, each link has a cost associated with each resource transported through 
this link.The network we used is presented in Figure 3.
The cost in this section is understood as a generic unit used to measure the cost of 
transportation and obtaining original resources. This cost is used to identify the flow of goods 
and resources between the nodes. Therefore, the costs in the system are associated only with 
transportation links and with original creation of raw materials, whenever it is performed. The 
production processes do not generate any costs. However, they require other resources.
We perform a real-time monitoring of the system, and we visualize the results in real-time, so 
that we can perform assessment of how the flow of goods is changing when the properties of 
the system change. The sample of this monitoring system is shown on Figure 4.
Figure 3. A topology and outline of the network used in the application 
that developed. The network consists of 5 production units and 9 demand nodes. 
It contains edges with costs assigned to each edge.
Supplier/producer
Raw
materials
provider
Raw
materials
provider
Producer
Consumer
Iterating through the balancing algorithm is used to balance the network. The algorithm is 
iterated at least the number of twice the longest path through the graph times to ensure 
that the network is completely balanced. Subsequently, this method of balancing can be used 
iteratively itself too, after changes or modifications to the network occur such as changes 
in the costs of transportation or in the production processes, to simulate the disruption or 
recovery of the system, or to observe how the system performs as changes in demand occur.
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Figure 4. An example of real-time monitoring of the performance of 
the simulation system. We can see external inputs of each node shown 
for each resource on a bar graph.
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The simulation was developed in Python using igraph library to simulate the networks, and 
numpy to perform linear algebra operations. Furthermore, we used CanvasJS library to 
visualize the flows of goods and services at each node.
We have evaluated the speed of the network and for the network of 5 production units and  
9 demand units presented in this section run over 100 iterations the average time of 100 
runs is 12.3 seconds. The time varies with the number of iterations linearly, and with the 
number of units as shown on Figure 5. We believe this speed to be sufficiently fast for 
the simulation of infrastructure system interactions with the flow of goods and services 
simulation.
Figure 5. Time for the execution of the simulation varied with the size 
of the graph. This data was obtained for running the simulation with 10 iterations
for each graph size. We can see that the time varies linearly with the size of the graph
and that up to 100 nodes, the time is below 2s per iteration.
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The data and information, which the simulation system can produce is the external demand 
of each production unit, the external supply of each production unit, and the internal 
production of each production unit. The internal production means the production of resources 
that is consumed by the same node to produce other goods and services. Therefore, it 
is the production that happens within the same unit without any need for transportation 
whatsoever. The relationship between these three metrics is shown on Figure 6.
4. Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we have described a framework to model flow of goods and services between 
businesses, households, and infrastructures systems. To do this, we constructed agents using 
input-output model to represent production process of each individual processing unit. We 
joined these agents with the use of transportation links in a network to obtain a system-of-
systems simulation, where the flow of goods and services is simulated. 
The model developed can be used to better predict the behavior of systems following 
disruptions. Having developed the simulation framework, we can introduce disruptions and 
investigate how these disruptions propagate throughout the systems. Additionally, we can see 
whether the system can survive the disruptions, this is whether demands can still be fulfilled, 
and what is the cost of these disruptions. 
Moreover, the simulation presented could aid with devising the best ways to organize the flow 
of goods and services in a network of businesses and households. These could be achieved 
through arranging alternative topologies and properties of the network, and assessing which 
of these are less costly using the framework described in this paper. This is a unique solution 
and contribution that could help to better design supply chains and infrastructure systems in 
various geographical areas, but also in sociotechnical settings. 
Figure 6. Relationships between external supply, internal production and external 
supply values in a producing agent. External supply is what is input into an agent from 
the outside. External demand is the total that it outputs. Internal production 
is what is produced inside the agent.
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There exist works on modeling of individual infrastructure systems. Moreover, Rinaldi, 
Peerenboom & Kelly (2001) describe and discuss interdependencies of systems, and show 
how interdependencies can be thought of as flows. However, they stop short of developing 
the actual models of infrastructure systems impacting societal entities. Similarly, Furuta et al. 
(2016) present a framework for modeling a network of infrastructure systems in a system-
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of-systems model approach. Nevertheless, there is much less research available on how 
infrastructure systems impact businesses and households. These interdependencies between 
infrastructure systems and other societal units are understudied. In this paper, we provide a 
method for researching these interdependencies.
The use of input-output model in various settings is well documented in research, and has 
been described and applied to many fields. It has been applied to production of resources by 
geographical area in economies (Isard, 1951). Also, the input-output model has been utilized 
in supply chain management modeling (Wang, Sun, Tian & Yu 2011). Similarly, it has been 
applied to life-cycle assessment in wood production in a forestry setting, to describe model 
of what resources are needed to produce quantities of wood in particular types of forests 
(Heinimann, 2012). These papers describe input-output model in various settings from the 
economic perspective. However, the input-output model has never been applied to dynamic 
infrastructure systems modeling scenarios, what we achieve in this paper.
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Abstract
This paper introduces the concept of accounting for the net co-benefits (the resilience 
dividend) associated with community-level resilience planning. Two solutions to the same 
resilience issue may often have different associated co-benefits that accrue on a day-to-day 
basis even if a disruptive event has not yet occurred. Thus, assessing potential community 
resilience projects requires taking (positive or negative) co-benefits (i.e., the resilience 
dividend) into account. Without including positive (negative) co-benefits, the total value of 
a resilience project may be underestimated (overestimated). But to date, quantification of 
the net co-benefits of resilience planning is not often addressed in the literature, as it is 
not a straight-forward task. We overview a methodology developed using 
spatial computable general equilibrium (SCGE) models to quantify and 
assess the distributional effects of the resilience dividend arising from a 
proposed resilience plan. In turn, such assessments can be used in benefit-cost 
analyses (BCAs) and other economic project assessments when comparing 
among potential resilience projects. Economically, good decision-making 
requires prioritizing feasible projects with the greatest overall net-benefit 
to the community. We provide a way for co-benefits to be quantified and 
subsequently accounted for in formal assessment by communities choosing 
among resilience plans.
1. Introduction
The number of observed large-scale disruptive natural events is rising – by about five 
percent a year since 1960 (Schultz and Elliott 2013). Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2009) 
note that costs of natural disaster-related losses jumped from $93.3 billion in the 1960s 
to $ 778.3 billion in the 1990s. Strömberg (2007) notes that population growth (meaning 
more people encounter disasters) explains only about half of this increase. After all, there 
has also been a marked reduction in lives lost due to natural disasters.40 An important 
40 From 1900 to 2003, 62 million deaths resulted from natural disasters throughout the world. But 85 percent of those deaths 
occurred between 1900 and 1950 (Bandyk 2010).
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factor in the increased number of reported disasters is likely better reporting and more 
responsive aid organizations as well as changing climatic trends.
As weather-related covariate risks and the associated costs of losses increase in the future, 
households and businesses need resilient strategies and coping mechanisms that reduce 
the effects of such disasters, in terms of intensity and economic losses. Generally, as assets 
vulnerable to natural disasters increase in value, so do costs of protecting these assets 
and infrastructure through insurance and/or other means of planning. Thus, the concept of 
choosing resilience plans that encompass co-benefits to the community on a day-to-day 
basis in the absence of a disaster event has garnered increased interest recently (e.g., Rodin 
2014). Accounting for the net co-benefits (i.e., the “resilience dividend”) of a resilience project 
can often produce a convincing business case for undertaking the project. This is especially 
pertinent when the return on investment may be much lower if a disaster does not take 
place during the time frame of the analysis. Fung and Helgeson (2017) define the “resilience 
dividend as the net benefit (or cost) that accrues, from investments aimed at increasing 
resilience, in the absence of a disruptive incident over the planning horizon,” and provide a 
comprehensive overview of the resilience dividend as a useful metric for community resilience 
planning and reviews measurement and assessment efforts.
This paper provides an overview of the importance of accounting for the net co-benefits  
of resilience planning and explores a novel approach to quantifying the resilience dividend. 
The methodological approach introduced uses a spatial computable general equilibrium 
(SCGE) model of the community being assessed for resilience planning to identify co-benefits 
(co-costs).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides context by reviewing 
the literature and some approaches that strive to quantify the resilience dividend, which to 
date has been largely dealt with through qualitative case studies (Rodin 2014). The section 
highlights the importance of considering the economic flows from the resilience dividend in 
a dynamic, quantifiable manner. Section 3 provides an overview of CGE and SCGE modelling. 
Section 4 provides a detailed discussion of data required to use SCGE models with special 
focus on the characteristics of a CGE model designed to trace co-benefit-related flows and 
distributional effects. It discusses the complex nature of obtaining data for CGE models and 
the accompanying social accounting matrix (SAM). This section offers insight as to the ideal 
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data versus data that is sufficient in most cases. Section 5 takes the data discussion towards 
methodological implementation. Finally, Section 6 highlights next steps and future work to 
develop a full case study based on the SCGE net co-benefits methodology introduced in this 
paper.
2. Background and Motivation
2.1. The importance of considering resilience-related co-benefits
Economic valuation techniques, such as benefit-cost analyses (BCAs) for community resilience 
planning alternatives, are often not a straightforward process. In nearly all cases, measuring 
the economic impact associated with resilience planning requires a better understanding of 
the costs and indirect losses41 to maintain a full accounting of the major cost elements. On 
the loss side, an understanding of the cascading indirect losses is critical to true valuation 
of losses stemming from a natural disaster. Furthermore, quantifying and accounting for 
uncertainty in estimates related to these costs and losses is complicated due to the nature 
of disaster events and the uncertainty surrounding their occurrence and effects. Finally, 
measuring net co-benefits (i.e., the resilience dividend) is needed to articulate the business 
case for resilience planning. Often plans that could alleviate vulnerability to a large-scale 
disruptive event, but are not called into action due to the absence of the event (in a given 
time frame), are perceived as a poor investment. Consideration of co-benefits (co-costs) is 
generally good practice,42 as the impacts of these values can be pivotal in identification of 
the most effective and efficient resilience plan.
When quantification of co-benefits is possible, they should be folded into the net-present 
valuation (NPV) of resilience plans (see Gilbert et al. (2016) and Helgeson et al. (2017)). Yet, 
much like cascading indirect losses, there are likely cascading and wide-spread effects of 
identified co-benefits. Thus, the use of computable general equilibrium (CGE) models that 
employ actual economic data from a community to estimate how an economy might react 
to changes in policy, technology, or other resilience planning initiatives allow for a better 
understanding of distributive effects of net co-benefits. Specifically, spatial computable 
general equilibrium (SCGE) models can be employed to indicate the distinction of flows 
throughout different areas of a community, which may be more or less vulnerable to and 
affected by a disruptive event. CGE and SCGE models are overviewed in Section 3.
2.2. Defining and quantifying the resilience dividend – overview
To date, the literature is largely dominated by definitional discussions and qualitative 
assessments of co-benefits (co-costs) and the resilience dividend using case study 
examples (e.g., Rodin 2014). In a review of the literature, Fung and Helgeson (2017) found 
that co-benefits fall into three broad categories: 1. Objective-based, 2. Intent-based, and 
3. Externality-based.43 The objective-based definition of co-benefits fits well into the 
methodology overviewed in this paper. Objective-based definitions regard co-benefits 
as benefits to secondary objectives of a policy (ibid.). For instance, changed zoning in a 
community may have a primary objective of shifting commerce away from the flood zone, 
while secondary objectives may include stimulating economic growth in an area of town that 
becomes favorable for re-locating businesses.
As noted in Fung and Helgeson (2017), research on the co-benefits of climate change 
mitigation and adaptation is substantial, while co-benefits in the context of resilience 
planning is still relatively nascent.
41 To date, direct losses tend to be better documented.
42 See Gilbert et al. (2016) and Helgeson et al. (2017)
43 Externalities are defined by benefits (costs) that accrue to third parties. As such we treat them fundamentally different from values 
that are encompassed by the resilience dividend. For a discussion of externalities versus non-disaster related benefits (i.e., the 
resilience dividend), see Gilbert et al. (2016) and Helgeson et al. (2017).
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Much of the literature on co-benefits of resilience planning is centered upon the developing 
country context. Furthermore, there appears to be relatively few scholarly works that deal 
with quantification, opposed to qualitative assessment, of co-benefits. This is understandable, 
as much of the work that explicitly encourages quantification of co-benefits when possible is 
based upon ex ante analysis, such as BCA, to determine effective investment decisions across 
a suite of options. In an ex ante BCA it is naturally complicated to capture full valuation of 
co-benefits, which often are apparent only after a plan is put in place. In other words, some 
co-benefits of significant value may not be readily obvious during the planning phase without 
a larger scale model that can incorporate spatial and/or distributive effects. But quantifying 
the full co-benefits ex post is not a simple task – modeling the economy is complex, it is 
likely very unclear how the co-benefits flow through the economy, and since the decision was 
already made, stakeholders may be less inclined to spend money and other resources on 
studying the issue.
Figure 1. Conception of the resilience dividend as net co-benefits used in this paper 
and upon which the proposed methodology is based.
Community investment(s)
in increased resilience
1st Dividend of Resilience:
AVOIDED LOSSES
2nd Dividend of Resilience:
CO-BENEFITS
2nd primary objective
A series of World Bank reports have presented the resilience dividend as arising from a “Triple 
Dividend of Resilience” as largely relevant to disaster risk management (DRM) (e.g., Tanner et 
al. 2015, Tanner et al. 2016, Mechler et al. 2016). This triple bottom line consists of:  
1. avoided or reduced losses, in the event of a disruptive event occurring; 2. increased 
economic resilience from reduced disaster risk; and 3. co-benefits for development. Elements 
one and two make up the first dividend of resilience, while the third element makes up the 
second as shown in Figure 1. Though these three “dividend” sources do not map perfectly 
onto the developed country context, the prevailing message is that budgeting for contingent 
liabilities such as disaster risk, especially ex ante a disruptive event, is nearly impossible 
without accounting for the resilience dividend.
A recent RAND report (Bond et al. 2017) describes a Resilience Dividend Valuation Model 
(RDVM) and its application to six case studies in the developing country context. It should be 
kept in mind that Bond et al. (2017) define the resilience dividend as “the difference in net 
benefits from a project developed with a resilience lens versus one that is not.” This definition 
is much broader than the definition we use (Fung and Helgeson 2017), which is concerned 
with net benefits above and beyond benefits expected to accrue directly to the goal of 
resilience to a disruptive event.
The RDVM largely looks at the resilience dividend as the positive net benefits generated 
between a resilience project and a business as usual (BAU) counterfactual. The elements 
of the RDVM are largely based on typical meso- and macro-economic elements within 
a production-oriented framework: 1. Capital stocks/assets, 2. Production functions and 
allocation mechanisms (i.e., institutions), 3. Social welfare function, 4. Shocks and stressors 
(both ex ante and ex post), and 5. Project interventions (based on resilience).
Of the six case studies considered in the RAND Report, three are ex ante and three are ex 
post assessments. Three of these six case studies resulted in no quantifiable resilience 
dividend assessment (two ex post and one ex ante) and three result in a partial quantitative 
assessment of the resilience dividend (two ex ante and one ex post). In many cases the lack 
of a full quantitative resilience dividend analysis is discussed in the context of too little data 
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being available through pre-existing documentation and data.44 Another challenge discussed 
is that only one state of the world is observed—the counterfactual is unobservable—it is 
then difficult to rely on observations made with or without a resilience intervention (i.e., plan) 
in place (ex ante or ex post).
The systems model approach we propose for assessing the resilience dividend is typically 
based at the meso-level of a community’s economy and allows us to make assessments 
of the resilience dividend and the associated indirect flows throughout the economy. Many 
of the elements discussed in the RDVM in terms of a production-oriented framework are 
reflected in the SCGE model approach we describe in this paper. In our approach, we can 
theoretically obtain community-level data for any US-based community that may be engaged 
in resilience planning and assess ex ante potential resilience dividends as well as ex post 
performance. There are limitations inherent in this approach; this is especially the case for 
micro-level economic activity, at the household, opposed to community levels. This approach 
is a first step toward creating dynamic quantitative valuation of the resilience dividend and 
distributive effects.
3. Computable General Equilibrium Models – 
Introduction and Overview
3.1. CGE General Details and History
The characteristics of CGE models make them a reasonable choice for exploring the effect of 
large disruptive events on a community’s economic activity as well as effects of resilience 
planning. This section provides a general outline of CGE and SCGE models. Specific use of an 
SCGE model and the relative data requirements is discussed in Section 4 of this paper.
There are two major reasons for exploring the use of CGE models to quantify the resilience 
dividend. The first being that while qualitative results are useful, understanding the 
relative effects in magnitude of a shock and the associated resilience plan as well as the 
resilience dividend is important. The second being that solid micro-foundations enhance 
our understanding of resilience planning and how a resilience dividend affects consumers, 
producers, and government in an economy. Overall, the aim of the CGE model approach is 
to convert the abstract representation of the community’s economy into a realistic, solvable 
approximation to assess direct and indirect benefits of resilience planning. In turn, these 
assessments can help inform values used for co-benefits (co-costs) of resilience planning in 
(ex ante) BCA during planning phases.
Input-output (I-O) analysis (Leontief 1941) has been used for assessing the impact of 
a change in the demand conditions for a given sector of the economy.45 I-O models/
coefficients assume constant returns-to-scale for associated production functions and prices 
are also assumed to remain constant. Extension of the I-O model to a social accounting 
matrix (SAM) framework is performed by partitioning the accounts into endogenous and 
exogenous accounts. Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995) note that endogenous accounts are 
those for which changes in the level of expenditure directly follow any change in income, 
while exogenous accounts are those for which we assume that the expenditures are set 
independently of income.
The CGE model encompasses both the I-O and SAM frameworks; this occurs because 
demand and supply of commodities and factors are assumed to be dependent on prices. 
Figure 2 provides a schematic overview of the typical elements of a CGE model. A CGE model 
simulates the working of a market economy in which prices and quantities adjust to clear 
all markets. For example, households maximize their welfare, the government is assumed 
to have a balanced budget, and resources are limited and costly. Effectively, a CGE model 
44 This data was not necessarily collected initially for use with the RDVM in most cases (Bond et al. 2017).
45 See Section 4.7 for further discussion.
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specifi es expected behavior of optimizing consumers and producers, as well as including 
community government (e.g., taxes) as an agent to capture transactions in circular fl ow of 
income (Robinson et al. 1990).46
Figure 2. Schematic of main components in a CGE model. Note that ROW refers to 
the “Rest of the World”, that is the aggregation of all economic transactions between 
the selected region under consideration and those not within the selected region.
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3.2. Comparative-Static or Dynamic CGE Models?
Many CGE models are comparative-static; they are used to model the reactions of the 
economy at only one point in time. In such cases, the model is interpreted as demonstrating 
the reaction of the economy in a future period to one (or more) external shocks, policy 
changes, and/or resilience planning eff orts—in our application, the resilience dividend. 
That is, the results show the diff erence (usually reported in percent change form) between 
two alternative future states (with and without the resilience plan in place). The process 
of adjustment to the new equilibrium is not explicitly represented in such a model, as the 
temporal element of a CGE model is not well defi ned. But it is possible to distinguish between 
short-run and long-run equilibria (e.g., looking at whether capital stocks are allowed to adjust 
in a given run of the model).
By contrast, dynamic CGE models (e.g., Pereira and Shove 1988) explicitly trace each variable 
through time—oft en at annual intervals. These models are more (temporally) realistic 
than comparative-static models; however, the data requirements are greater and they are 
generally more challenging to construct and solve. Furthermore, in the case of resilience 
planning which already encompasses a great deal of uncertainty, they require that future 
estimations are made for all exogenous variables—not just those aff ected by the shock, 
46 The CGE model takes a Walrasian neoclassical general equilibrium approach—the main equations that need to maintain 
equilibrium are derived from constrained optimization of the neoclassical production and consumption functions. Producers operate 
at a level as to maximize profi ts (minimize costs). Production factors – labor, capital, and land – are paid in accordance with their 
respective marginal productivities. Consumers are assumed to be subject to budget constraints, but otherwise maximize their 
utility. At equilibrium, the model solution at equilibrium provides a set of prices to clear commodity and factor markets within the 
modelled community’s economy (see Bandara 1991).
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policy change, and/or resilience plan. Furthermore, consistency problems may arise because 
variables that change from one equilibrium period to the next may not be consistent with 
each other in the fixed period of change.
Thus, we propose using a comparative-static model set-up. In some cases, the data required 
for the CGE assessment of the resilience dividend (see Section 4) will be available in different 
years. Thus, creating a CGE model for a period before the resilience plan integration and 
another CGE model following the integration may be a realistic way to provide a dynamic 
understanding of the resilience dividend.47
3.3. Spatial CGE Models
SCGE models deal with distributive effects in a manner that makes a great deal of sense 
when dealing with resilience planning against large-scale shocks (e.g., natural disasters). To 
date, SCGE models have been used to assess economic impacts of infrastructure investments 
and policies, especially in the area of transportation (e.g., Ivanova et al. 2007 and Miyagi 
et al. 2006). Multi-regional input-output models are the closest relatives to SCGE models, 
but they are not able to fully capture price and quantity effects as they do not allow for 
substitution effects.
Thus, SCGE models are a natural fit for exploring the resilience dividend and the geographic 
distribution of the relative effects. In our discussion of data requirements and setting up the 
resilience dividend assessment we assume use of SCGE modelling.48 Section 4 describes 
the specific data required to create a SCGE model to quantify the resilience dividend and 
determine distributive effects.
4. Data Required
4.1. Social Accounting Matrix (SAM)
The primary goal of data collection is to develop the social accounting matrix (SAM). A SAM 
can generally be described as “an organized matrix representation of all transactions and 
transfers between different production activities, factors of production, and institutions … 
within the economy and with respect to the rest of the world” (Hirway et al. 2008). In short, it 
quantifies all cash flows between pertinent actors within an economy. The SAM serves as the 
core of the CGE analysis, as it defines the base relationships between sectors, households, 
labor markets, and other key actors in the economy that the CGE model uses to determine 
the impacts of policies and shocks. The World Bank (Round 2003) notes that there are three 
key features to a SAM: 1) they are square matrices, 2) they are comprehensive, including all 
economic activities of the system, and 3) they are flexible in how they may be disaggregated 
and what parts of the economic system are emphasized. The following sections provide 
available sources for acquiring the data needed to build a SAM based on the method for 
constructing a spatial SAM and CGE model developed in Cutler et al. (2017). The subsequent 
data sources are not the only ones available, but are more commonly used than others or are 
most capable of filling data needs. There is a comprehensive discussion of methods for SAMs 
and CGE models in Cutler et al. (2017). Example applications and case studies using CGE 
modeling can be found in Cutler et al. (2017) and Schwarm and Cutler (2003).
47 This solution implies a retroactive study opposed to a perspective study in which the outcomes of the economy after the resilience 
plan is enacted is completely unknown.
48 For more on SCGE, see Bröcker and Korzhenevych (2011).
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4.2. Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) data
4.2.1. Summary
The quarterly census of employment and wages (QCEW) is a Bureau of Labor and Statistics 
(BLS) program that reports the quarterly count of employment and wages for employers, 
broken down at the industry (defined by the North American Industry and Classification 
System (NAICS) code) level and geographically at the county, Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(MSA), state, and national levels. The QCEW covers roughly 95 % of all U.S. jobs (BLS 
Website). This data is an excellent source to determine wage payments, employment, and 
number of firms by industry.
4.2.2. Challenges
Because the data contains commercially identifiable information (CII) and, potentially, 
personally identifiable information (PII), firm-level QCEW data is not publicly available and 
must be requested through an appropriate state or federal government agency. This process 
can be time consuming and may require payment to cover the cost of labor. There are also 
restrictions on how it can be used and reported, namely steps must be taken to mask any CII 
or PII. This is typically done through ensuring a minimum number of firms in each industry and 
making sure that no single industry has a large percentage of its data coming from one firm, 
regardless of how many firms are in the industry.
While one of the best sources of data for building a SAM, there are other ways to obtain 
the same information, though the data will typically be pre-aggregated to address CII 
and PII concerns and thus, less refined. The advantage of obtaining firm-level data is that 
a researcher can customize how the data is aggregated. In particular, the data can be 
aggregated with respect to sectors defined by the researcher, potentially breaking these out 
spatially using the establishment address. See Section 5.1 for more details.
4.3. LEHD Origin-Destination Employment Statistics (LODES) data
The Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) Origin-Destination Employment 
Statistics (LODES) data collected by the Center for Economic Studies at the US Census Bureau 
details employers, their employees, and the flow of jobs over time and space. This data allows 
for the mapping of labor flows between regions within and beyond the scope of a given CGE 
model. This data can be especially useful in modeling the commuting patterns of employees in 
and out of town as well as movement between a city’s districts. The value of this data is in its 
ability to specify the transportation needs of the community under analysis and evaluate how 
that community would be impacted by various disaster scenarios or other shocks. For instance, 
the severity (measured in economic damages) of a hazard event that results in a bridge closure 
is likely to be informed by the extent to which the local community relies on that piece of 
infrastructure to commute to work or flee the ill-effects of the hazard in question.
4.4. Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) data
4.4.1. Summary
Public use microdata sample (PUMS) data is collected by the U.S. Census Bureau and reported 
at various intervals. The dataset relies on the use of American Community Survey (ACS) data. 
Unlike the decennial census, ACS surveys are yearly and not nationwide. Roughly one in thirty-
eight households are invited to take the survey every year (U.S. Census Bureau 2017). The 
data collected in the ACS is very similar to the data collected during the decennial census. The 
household income distribution can be obtained from this dataset at varying geographic levels 
ranging from as large as the United States, down to ZIP code tabulated areas. The primary data 
set of interest from the PUMS data is the employment by sector and the aggregated wage 
payments by sector. These allow the SAM to differentiate between different labor groups.
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4.4.2. Challenges
Access to individual level data is not available without the permission of the U.S. Census 
Bureau due to the large amount of PII and its access and use is subject to severe restrictions. 
At present, getting access to Census data requires showing that the use of the data would 
benefit the U.S. Census Bureau in some way. This is not necessarily easy to prove and, even 
if access is given, may take a significant amount of time to obtain. If obtained, restrictions 
on use, where and how the data can be accessed, and how data can be reported add 
further barriers to use. The publicly available data through the ACS website comes with no 
restrictions, but is pre-aggregated in a way that may not match one-to-one with the way 
industries are defined in other datasets. This issue may or may not be important depending 
on how industries are aggregated in the SAM, but nevertheless it is the most readily available 
data. The use of microsample data means the given value is extrapolated from the subset 
of U.S. homes that took part in the survey. If the desired year happens to coincide with a 
decennial census, then the use of decennial census data is possible.
4.5. County and City Assessor data
4.5.1. Summary
The development of a CGE model involves the construction of an accurate snapshot of a 
specific economy at a given point in time so that the resulting model may be calibrated 
to represent the community under investigation. One key component of the CGE model is 
the accurate representation of the value of land and capital within the regional economy. 
Estimates of household expenditures on various classes of housing services for disaggregated 
groups of households is also a key attribute of the regional economy that must be modeled 
with the greatest level of fidelity possible. City and County Assessors offices collect, maintain, 
and make available to the public this information on the building stock within their respective 
political boundaries.
4.5.2. Challenges
The challenges inherent in working with public data are generally present when working with 
property tax assessment data. While very accessible, property tax assessment data is freely 
available for many communities, usually through the county assessor’s office, it can and often 
does entail typographical errors that complicate the matching of the built environment to 
the businesses and residences therein. Missing data can be a problem for some variables 
reported in the property tax assessment data. There is considerable variance in the degree of 
detail and historical support of reported data across communities. Data may be reported in a 
manner that is not consistent across all years of interest to a given project. The classification 
and categorization of the built environment may change over time as data systems are 
improved and expanded.
4.6. City Budgets and the Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR)
4.6.1. Summary 
Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFR) are documents containing details of 
the financial state of a given governmental entity such as a state or municipality. These 
documents are useful resources for the determination of local government tax revenue, 
expenditures, and employment. The CAFR provides the information necessary to decompose 
employment and expenditures into constituent government “industries”; education, public 
health, public safety, park and recreation, and others. This information is critical to efforts 
to properly size and disaggregate the government sector within the CGE model. CAFRs tend 
to be different across communities; one constant tends to be that the CAFR provides an 
excellent source of tax revenue and expenditures. The CAFR can also be a reliable source of 
data on the expenditure of federal funds in the local economy. Within some CAFRs, there is 
a Schedule of Expenditure of Federal Awards which lists information for each federal grant 
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awarded to the city (or other government entity) organized by the granting agency and 
program title.49 This is a useful source of information for corroborating the timing of federal 
assistance programs that target disaster response among other pressing community needs. 
While the data in the CAFR on federal assistance may not be sufficiently disaggregated 
to model at the establishment or industry level, it is useful for ensuring the magnitude of 
relevant programs.
4.6.2. Challenges
The CAFRs are data-rich documents, but they generally contain information that must be 
reformatted or reorganized if it is to be of further use to the CGE modeler. While there are 
standards of presentation and content associated with the CAFRs, the exact format of the 
reports can differ over time, complicating long-term trend analysis.50 It is possible that the 
CAFR for any single year may include federal grants that are only present in that year. Care 
should be taken to avoid treating grant awards as recurring components of local government 
finance within the CGE model.
4.7. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data
4.7.1. Summary
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data is vital in building the SAM. The BEA data set 
provides the necessary tables to determine I-O coefficients and the values required to 
develop the relationship between investment and the stock of capital. The I-O data is 
generally taken at the national level and, in its raw form, gives the raw dollar amounts of 
input from each industry and the total output from each industry. These values can be used 
to determine I-O coefficients, which represent how much input each industry requires from 
every other industry in order to produce a dollar’s worth of output. I-O coefficients define the 
flow of money between industries, and thus the linkages between industries necessary for the 
CGE model to determine how impacts on one industry flow to another.
The data for the investment capital linkage (CAPCOM) matrix comes from the BEA “Capital 
Flow” data. This data tracks the investment in new structures, equipment, and software 
by using industries. In essence, it measures how many commodities a specific industry 
purchases for investment from another industry. Like the I-O data, the CAPCOM tracks the 
interdependencies between industries; however, it focuses on new investments instead of 
required input. The raw data is taken from the I-O commodity categories (as opposed to the 
National Income and Product Account categories), which are in terms of producers’ prices.
Other useful data from the BEA includes the BEA employment estimates and the BEA income 
estimate, which are available at varying geographical levels. While other datasets offer data 
on these values that are better suited for use in the SAM, the BEA estimates provide a useful 
check for their totals.
4.7.2. Challenges
As the BEA data is derived from multiple sources using CII, including the U.S. Census Bureau, 
all publicly available data is pre-aggregated, meaning industry classifications may not match 
one-to-one between other data sets. The more detailed underlying data is subject to the 
similar requirements for access, and restrictions on use, as mentioned for the ACS data.
49 A CAFR may not include a Schedule of Expenditure of Federal Awards if the total amount of federal awards expenditures by a 
non-federal entity is less than $750 000 dollars in the reporting year. Title 2 U. S. Code of Federal Regulations Part 200, Uniform 
administrative requirements, cost principles, and audit requirements for Federal awards provides the guidance on whether or not a 
CAFR must contain an audit of the expenditure of federal grant awards.
50 Accounting and financial reporting standards for state and local governments are codified by the Government Accounting Standards 
Board (GASB).
201 |
4.8. Informal data from community leadership and agencies
4.8.1. Summary
Depending on the exact research question and scope of the resilience dividend, the 
community being studied itself may prove to be an invaluable source of information. In the 
context of resilience, local officials can offer a unique and comprehensive perspective on the 
impact of a natural disaster on the community. Conversations with the City Manager’s Office, 
Emergency Management, and (public or private) Economic Development teams can reveal 
priorities with respect to both the immediate response to a disruptive event type faced by 
the community, as well as short- and long-term recovery efforts and community goals. For 
instance, while a researcher may be aware that a community is investing in flood resilience, it 
is not obvious to an outsider where and how a community is investing its resources. Moreover, 
community officials can help a researcher compile a more complete picture of funding 
sources, both private and public.
Conversations with community officials can also provide perspective on local economic trends 
and goals, both irrespective of the potential disaster and specific to the disaster occurrence. 
While official data may suggest that manufacturing is an important sector to a community, 
the community itself may emphasize information technology as a growing sector being 
targeted with economic incentives such as tax breaks. Moreover, the community can provide 
insight into regional trends. For instance, business improvement districts may be integral to 
long-term community resilience. Certain neighborhoods may be of particular interest to a 
community (e.g., revitalization of downtown commerce). Such trends may inform the modeling 
step, in terms of how a researcher defines the productive sectors—especially spatially—and 
consequently the aggregation of official data for constructing the SAM.
4.8.2. Challenges
While the information gathered from conversations with community officials comes from 
authoritative sources, the “data” collected is informal. Incorporating the array of information 
into constructing a CGE model is less about collecting input data and more about guiding 
research direction. The biggest challenge arises from knowing what to ask. As an outsider, 
a researcher may have preconceived notions of what issues matters most, and community 
officials may be more than happy to answer questions about such issues. It is important to 
remember that what matters most to a community may differ from what a researcher thinks 
matters most. Gaining an understanding for a community’s priorities can provide the proper 
context for analyzing a community with a CGE model. Moreover, it is important to keep in 
mind that not all communities may be organized enough to provide the necessary data, 
and some may be reluctant to the idea of providing the information. Even when community 
officials are willing to share information, they may be constrained by regulations, budget, or 
time.
4.9. Third Party data
4.9.1. Summary
If other data sources are not viable for use in the SAM, third party data may also be used. 
Third party datasets typically will provide the requested data aggregated as requested for 
a fee. Impact Analysis for Planning (IMPLAN) data (IMPLAN Group LLC) is a commonly used 
third party dataset derived for economic analysis. Their data includes premade SAMs at 
the national, state, and county level that can be augmented by the user with different data 
or relationships (RESI 2006). Other datasets are available, for example Thomson Reuters 
(Thomson Reuters 2015) and FactSet (FactSet 2017).
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4.9.2. Challenges
Due to the proprietary nature of third party datasets, it is impossible to know all of the 
details of how the data were developed. While companies do describe processes and 
underlying sources, they invariably do not include everything in order to preserve any business 
advantages they might possess. The data also must be purchased and the fees may be 
prohibitive depending on the nature of the analysis and the party or parties required to 
purchase it. Care also must be taken to ensure that the data available from the third party is 
the actual data required.
4.10. Geographic Data
4.10.1. Summary
Economies have long been modeled as systems disembodied from their physical 
components. The increased adoption of geographic information systems (GIS) by firms and 
government entities allows for the spatial disaggregation of economic data with location 
records. Geographic data enables the introduction of explicit spatial considerations into the 
CGE model, which brings it towards an SCGE model. It is reasonable to assume that similar 
shocks may propagate through an economy in patterns that are informed by the topology of 
the built environment and regional geography. In many cases, data used for the CGE model 
includes spatial identifiers such as street address. GIS tools such as geocoders that produce 
longitude and latitude coordinates when fed address information, allow for the geolocation 
of individual business establishments and residences. In addition to matching firms and 
parcels, geocoding is instrumental to the process of defining the districts into which the 
local economy is divided. Once the geographic coordinates of each parcel are obtained, the 
parcels can be plotted and sorted into their districts using ArcGIS software. The importance 
of spatial linkages to overall impacts from a hazard may differ with the economy and hazard 
in question. There is a fundamental tradeoff between increased spatial disaggregation using 
GIS data and reduced complexity within the SAM. Establishing a distinct district for each 
establishment or residence would intractably complicate the SAM. Neglecting to incorporate 
any spatial information into the SAM may aggregate contravening trends, delivering results 
that mask important underlying trends in economic growth and hazard recovery.
4.10.2. Challenges
The fundamental challenge of working with GIS data is rooted in its variable quality and 
availability. GIS data may be missing for some public records and can be difficult to extract 
from data with messy variable coding. Improperly assigning establishments to the wrong 
district, as a result of bad address data, could impact the validity of a spatial CGE model. 
Different geocoding tools can produce geographic coordinates for the same record that 
disagree by small or large distances. The judgement calls that must be made to render this 
GIS data usable may ultimately be unjustifiable. Furthermore, GIS data can be inherently 
identifying when merged with other sources of data. Care must be taken when working with 
GIS data to avoid the unintended disclosure of CII and PII.
5. Methodology
5.1. Combining the Data
Combining the data from Section 4 into the SAM offers several benefits. First, in many cases 
it is often necessary. No single data set from Section 4 contains all of the required data 
for the SAM, with the possible exception of that provided by a third party vendor. Second, 
all of the data can be verified by the model builder. Moreover, each dataset can be verified 
independently by the model builder and better tailored to particular assumptions. Using third 
party data limits how much verification and customization is available for the analysis. Most 
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third-party datasets are heavily vetted; however, it can be beneficial to be able to check the 
underlying data. Third, working with the data directly can allow further insights outside the 
original scope of the model. Trends may appear in one dataset that wouldn’t be visible in 
working with only the final SAM.
While there are benefits to using multiple sources of data, the use of the varied sources in 
Section 4 can create challenges when folding them into the final SAM. One example of this 
complication is attempting to derive the I-O and CAPCOM data at the PUMS sector level 
using the PUMS defined industry codes. The BEA and PUMS data sets are both based on 
NAICS codes; however, they aggregate those NAICS codes into larger industry categories 
that do not match one-to-one with each other. If the industries are broadly defined then this 
is not necessarily an issue. For instance, if manufacturing industry data is provided without 
disaggregation, then the industry codes from the PUMS data and BEA data, while different, 
still fall entirely within the larger aggregated manufacturing sector. If manufacturing industry 
data is disaggregated, then there is no guarantee that the each PUMS industry code will 
have a corresponding BEA code, or codes, that match in terms of NAICS codes covered. In 
such cases a fuzzy match is required which will possibly lead to a NAICS code from a sector 
not in a specific PUMS industry code being in the IO table for that PUMS industry code due to 
the inconsistency. The alternative version where a PUMS industry code loses a corresponding 
NAICS code is also possible.
Another challenge comes from datasets not necessarily covering the same geographical 
area. For instance, the smallest division of the county assessor may be at the city level, while 
the smallest division in the PUMS data may be at the MSA level. In such cases, it may be 
necessary to scale numbers up or down based on some distribution of relevant data, to get 
geographic areas to match up. An example of this would be scaling down MSA level data 
for industry specific employment by labor group down to the city level based on the known 
distribution of industry employment in the city.
Using different data sets means the totals for some values obtained for the same geographic 
area, such as total employment, should be the same (if all data were perfect), but end up 
being different between data sets. Such differences are to be expected between data sets, 
as differences in what is or is not included and methods may end up resulting in different 
estimates. Still, the CGE requires consistency between key values in order to balance the SAM 
and run analysis. Similar to the situation of differing geographic areas, scaling numbers up 
or down to match may be required. However, these differences between data sources under 
such circumstances should be relatively close. Otherwise, there may be an unaddressed issue 
with the data.
Spatializing the SAM adds further complications. One issue that arises is the need to match 
industry level data to the spatialized components. This process is meant to allot the capital 
land value from the county property tax assessment data and the QCEW employment and 
wages to the appropriate industry sector. Matching on addresses is known to be a non-
trivial task, as abbreviations, misspellings, date entry errors, and other consistency problems 
make getting the desired match difficult. Address standardization and fuzzy matching can 
alleviate this, but typically does not fully address the issue. The other complication with 
using the QCEW data in this context is that there are requirements on making sure all data is 
aggregated to the point that CII becomes masked. This is typically achieved by ensuring every 
industry has a minimum number of firms included to make it impossible to trace back the 
information to a specific firm. This means that industry sectors may need to be aggregated 
into larger sectors if they contain too few firms.
Spatialization also complicates the entry of sector related data into the SAM. Ordinarily, 
industries are assumed to be in the area of study and that is all. Spatialization divides 
industries into sub-regions of the study area. This means labor, households, capital value, 
and the I-O and CAPCOM tables need to reflect this division. For the I-O table, it can be done 
fairly simply if one assumes that the firms in any sub-region are essentially the same as 
the firms in the larger area. Under this assumption, all I-O coefficients are identical to the 
non-spatialized I-O table for every industry. Otherwise, effort must be put into understanding 
how firms differ in terms of inputs and outputs in each sub-region. The spatialized CAPCOM 
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can be obtained by determining a distribution of investments based on available data, for 
instance, the distribution of workers, firms, or wages for all sub-regions, and distributing them 
accordingly.
5.2. CGE Coverage of the Resilience Dividend
The ultimate goal of the proposed SCGE modeling method is to quantify the resilience 
dividend. Therefore, it is important to understand what the SCGE model can and cannot 
quantify. A CGE model provides distributional impacts of shocks, policy changes, and the 
current status of the region. Distributional impacts allow the analyst to understand not only 
the overarching net impacts, but to whom and where those impacts fall and are distributed. 
Large economic effects will be easily discerned and the impacts can be selected to see how 
different scenarios may have played out in the region. Any effects of resilience actions that 
have co-benefits can be modeled to identify how those co-benefits manifest themselves 
throughout the economy and where they go. Thus, the resilience dividend can be quantified 
as a grand total, as well as determining who gets these benefits and where they go spatially. 
SCGE models may not capture the entirety of the resilience dividend in many cases. Non-
market benefits that never actually materialize as real cash flows are not necessarily 
captured. Minor impacts may also be lost as the overall economic conditions may overwhelm 
them.
5.3. Additional Considerations
There are additional considerations that are important when using a SCGE model to quantify 
the resilience dividend. There are limitations to the CGE approach and full assessment of the 
resilience dividend may be best achieved using CGE methods in tandem with other economic 
methods.
5.3.1. The use of two CGE models
One critique of CGE models is that they are unable to fully capture the dynamics of an 
economy’s response to a shock. Whether a community responds in acute fashion or slowly 
over a longer time period can have a considerable influence on the impacts of a given 
shock. The speed and persistence of a shock may be more informative than its magnitude. 
An advantage of having cross-sectional and panel data for a community is that response 
trajectories generated without full time specification can be calibrated using trends observed 
in the temporal data. The speed of recovery is of interest to communities considering their 
various options. The use of multiple CGE models may facilitate the corroboration of findings 
across approaches. Furthermore, if static CGE models are built using different baseline years 
that coincide with periods before and after a hazard event of interest, it is possible to see how 
the economy’s response to an unrelated shock has changed over time. Of course, care must 
be taken to avoid the Post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy if one is to employ two CGE models 
timed to before and after a hazard event. It is quite possible that other important structural 
changes are occurring simultaneously with the hazard.
5.3.2. Net Present Value, The EDGeS Tool, and CGE
As the CGE methodology uses I-O data there is some debate as to how time plays in CGE 
models. I-O tables generally represent a snapshot in time. However, CGE models use them 
to obtain the equilibrium following shocks to a system. How long it takes to reach that 
equilibrium after a shock is not a simple question to answer. In that regard, the time varying 
nature of the transition period from base state to post-shock state is currently difficult to 
model.
On the other hand, if one views the post-resilience action equilibrium as the base state for 
one case and the pre-resilience equilibrium as the base state for another case, it is possible 
to use the Economic Decision Guide (EDG) (Gilbert et al. 2016) methodology to examine 
these options based on Net Present Value (NPV). If a shock representing a disaster of an 
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assumed magnitude is applied to both cases, the on-event indirect losses required using the 
EDG methodology can be obtained. Direct losses, such as structural losses, and response 
and recovery losses, such as temporary shelters, would need to be added in separately. The 
non-event related benefits can be estimated by examining the two cases’ base states, with 
non-market benefits and externalities added separately from the CGE analysis, assuming 
these are not impacted by disaster related shock. The costs for each case should be known, 
thus all inputs required for the Economic Decision Guide Software (EDGeS) Tool (Helgeson et 
al. 2017) should be available.
6. Next Steps
The next step in this process is to complete an SCGE model based upon a community that 
has made changes based on resilience planning against a natural hazard event. A flooding 
event was chosen for the initial case study. Flood situations cannot be entirely prevented, 
but steps can generally be taken to prevent and minimize loss of property, interruption of 
business, and loss of life. Furthermore, floods are a leading cause of death from natural 
disasters in the United States. Flood-related fatalities are reported around 200 per year with 
about half caused directly by individuals attempting to drive through flood waters (Ashley and 
Ashley 2008).
Given the uncertain nature of most hazard events, in terms of timing, magnitude and 
path, we find flooding to be one disturbance event that may be more predictable than 
are other events, at least in terms of areas potentially affected (i.e., within a flood plain). 
Flood situations are variable and are often a by-product of other natural hazards, such as 
hurricanes. But there are instances when floods are standalone disturbance events (e.g., 
snowmelt, severe thunderstorms, prolonged rains) versus a bi-product or co-consequence of 
other disturbance events. In such cases of flood as a singular event, a geographic area in a 
given community may be affected more than other areas given soil, height above sea level, 
and flood protections. This is the case in general for Cedar Rapids, Iowa and the community’s 
flooding events (p.c. S. Fowler, 13 March 2017).
We are in the process of finalizing the construction of the SAM for Cedar Rapids, Iowa with 
consideration for Linn County, Iowa. To date, we have collected detailed data for each 
category noted in Section 4 of this paper. This community made a number of deliberate 
choices in terms of zoning, retrofit construction, and new construction in the period since the 
major flood event of September 2008. Tate et al. (2016) assess the government buy-out 
process undertaken in Cedar Rapids. There are a number of additional projects that have 
now had time to mature since 2008, such as the revitalization of the downtown district 
and development of the McGrath Amphitheater (p.c. H. Stiffler 27 June 2017) that can be 
assessed using SCGE modeling to understand the full resilience dividend and distributional 
effects throughout the Cedar Rapids economy.
In turn, these findings may be compared to estimates of ROI and the NPV metrics calculated 
for the projects at the initial time of development and when the choice was made for which 
projects to take-on and further develop.
We are aware that the SCGE process is data-driven and unique to each community and 
its associated economy, the disturbances faced and the resilience options available (e.g., 
subject to budget constraints, social factors, etc.). It is clear that the SCGE resilience dividend 
quantification methods discussed in this paper may be better suited for the developed 
country context because of the extensive data requirements. Yet, once the methodology is 
demonstrated in a case study, it may be possible to assess the level of specificity required in 
the data to obtain meaningful estimates of the resilience dividend.
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Abstract
This paper presents a new approach to predict the potential damage and physical impacts 
of an earthquake on the built environment. A new methodology to the urbanized systems 
and large-scale simulations within a seismic scenario is explored, by evaluating multipurpose 
codes for numerical simulation. A 3-D building shape of a standard virtual city is developed 
for evaluating the seismic effects at increasing intensities. Four different building sectors that 
provide essential functions to a community, including housing, education, business, and public 
services are considered. Once the buildings are integrated into the city, parallel simulations 
are applied to compute the system functionality following a disruptive scenario. Tri-linear 
elasto-plastic backbone curve representative of global shear behavior of each building is 
estimated considering the dominant modal shapes and building irregularities. Monte Carlo 
Simulations (MCS) are applied to take into account the epistemic uncertainties associated 
with geometry and mechanical properties within the range of observations. For each set of 
buildings’ data, the nonlinear dynamic analysis is performed through SAP2000 Application 
Programming Interface (API) in order to assess the dynamic response of the buildings in an 
organized and automatic fashion. Accordingly, the city is mapped into different 
zones representative to the possibility of having different levels of damage 
(complete, extensive, moderate, and slight). This methodology supports 
decision-makers to explore how their community will respond to a disruptive 
event, to develop different strategies for monitoring and control the emergency 
in urbanized areas, and to plan better resilience-building and evacuation 
strategies.
1. Introduction
According to the World Bank, disasters have killed 58,000 people on average each year and 
affected another 225 million people worldwide since 1990. The rising of global populations 
and the massive economic development in areas prone to disasters have increased the 
chance of catastrophic incidents, which leads to disruption of buildings and infrastructure. 
Over the years, community resilience has attracted tremendous attention due to the 
increasing number of natural and man-made disasters. The concept of resilience is multi-
dimensional, and therefore involves various subjects of different disciplines. In engineering, 
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disaster resilience, 
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resilience is the ability to “withstand stress, survive, adapt, and bounce back from a crisis 
or disaster and rapidly move on”. It can also be defined as “the ability of social units (e.g. 
organizations, communities) to mitigate hazards, contain the effects of disasters when they 
occur, and carry out recovery activities in ways to minimize social disruption and mitigate 
the effectors of further earthquakes”. The absence of a concise and methodical approach 
makes it extremely difficult to evaluate resilience. This paper focuses on the resilience-based 
design and assessment of the residential buildings in a virtual city. The objective is to predict, 
with the set of physical simulation models, the potential damage and physical impacts of 
an earthquake and other hazards (natural disasters and man-made attacks) on the built 
environment. A virtual city consisting of different buildings categories and infrastructure was 
designed. Four building sectors that provide essential functions to a community including 
housing (residential building, hotel, shelter), education (school, university, library), business 
(shopping centers, retail stores, heavy industries), and public services (hospital, police 
station, churches, airport etc.) are considered. Five critical infrastructure systems supporting 
a community’s indispensable demands, i.e., water and waste water distribution system, gas 
networks, power grids, transportation and communication networks were also designed. Once 
the infrastructure was integrated into the city, parallel simulations were applied in order to 
compute their functionality when exposed to a disruptive scenario.
Given the large number of buildings in a city, the seismic simulation of the buildings cannot 
be easily implemented without huge computational effort. Thus, several numerical models 
have been proposed to simulate the seismic damage to buildings in the recent years. 
Basically, the simulation models are classified into a data-driven method and a physics-
driven method. The first is based on statistical data obtained from previous earthquakes. The 
main limitation is due to the inadequacy and leakage of statistical data for any world areas. 
To overcome these intrinsic limitations, the physics-driven methods have been progressing in 
recent years. The building seismic damage is based on the structural analysis of an individual 
building subjected to a given seismic input. Given limited attribute data of each building 
and the large number of buildings in an urban area, the seismic response prediction model 
of buildings must be relatively simple to reduce the computational time requested by the 
analyses. 
In this paper, a simplified and efficient physical approach is presented. Nonlinear response 
of an Multi Degree Of Freedom (MDOF) model of each building is obtained considering the 
©
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dominant modal shapes and irregularities. A trilinear backbone curve is used to simulate the 
building’s seismic response. The elastic trend of this curve is assessed through a multi-modal 
approach. A nonlinear static procedure is carried out to evaluate the yield shear force, which 
is identified as the horizontal force causing the first plastic hinge in the weakest base column.
A collapse analysis is carried out for each building to assess the post-elastic building’s 
behaviour. Considering a global collapse mechanism, the over strength factor is identified 
according to the geometry of the structural elements composing the building.
Furthermore, the epistemic uncertainties associated with geometry and mechanical properties 
within the range of observations are taken into account by performing MCS. At each step of 
MCS a set of parameters are assigned to each building and the associated backbone curve 
is obtained through an algorithm developed in MATLAB (MATLAB, 2012) by using parallel 
computing features. The SAP2000 (Computers & Structures, Inc.) application programming 
interface (API) is used to import, change the building’s parameters at each step of the 
simulation, and perform nonlinear dynamic analysis with a given seismic input. 
The SAP2000 advanced numerical modules permit efficient pre- and post-analysis 
computations. In fact, the automated post-processing analysis allows us to extract all the 
response parameters needed to estimate the level of damage for each building. The Figure 1 
depicts the typical data flow using the SAP2000 API.
Figure 1. Data flow.
Data feed
Uncertainties Output
Building’s damageMean structure’sdesign data
Data feed
Monte Carlo
simulation
SAP2000 API
PRE-PROCESSING POST-PROCESSINGPROCESSING
2. Buildings Database
The virtual city has been designed based on the buildings stock for the city of Turin, Italy. The 
virtual city has the area of 120.1 km2 with the total population of 850,000. Four building 
sectors that provide essential functions to a community, including housing (residential 
building, hotel, shelter, etc.), education (school, university, library, etc.), business (shopping 
center, retail store, heavy industry, etc.), and public services (hospital, police station, church, 
airport, etc.) are considered. 
Table 1 lists in detail the building sectors supporting the physical, economical, and social 
dimensions of the virtual city. In total, the virtual city has 30,122 buildings.
The plan dimensions of each building have been gathered through CADMAPPER file for the 
entire city of Turin. In addition, the numbers of story have been obtained by the shape-file of 
“Carta Tecnica Comunale (CTC)” of the city of Turin, available at the website  
http://www.comune.torino.it/geoportale/. 
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The building inventory of the city is based on the building typology concept already used in 
many European countries at national and regional levels. However, the lack of information 
about some buildings makes it difficult to have perfect knowledge of any individual building. 
For this reason, some building’s attributes (e.g. year of construction, type of deck) have been 
assigned based on known data for the entire city. Six different categories of construction year 
have been utilized according to the main changing from standard Italian codes (Table 2).
Table 1. Number of buildings stock and map of the city.
Ph
ys
ic
al
 In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
Building
Residential 27 830
Mobile Home 62
Hospital 17
Fire Station 3
Police Station
Carabinieri 18
Polizia Municipale 11
Questura 31
Educational
Elementary School 157
Middle School 105
High School 97
University 70 
So
ci
al
 In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
Hotel 31
Historical Building 951
Castel and Palace 18
Church 176
Sport 265
Cinema 48
Museum 156
Theater 38
Library 15
Ec
on
om
ic
 
In
fr
as
t.
Industrial Build.
Light 321
Heavy 108
Commercial
Retail store 25
Malls 12
Table 2. Categories of year of construction.
I II III IV V VI
< 1916 1916-1937 1938-1974 1975-1996 1996-2008 > 2008
The numbers of buildings for each year of construction category have been assigned 
according to Cities on Power (CoP) European program research for the city of Turin (Fracastoro 
et al., 2013). Corrado et al. (2012) provided typical Italian building construction elements 
depending on the year of construction. Classification of building construction elements (e.g. 
deck,wall, etc.) plays a key role in the assessment of mass. Seven different typical deck 
and three typical external walls have been selected and distributed based on their year of 
construction (Figure 2).
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All the buildings have been divided into groups based on material: concrete, masonry, and 
steel. Considering limited information in the building attribute data, an accurate determination 
of the nonlinear structural parameters is rather challenging. The major objectives of this 
work are to provide a simplified and accurate method for assessing the dynamic response 
of residential buildings in a generic built environment. For this purpose, the geometric 
characteristics of the structural elements (e.g. columns and beam sizes) have been defined 
in order to respect all the technical standards for a given year of construction and for a given 
seismic hazard scenario (medium or high level).
Figure 2. Typical Italian building’s decks (a) and 
walls (b) used for residential occupancy in different years (Corrado et al., 2012).
Description Year
Vault ceiling with solid bricks < 1900
< 1900
< 1930
> 1930
> 1930
> 1976
1900 - 1930
1910 - 1940
Description Year
Solid brick masonry (25cm)
Hollow wall bricks brick 
masonry (30cm)
Hollow wall bricks brick masonry with
solid and hollow bricks (40cm)
1900 - 1950
Vault ceiling reinforced concrete
Vault ceiling with bricks
and steel beams
Vault ceiling with hollow bricks 
and steel beams
Ceiling with wood beams
and hollow bricks 
Ceiling with reinforced
bricks-concrete slab
Ceiling with reinforced
bricks-concrete slab, low insulation
(a)
(b)
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3. Nonlinear model 
A large component to an urban environment is residential buildings. When a catastrophic 
event such as an earthquake occurs in a built environment, the consequential structural 
damage may cause high losses (casualties, repair costs, and repair time). Thus, a concise and 
methodical approach is needed to estimate the fragility of the building framework. Nonlinear 
MDOF shear model is able to satisfactorily capture the nonlinear properties of multi-story 
buildings, predict the Engineering Demand Parameters (EDPs), and assess a reasonable level 
of damage (Lu et al. 2014; Xu et al. 2014). In the proposed approach, the inter-story behavior 
of a regular building is simulated through a trilinear backbone curve (Figure 3). Many studies 
claimed that the trilinear backbone curve model can accurately represent the building’s 
response in terms of inter-story (Vamvatsikos and Cornell 2005; Shi 2014). 
Figure 3. Trilinear backbone curve.
F
λ˙F
Fy
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(1)
(2) (3)
The first point of the trilinear backbone curve (1) indicates the yield point (λ˙Fy – u1) 
corresponding to the formation of the first plastic hinge in the weakest base column. After 
the yield point, the stiffness is significantly reduced until the next point (2), for which the 
maximum shear base capacity (λ˙Fy) is reached. The ultimate point (3) corresponds to 
the collapse of the building (complete damage). The evaluation of the shear base and top 
displacement parameters for each point is discussed in the following subsections. 
The three main points of the curve are evaluated using a nonlinear static approach for a 
MDOF system. To achieve this goal, a MATLAB algorithm has been developed considering the 
uncertainties on the geometric and mechanical parameters used in the analyses. Variation 
of the parameters within an acceptable range is considered through an MCS obtaining a set 
of trilinear backbone curves for each building. The ranges of the main building’s parameters 
are selected according to the knowledge level of the building. In addition, the deterioration 
of the mechanical properties (such as strength and elastic modulus of concrete) is taken into 
account through the aging equation proposed by Eurocode 2 (EC2, 2004) according to the 
year of construction. Once the Matlab algorithm evaluates the trilinear backbone curve at 
each step of MCS, the SAP2000 API is used to apply to all the buildings the data set obtained 
by the algorithm. This automated procedure is capable of reducing the computational time 
and analyze the dynamic responses dispersion caused by the data uncertainty. Therefore, 
the mean response and associated dispersion for each building within the virtual city can be 
estimated. This approach is suitable to allow a decision-maker the ability to explore how their 
community responds to a disruptive event and quantify the mean performance of buildings 
and their uncertainty in the dynamic response after a hazard. 
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Assimilating the dynamic nonlinear response of a structural system to a unique backbone 
curve leads to analyze the building as a nonlinear equivalent Single Degree Of Freedom 
(SDOF) model. Considering an SDOF system allows for a reduction in the computational effort 
needed to assess the response of a large number of structures. Finally, due to limited amount 
of detailed building information about its dynamic behavior, the hysteresis is considered 
according to the Takeda model (Takeda et al., 1970) implemented in SAP2000.
3.1. Elastic parameters 
Generally, the geometry of a residential building is mostly regular in plan and elevation, 
therefore the mass and stiffness can be assumed to be mostly uniformly distributed. In these 
cases, the evaluation of the response of MDOF system with a nonlinear static procedure is 
close to the real response of the structure. 
Thus, a nonlinear static analysis is performed to assess the base shear and top displacement 
values corresponding to the formation of the first plastic hinge at the base level (yield point). 
In order to consider all Degrees Of Freedom (DOFs), the stiffness matrix of the structure is 
evaluated considering the building as a bending type system. Since the load patterns are 
applied on two main directions of the buildings, the modal characteristics are derived by 
considering the stiffness matrix in the two directions for a 2D system. Thereafter, the static 
condensation procedures are performed to reduce the number of DOFs to the translational 
DOFs. Moreover, the model assumes that the mass of each story is concentrated in the center 
of the mass on its elevation and represented by a mass point (Figure 4). 
Figure 4. Concept of nonlinear MDOF system.
Equations (1) and (2) summarizes the global stiffness and mass matrices of a MDOF model, 
respectively. 
 (1)
 (2)
where dof represents the total number of DOFs. 
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The yielding base shear force is assessed by applying a monotonic load pattern on the 
building proportional to a given modal shape. A multi-modal approach is carried out to 
consider all the modal shape contributions, especially for buildings that have geometric 
irregularities (Equation (3)). 
 (3)
where Φτοτ is the modal shape considering all modal contributions (Φi). The modal 
participation factors are represented by the term gi.
3.2. Post-elastic parameters
Once the structure reaches the yield point, the stiffness is significantly reduced until point 
(2) for which the maximum shear base capacity is reached. Thus the top shear base remains 
constant and the top displacement increases (perfectly plastic behavior) until the ultimate 
value. The maximum shear base capacity is estimated through the kinematic approach of 
the limit analysis (Greenberg-Prager theorem). The general global collapse mechanism of a 
frame subjected to a distribution of horizontal forces (proportional to a given modal shape) is 
considered (Figure 5).
Figure 5. Global collapse mechanism.
{Fi} = λ˙[K]˙ {φtot} Z
φ
φ
This approach leads to take into account the strength contribution of all the structural 
elements (beams and columns). According to the kinematic theorem of the limit analysis, the 
global over-strength factor (λ) is assessed by the ratio between the internal and external work 
of the structural system with equal columns and beams dimensions (Equation (4)).
 (4)
where My,c and My.b are the yielding bending moment for the columns and beams, 
respectively. The parameters nc represents the number of columns, nspan indicates the 
number of spans in the considered direction, and dof is the number of master DOFs 
which corresponds to the story number of the building. The external work is given by the 
denominator expression and it is due to the horizontal load patterns {Fi} multiplied by the 
distance between the considered story and the base at each elevation level {zi}.
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One of the limitations of this procedure consists of the load pattern’s shape. In fact, the 
monotonic horizontal force distribution does not change its shape due to the progressive 
formation of the plastic hinges in the columns (non-adaptive approach). In addition, a 
global mechanism has been considered as representative of the collapse mechanism. This 
hypothesis is reasonable for regular buildings designed according to the seismic standard 
codes. When a building is not well designed or seismically retrofitted (such as an old building), 
the collapse can be caused by a local mechanism for which the over-strength factor assumes 
lower values. In these cases, the possible local mechanisms have to be identified and the 
over-strength factor will be assumed as the minimum values among all the defined factors.
Once the shear base capacity is determined, the top displacements corresponding to points 
(2) and (3) of the trilinear backbone curve (u2 and u3 in Figure 3) have to be assessed. Since 
the shear base capacity is previously evaluated, the definition of reduction factor (Rµ) can 
be used to calculate the displacement u2. The reduction factor accounts for ductility, over-
strength, redundancy, and damping of a structural system (Equation (5)).
 (5)
where λ·Fy is the maximum shear capacity and FEL represents the equivalent elastic shear 
force. As mentioned previously, the reduction factors depend on ductility (µ), over-strength (λ), 
damping (ξ) and elastic building characteristics (such as period, T). Several mathematical 
formulations have been proposed for evaluating the reduction factor. One of the most used 
expressions is based on the equal energy rule (short period systems, T<0.5 s) or equal 
displacement rule (long period systems, T>0.5 s) (Equation (6)).
 (6)
The ductility parameters are expressed as a ratio between the ultimate displacement and 
the displacement for which the maximum shear capacity occurs. According to the proposed 
trilinear backbone curve, the ductility is given by the ratio between displacements u2 and u3. 
Furthermore, the ultimate top displacement is evaluated based on the equal energy theorem 
(Figure 6). 
Figure 6. Equivalent elastic energy (EEL) and elasto-plastic energy (FPL) of the system.
F
λ˙Fy
FEL
EEL
EPL
Fy
u1 u2 u3 u
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According to the Figure 6, the energy balance between the equivalent elastic energy (EEL) 
and elasto-plastic energy (EPL) is reported in Equation (7).
 (7)
In the proposed approach, the two unknown displacement values are evaluated through 
an iterative procedure. The reduction factor value is fixed and then the displacement u2 is 
assessed (Equation (8)). 
 (8)
where k is the stiffness of the system. According to Equation (7), the ultimate top 
displacement u3 is evaluated and then the reduction factor is calculated by using 
Equation (6). This iterative procedure continues until the corresponding calculated reduction 
factor converges for given initial approximation (Figure 7).
Figure 7. Iterative procedure to evaluate the reduction factor.
Fix reduction factor
FALSE
TRUE
END
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Rμ, xed
Rμ, xed ˙ λ ˙ Fy
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(Rμ, xed –1)
2
u3 = (u2 = u1)  + u2 
Rμ,cal  = 2˙μ – 1  (T <0.5s)
Rμ,cal  = μ –(T <0.5s) {
Rμ, xed  = Rμ,cal
4. Analysis implementation and simulation
The proposed approach is capable of applying nonlinear time history analyses to a large 
number of buildings. The dynamic response of the structural system in a built environment 
takes into account a considerable amount of parameters. The building inventory, containing 
all the information (such as material, geometry and mechanical properties) has been 
developed and allocated on an external server. All this data are accessible by a MATLAB code 
organized in several functions that manage the seismic input definition, MCS for evaluation 
of the nonlinear parameters, and SAP2000 API actions. Due to the large number of variables 
and the time requested for processing, parallel algorithms running on multiple processors are 
developed with MATLAB. The global behavior of each building has been modeled by using 
multi-linear plastic link element available in SAP2000. The mechanical characteristics have 
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been defined automatically according to the obtained backbone curves from MCS. Figure 9 
depicts the schematic model used for simulating the global shear capacity of each building. 
The equivalent damping coefficient has been assessed according to the Rayleigh formulation 
considering the first and second building’s period as control periods.
Figure 8. Multi-linear plastic model.
üg
kplastic kelastic
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4.1 Software architecture
The analysis flow is controlled through an interactive graphical user interface (GUI) that allows 
for selection of an earthquake scenario in the virtual city (magnitude and epicenter location). 
Furthermore, the acceleration time history can be selected and processed in both North-South 
(NS) and East-West (EW) directions. In order to take into account the deamplification of the 
seismic excitation with the epicenter distance, the shear wave velocity in the upper most 
30 m (VS30) for the city of Turin is included in the data. The VS30 map has been obtained 
via USGS website (USGS, 2013) at the link http://earthquake.usgs.gov/hazards/apps/vs30/. 
The Boore-Atkinson (Boore and Atkinson, 2008) attenuation law is used to estimate the 
attenuation of the time history’s peaks. A Matlab function is provided for calculating distances 
between the selected epicenter and the center of the mass of each building. Moreover, the 
equivalent shear wave velocity is assessed according to the VS30 map, and considered in the 
attenuation model. 
The main Matlab function controls the building’s data flow, then the MCSs are carried out to 
evaluate the backbone curves for each building, considering the epistemic uncertainties in the 
input model parameters.
4.2. SAP2000 API
219 |
The SAP2000 Application Programming Interface (API) is a programming tool that offers 
efficient access to the analysis and design technology of the SAP2000 structural analysis 
software. A direct interaction with third-party applications is allowed during run-time analysis. 
The API software library provides access to a collection of objects and functions capable of 
remotely controlling the data exchange and setting data in SAP2000. Both pre- and post-
processing procedures are managed by a Matlab language code which mainly provides the 
two-way data exchange. This procedure is capable of significantly reducing the time needed 
for data exchange, especially for large data models.
Once the Matlab functions assess the nonlinear parameters (trilinear backbone curve) and the 
processed seismic input, they are transferred to SAP2000 through API tool. Due to the limited 
amount of detailed building information, the hysteresis is considered according to the Takeda 
model. Thus, the nonlinear time history analyses are performed in the SAP2000 environment 
and the derived output is remotely controlled by Matlab. Figure 9 shows in detail the software 
data flow used in the simulations.
Figure 9. Software data flow.
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According to the maximum drift, the structural damage is assessed for each building and 
the associated level of damage is evaluated (slight, moderate, extensive, complete). A 
3D visualization tool is also provided which shows the dynamic response of the building 
within the virtual city. This visualization tool can be helpful for monitoring and evacuation 
management in smart cities.
The proposed methodology has been applied to the virtual city and the results, in terms of 
displacements, are shown for a part of the city in Figure 10. A time history recorded during 
the Central Italy earthquake (Norcia station, PGA=0.42 g), in both horizontal directions, has 
been used as earthquake scenario for the simulation. The predicted real time response of 
buildings can help decision makers to monitor and manage the resources during emergency 
situations. 
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Figure 10. Displacement contours at four different time steps.
5. Conclusions
This paper deals with the development of different strategies for monitoring and control the 
emergency in urbanized areas. A new approach to implement dynamic time history analyses 
in a built environment of a virtual city is proposed. The virtual city has been designed based 
on the buildings stock for the city of Turin, Italy. All the characteristics of each residential 
building have been collected and organized in a complete database. The dynamic structural 
response has been simulated through a trilinear backbone curve through a nonlinear static 
approach for a MDOF system. The uncertainties on the building geometric and mechanical 
parameters have been taken into account through a MCS. Furthermore, an accurate selection 
and evaluation of the seismic input has been proposed. The dynamic response of the built 
environment have been carried out by SAP2000 software. 
A Matlab based software has been developed to control the input data and the SAP2000 
workflow through its Application Programming Interface. The post-processing is remotely 
controlled by Matlab, and the buildings’ damage level is estimated. Finally, a 3D visualization 
tool is also provided which shows the dynamic response of the building within the virtual city.
This procedure is capable to significantly reduce the time needed for data exchange 
especially for large data models. This methodology supports decision-maker to explore 
how their community responds to a disruptive event, quantify the performance of buildings 
following a hazard, and to plan the better resilience-building strategies to minimize the losses 
and recovery time.
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